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Glossary of Terms 
 
Disruptive innovation – an innovation, employing a ‘technology’ in management, 
marketing activities and investment policy which transforms information, labour, capital, and 
materials into products or services of greater value, which becomes the main goal of a 
company, and, as a consequence, fundamentally changes the established ‘rules of the game’ 
in many industries (Christensen, 1997). 
Business model describes the design or architecture of the value creation, delivery, and 
capture mechanisms it employs (Teece, 2010), or the organization’s way for creating value 
(Battistella, Biotto & De Toni, 2012). 
Business model innovation –  the generation of new value in an industry in value 
proposition, target market, value chain, revenue mechanisms, value network or ecosystem, 
and/ or competitive strategy (Chesbrough, 2007). Business model innovation is not only a 
modification of an existing product or service; it describes the development of a new activity 
system for the creation and capture of value (Amit & Zott, 2010). 
Response strategy – from the strategic perspective, it is seen as a direction (Grant, 
2016) and a cohesive response to an important challenge (Rumelt, 2011, quot. in Grant, 2016) 
towards a disruptive threat in a given industry. From the disruptive innovation perspective, it 
is about a competitive response, which is adjacent to growth (Christensen, 1997).  
Catalyst of disruption – shifts outside of a company’s direct control rather than 
company-made decisions related to enabling technologies, customer mindet, expectations and 
preferences, platforms, economy and macroeconomics, and public policies (Hagel, 2015). 
Human / managerial factors – ‘soft’, management-related factors, or variables, that 
have the strongest impact on understanding (or misunderstanding) the importance of an 
emerging threat, such as disruptive innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996; King & 
Baatartogtokh, 2015; Day & Lord, 1992; Vlaar, de Vries & Willenborg, 2005; Chesbrough, 
2001; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010). Human/ managerial factors, 
determining the choice of the response strategy by an incumbent company, engaged to 
disruptive innovation, include (but are not limited to) the following: Strategic direction/ 
vision, Non-autonomous (team) decision making, Risk propensity, Executives’ psychological 
and observable characteristics, Expertise and competency, and Managerial myopia.  
Structural/ organizational factors – ‘hard’ factors, or variables, that have the strongest 
impact on understanding (or misunderstanding) the importance of an emerging threat, such as 
disruptive innovation (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Sandström et 
al., 2009; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011). Structural/ organizational factors determinig the choice of 
the response strategy by an incumbent company engaged to disruptive innovation include (but 
are not limited to) the following: Value network, Heterogeneity, Investments, Resources, 
Organizational lethargy, Company structure, and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and 
policies. 
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Abbreviations 
 
TV – a/ the television.  
Analogue terrestrial television (ATT) is the primary TV technology that uses analog 
signals to transmit video and audio.  
Standard definition (SD) television (SDTV) supports DVB, ATSC, and ISDB 
broadcasting standards and is a TV system that uses not HD television (720p, 1080i, 1080p, 
1440p, 4K UHDTV, and 8K UHD) or enhanced-definition television (EDTV 480p) 
resolution.  
High definition (HD) television (HDTV) is a TV system having a relatively higher 
than SD image resolution. 
Digital terrestrial television/ Digital Video Broadcast – Terrestrial (DVB-T) / (DTT) 
/ (DTTV) is a technological advancement in respect to analog TV. DTTV broadcasts land-
based (terrestrial) signals. The DTTV is more efficient, provides better quality images, and 
offers lower operating costs for broadcast and transmission. 
Over-the-Top (OTT) video streaming platform, or system that transmits content to the 
viewer and comprises: content provider; the Internet used for transmission; a receiver having 
an Internet connection; a display device. Internet TV is a type of over-the-top content.  
Smart TV is a type of TV set with integrated Internet features, and is an example of 
technological convergence between computers and television sets. 
Video-On-Demand (VOD) is a system which allows customers to choose and watch/ 
listen to video or audio content when they want to, without a certain broadcasting time. IPTV 
technology allows delivering VOD to TVs and personal computers. 
IPTV operates in a closed network controlled by the local cable, satellite, telephone, or 
fiber firm.  
Subscription-based channels are diffused across various platforms and services: basic 
cable services, digital services in cable, fiber, landlines and satellite services across the 
country. 
Pay-TV refers to subscription-based TV services mostly providing analog, digital cable, 
satellite, digital terrestrial and internet television. Subscription-based TV started in the era of 
multi-channel transition.  
Pay-per-view is a type of pay-TV service when a TV service subscriber can purchase 
content to view through a private telecast. The TV service provider broadcasts the chosen 
event at the same time to everyone who purchased it. It is reverse to VOD systems which 
allow customers to watch recorded broadcasts at any convenient time. 
Free-TV refers to a free of charge television broadcasting service. 
Interactive television (iTV) is a TV form of media convergence adding data services 
to traditional television technology, including VOD content, online shopping, internet 
banking, etc. 
FIC – a multinational TV network, FOX International Channels. 
LNK – Free independent channel (lt. Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas). 
BMI – the abbreviation for business model innovation. 
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Introduction 
 
Disruptive technologies and business models are fundamentally changing the 
established ‘rules of the game’ in many industries and in different economic contexts. The 
incumbent firms are often confronted with ‘innovator’s dilemma’ between monetizing on its 
current business and/ or creating a new source of future growth. The latter is often in conflict 
with the first. Thus, finding an adequate response in case of ‘innovator’s dilemma’ becomes 
a matter of survival to companies touched by disruptive innovation.  
As technology-driven processes urge for business model innovation, the real challenge 
for TV broadcasters is how to reconfigure and reinvent value in the digital domain (Küng, 
2008; Picard, 2004). But the question is, who is really disrupting whom? For instance, Internet 
TV is following the classic case of the ‘innovator’s dilemma’ – the most fundamental driver 
of the Internet destruction of industries, and the mass adoption of Internet video has already 
taken place (Suster, 2011; Wolff, 2014). Controversially, Wolff (2014) has argued that the 
new TV was disrupting the Internet. 
Hence, in the TV industry, the digitalization and technological convergence have 
facilitated a shift away from the classical vertically integrated model, in which content had its 
corresponding infrastructure and transportation protocol into the converged layer model 
mapping the common horizontal activities of the communications industries’ value chains. 
As digitalization blurs boundaries between previously distinct access networks (audiovisual 
content is delivered along various transmission networks and platforms, such as cable, 
satellite, terrestrial, internet-based, mobile, etc. (Küng, 2008; Storsul & Stuedahl, 2007)) and 
technologies (in media, telecom and computing), industry architectures and business models 
previously used within this converged media ecosystem are experiencing transformations 
(Chan Olmsted & Kang, 2003).  
Based on the above mentioned notions it is suggested that a disruptive innovation 
requires an adequate response in terms of a business model and/ or a strategy itself. In 
addition, it is also important to know what factors underlie the choice of a specific response 
strategy to disruptive innovation. Media industry and TV broadcasters in particular are 
affected by disruptive innovations (due to digitalization and convergence), and local firms 
(e.g., local TV broadcasters) face specific challenges when embracing global disruptive 
change. Thus, this research seeks to determine what factors cause the strategic choices of local 
incumbent TV broadcaster in response to global disruptive innovation. 
Constituting a part of the global TV industry, local TV broadcasters to some extent are 
experiencing the same disruptive innovations. Small open economies like Lithuania, having 
overall stable and transparent institutional and market environment and being open for foreign 
trade, have specific market regulations fostering the establishment of new entrants and not 
protecting the incumbents’ market leadership (OECD, 2016). This condition allows tougher 
market competition and, therefore, raises scientific questions about a local Lithuanian 
incumbent TV broadcasters’ response strategy to global disruptive innovation and the factors 
that determine the latter choice. Indeed, the country context, Lithuania in this specific case, is 
a very important aspect not only in terms of competition, but also in terms of the response 
strategies and factors. Even in the Baltic States, the competitive environment in the TV 
industry is different in every country (e.g., the monopolistic TV market in Latvia), not to 
mention the Western countries and the rest of the world. While the mainstream literature 
analyzes generic response strategies and factors in the light of disruptive innovation, the 
context is generally left behind. Thus, the current research attempts to point out the 
importance of the context-specific, incumbent Lithuanian companies’ response strategies and 
factors based on the literature analysis, data analysis, global and local case analysis. 
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Even though the existing research largely focuses on disruptive innovation in general 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000;  Markides, 2006; Georgantzas et al. 2005; 
Yovanof & Hazapis, 2008; Yu & Hang, 2010), technological convergence (Bores et al., 2003) 
or transformation (Medina & Ojer-Goñi, 2012), first-mover vs. second-mover incumbents 
(Zhou, 2002; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010), response strategies and 
influencing factors (Christensen, 1997; Charitou & Markides, 2003; Sandström et al., 2009; 
Viellechner & Wulf, 2010) towards disruptive innovation, value networks in the context of 
disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997; 2003; Tesfaye & Nguyen, 2012; Evens, 2010), TV 
industry as an innovative sector (Worlock, 2007; EY, 2013; Friedrichsen & Muhl-
Benninghaus, 2013; Jennes & Van den Broeck, 2014; Jenner, 2014), and disruptive 
innovation in TV industry (Benson, 2007; Sarkis, 2009; Storsul & Krumsvik, 2013) it can be 
stated that the combination of both subject matters, that is, lack of scientific research and 
empirical data analyzing factors determine the choice of the response strategy to disruptive 
innovation by local incumbent TV broadcasters. 
 
Context of research problem: research gap 
The phenomenon of ‘disruption’ is more complex and diverse than claimed by 
Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation. The researchers diverge as to what repertoire 
of ‘innovator solutions’ is available to the incumbent firms. Christensen (1997) claims that 
(1) creating a new business unit, or (2) sustaining innovation is the solution. Charitou & 
Markides (2003) highlight the following solutions: (1) focusing on and investing in the 
traditional business, (2) ignoring the innovation, (3) disrupting the disruption, (4) adopting 
the innovation by playing both games at once, or (5) embracing the innovation completely 
and scaling it up.  
Moreover, the foundations of the disruption and disruptive innovation can be tracked in 
the institutional theory (e.g., Zucker, 1987), which in the very essence is similar to the 
contemporary Hagel’s (2015) concept ‘patterns of disruption’ comprising technological, 
platform, customer, economic and policy paradigms. The latter institutional theory links 
institutional perspective to political, social and legal grounds for the rules of the game and 
comprises production, exchange and distribution activities (North, 1990; Davis & North, 
1971), or that institutions influence the way individuals and societies think based on cultural 
and political systems (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012; Zucker, 1987). Therefore, the linkage 
between institutional theory and response strategies to disruptive innovation exists as the 
institutions shape the political, social, and economic environment by setting background in 
the era of uncertainty. However, roughly called ‘external environment’ is not perceived as the 
only factor determining the response strategy in this research. In the research of other 
prerequisites, or factors, it is to note that the scientific literature provides not much evidence 
of which factors and variables determine the choice of specific response strategies towards 
disruptive innovation under different circumstances. Moreover, the analysis of the 
aforementioned aspects is lacking in different industrial contexts, e.g., TV broadcasting 
industry. Put differently, there is no sufficient theoretical and empirical research linking the 
TV broadcasting industry and the adoption of a response strategy by local incumbent firms 
engaged to global disruptions and the factors that underlie their choices (e.g., what is the 
difference in response strategy to disruption by local vs. global TV industry players? What 
does it depend on?). So, the key research question is what factors determine the choice of 
response strategy to disruptive innovation by incumbent firms in the TV broadcasting 
industry.  
The theoretical relevance of this research is based on testing the theory in practice by 
modifying, expanding, and amplifying it and proposing new insights on disruptive innovation, 
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small open economies, strategic management, business model theories, and, at the same time, 
linking the latter theoretical approaches to specific industrial TV broadcasting context. From 
the managerial point of view based on the empirically tested research model, the investigation 
provides strategic patterns, insights and beneficial notions for incumbent TV broadcasting 
companies engaged in disruptive innovation. 
 
The aim of the research is to reveal the factors determining the response strategy of 
local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovation. 
 
Research objectives: 
1. To conceptualize the diversity of response strategies of incumbent firms to disruptive 
innovation; 
2. To conceptualize the key factors (and their combinations) that underlie the choice of 
response strategies of incumbent firms to disruptive innovation; 
3. To design research methodology for the analysis of different factors shaping 
incumbent firm strategies in face of disruptive innovation; 
4. To reveal what factors (and their combinations) determine the choice of response 
strategy by local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovations. 
 
Research object is the factors behind response strategies. 
 
Methods of the research: analysis of scientific literature, multiple case analysis, 
within-case analysis, data analysis, semi-structured interview, content analysis. 
 
The research consists of the following parts: firstly, on the basis of relevant scientific 
literature, the concept of disruptive innovation is presented, the role of disruptive innovation 
in the generic strategy discourse is highlighted, and the diversity of response strategies of 
incumbent firms to disruptive innovation is analysed. Secondly, the nature and type of 
disruption is discussed, in the light of the presentation of key human/ managerial and 
structural/ organizational factors as well as their combinations and the choices of response 
strategies of incumbent firms to disruptive innovation. The latter concepts are integrated in a 
theoretical conceptual framework. Thirdly, having analyzed the factors shaping incumbent 
firm strategies in the phase of disruptive innovation, the research methodology is designed. 
The chosen research cases have been created by conducting semi-structured interviews and 
conducting content analysis. Fourthly, based on the global pilot research and local multiple 
cases, the factors and their combinations determining the choice of response strategies by 
local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovations are revealed, and the 
conceptual framework is adjusted. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are provided. 
 
Theoretical research implications: 
1. Context-wise, the current research higlights the specifics and the importance of 
incumbent Lithuanian firms’ response strategies and factors in the light of disruptive 
innovation, providing the valuable context-related notions to extend the existing 
theory on topic. Moreover, context application provides theory extention from the 
global case analysis as well and enables to ground the novelty of the latter research. 
2. The results of the research suggest to explain more in depth, but not to expand the 
existing theory of disruptive innovation for business and, therefore, help companies 
confront the ‘innovator’s dilemma’ between monetizing on its current business and/ 
or creating a new source of future growth.  
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3. Based on the research findings, it is suggested to amplify the existing scientific 
notions on Business modelling literature by linking it closer to disruptive perspective: 
to catalysts of disruption and to factors behind response strategies when facing a 
disruption. 
4. Based on the latter research insights, strategic management literature and response 
strategies undoubtedly have to be linked to the first mover and the second mover 
perspectives as strategy crosscutters. 
5. An integrated research framework has been prepared and tested based on the above 
mentioned theoretical insights. In the context of disruptive innovation, the latter 
framework incorporates and links the following theoretical constructs: Catalysts of 
disruption, Response strategies and Human/ managerial & Structural/ organizational 
factors. 
 
Practical research implications: 
1. The integrated research framework can be used as an integral instrument to reveal the 
Response strategies and Human/ managerial & Structural/ organizational factors in 
the TV broadcasting industry, also, it can be adapted to other, disruption-intense 
creative industries. In addition, the latter framework allows companies to identify 
disruptive market threats and choose an adequate response strategy based on the most 
important company-specific factors. 
2. The disclosed Human/ managerial & Structural/ organizational factors allow TV 
broadcasting industry companies to, firstly, identify the factors which are relevant in 
specific cases and, secondly, to set an appropriate response strategy to global 
disruptive innovation.  
3. The results of the research also allow local incumbent TV broadcasting companies to 
evaluate whether the response disruptive global innovation – the launch of an Internet 
TV – will pay off, based on all the local broadcasting companies’ experience. 
4. The company cases can be used in the study process. 
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1. Disruptive innovation and strategies of incumbent firms: conceptual 
background and linkages 
 
In this part, the theoretical concept of disruptive innovation is presented by linking its 
basic notions to the strategy discourse and business modelling literature, and to response 
strategies in case of incumbent companies in theory and practical examples.  
 
1.1. Concept of disruptive innovation: C. Christensen’s theory, its criticism 
and adaptations 
 
The first notion of disruptive innovation was presented to public in 1995 by Clayton M. 
Christensen, and in 1997 the scholar presented his book on the topic. The latter book, ‘The 
Innovator’s Dilemma’ (1997) highlights that even the successful firms operating correctly in 
the market risk to lose market leadership and fail when new entrants take over the market. 
After the introduction of the theory, many scholars (see Christensen & Overdof, 2000; 
Charitou & Markides, 2003; Georgantzas, Peeva, & Weinberg, 2005; Markides, 2006; 
Benson, 2007; Sandström, Magnusson & Jörnmark, 2009; Viellechner & Wolf, 2010; Madjdi 
& Hüsig, 2011; Tesfaye & Nguyen, 2012; Hagel, 2015) and consulting companies (e.g., BCG 
Perspectives, 2016; BCG, 2016) have continuously conducted investigations on the topic, or 
contra the topic (e.g., Denning, 2015; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Denning, 2016a/2016b). 
By referring to specific industrial contexts, Benson (2007) analyzed the disruptive changes in 
the media industry; Iordanova & Cunningham (2012) presented digital disruption in cinema; 
Jennes & Van den Broeck (2014) analyzed digital TV innovations; Sarkis (2009) presented 
disruptive innovations in telecommunications industry; Wolff (2014) argued whether the new 
TV was disrupting the Internet.  
According to the generalist theory of disruptive innovation, based on multiple industry 
cases, Christensen (1997) advocated the need of diverse understanding of innovation in 
business. Indeed, Christensen (1997) argued, that only ‘good management’ was not enough 
for business success. In fact, it was one of the main reasons companies failed and could not 
lead the market. Paradoxically, the author points out, that the investigated firms lost their 
position in the market because they listened to their customers, invested much in innovative 
technologies that should have provided the desired products, and also because the companies 
investigated industry trends and continuously put investment capital to innovative solutions, 
that were expected to bring best return on investment. And even if the management of a 
company is highly effective, Christensen (1997) claims, these principles may have been 
forgotten, ignored, or fought back in the investigated companies. Therefore, it is not enough 
to be efficient, it is essential to understand the key principles of disruptive innovation and 
manage innovatively. Indeed, Fisher (2001) agrees, that a company can seem to doing 
everything correctly: dialoguing to its users, investing in R&D, competing boldly, and still 
fail due to a new technology or a business model that at first seemed irrelevant. Business cases 
provide many examples of such leadership loss: Digital Equipment vs. the PC; Sears, Roebuck 
& Co vs. Wal-Mart Stores, etc. In addition, other business cases give an idea that some 
industry giants fail not even because of a challenging competitor but because of the new 
entrant with lower-quality solutions. 
Therefore, the theory of disruptive innovation can be applied to various industrial 
contexts: from high-tech to low-tech, and from lagging to rapidly changing environments. 
Given the fact that all companies possess technologies, Christensen (1997) highlights that the 
role of technology encompasses the transformation of information, labour, capital, and 
materials into products or services of greater value, and it becomes the main goal of a 
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company. Thus, when talking about innovation in ‘technology’ in the disruptive innovation 
theory, a broader context should be taken into consideration comprising such areas as 
management, marketing activities and investment policy. 
It is generally presumed that as companies become bigger and more successful, they 
tend to reduce risk and ignore innovation. However, the theory of disruptive innovation 
suggests that it is not the case. Indeed, industry giants often adopt sustaining technologies, or 
innovation, that often influence performance breakthroughs. Christensen (1997) advocates, 
that the adoption of a sustaining technology, or innovation, helps leading companies to create 
better results for their customers. Differently, a disruptive innovation, or technology, allows 
creating products and services which are not targeted to the main pool of customers. 
Therefore, mainly companies ignore disruptive innovations for rational reasons as the profit 
margins seem to be low for their businesses.  
Denning (2016a) describes different kinds of disruptions going on in the industry. 
Recent investigations have been made about how the trajectories of technological 
improvement differ in various markets. It is highlighted that within some industries the latter 
innovation trajectory is very steep, e.g., in the disk drive industry where after some years a 
company gets eliminated. On the contrary, there are other industries where the trajectory of 
innovation is gentler, e.g., in discount retailing. And, finally, in other cases, the trajectory is 
flat, as it was historically in higher education prior to online learning. Quoting Christensen, 
Denning (2016a) argues that the latter differences have important implications for disruption. 
If the trajectory is flat, disruption does not occur. On the other hand, innovative technologies 
and business models can cause evident changes in markets where disruption has not yet 
occurred. Considering the impact Airbnb has made to the hotel industry, it can be called a 
classic example of disruptive innovation. Airbnb launched its services targeting low-end 
users, who could not afford a hotel or could not pick one in the overstocked market. At the 
beginning, it was not perceived as a threat to hotels, but, over time, Airbnb has moved 
upmarket, providing upper-level housing opportunities. 
Despite the theory’s practical and theoretical importance and recognition in business 
and academia, it is also important to highlight that the theory of disruptive innovation has also 
received criticism.  
An interesting aspect found in the article written by King & Baatartogtokh (2015) 
suggests, that it was obvious from the beginning that not all companies are being disrupted in 
the Christensen’s classic pattern. Indeed, King & Baatartogtokh (2015) argue, that there are 
many alternative factors influencing the disruption, like shifting economies of scale, first-
mover advantage, legacy costs, etc., and that there are no universal rules in business. In the 
research implemented by Denning (2015), it was presented how managers generally think and 
act, and how they act under a serious competitive threat. Based on the empirical results of 
Denning’s (2015) study, 39% of the experts disputed Christensen’s disruptive innovation 
theory that incumbent companies were able to respond to the emerged disruptive innovation 
accordingly. To put it differently, some companies gave up because a common reaction is to 
give up and die as a business. Therefore, according to King & Baatartogtokh (2015), it is 
essential for companies to have a capability to implement the disruptive innovation, or change. 
Another critical point regarding the theory of disruptive innovation, according to King & 
Baatartogtokh (2015), is that companies demonstrate inability to innovate. The latter critical 
point is in line with Porter et al.’s (2013) research on U.S. international competitiveness. 
According to Porter et al.’s (2013) investigation, the new workplaces in the U.S. have mostly 
been created in local business, which decreases the country’s international potential. In order 
to reveal how the U.S. companies are losing the ability compete internationally, the quality of 
management has been named as one of the most important problems. Interestingly, when 
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asked if the business managers saw the poor quality of their own management, the answer 
was no. On the contrary, the managers named their management practices as strongly 
improving. The latter fact illustrates the contradiction that even though the U.S. businesses 
are perceived as unable to compete internationally, still, management is perceived to be 
strong. Based on Porter et al.’s (2013) insights, King & Baatartogtokh (2015) suggest that the 
main value of disruptive innovation theory can only be perceived as a warning to industries. 
They indeed claim, that the theory of disruptive innovation provides a useful understanding 
about managerial myopia. The experts having participated in King & Baatartogtokh’s (2015) 
research have noted cases of managers who overlooked or misunderstood the emerging threat. 
Thus, the theory of disruptive innovation can be perceived as a useful reminder of how 
to reduce managerial myopia by testing assumptions and capturing information. However, the 
real issue is how to deal with a warning. Action-wise, King & Baatartogtokh (2015) suggest 
the implementation of better analysis and a fast retreat. Before the chosen response to 
disruptive innovation, it is though important to evaluate whether the industry itself continues 
to be the right place to compete. In case an industry becomes unattractive to compete in, 
companies should plan an organized retreat. Another response for incumbent firms is named 
as collaboration with other companies. King & Baatartogtokh (2015) found evidence in 
several cases that incumbent firms saw potential to work with new entrants.  
In the essence, the disruptive innovation theory cannot be and is not aimed at replacing 
careful analysis and evaluating difficult business choices. Indeed, better responses towards 
innovation are to discontinue running business with a defensive, inwardly-focused, 
hierarchical bureaucracy and concentrate on continuous customer-focused innovation. 
Recently, Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015), published an article providing 
counterarguments and explaining what really a disruptive innovation is, according to the 
scholars. Essentially, the theory of disruptive innovation, introduced in 1995, refers to the 
way of thinking regarding innovation-driven growth. Many managers and executives from 
small, entrepreneurial companies, as well as big companies’ representors, e.g., Intel, Southern 
New Hampshire University, and Salesforce.com faced the importance of the theory. However, 
the theory of disruptive innovation to some extent was misunderstood or interpreted in the 
wrong manner. In addition, some core principles of the theory have been overshadowed by 
the popularity of the primary formulation during the past few decades causing criticism for 
shortcomings that have already been presented. According to Christensen, Raynor & 
McDonald (2015), the term ‘disruption’ has been used widely and loosely talking about many 
innovations, and thus supporting an imprecise statement. In fact, many scholars and 
consultants use the concept of ‘disruptive innovation’ to indicate any situation in which a 
chosen industry is facing breakthroughs, or previously successful incumbent firms are facing 
difficulties. Interestingly, the authors start with exploring the basic principles of disruptive 
innovation and examining whether they apply to, for instance, Uber (as it has been taken as a 
case of disruptive innovation by many scholars, e.g. Hagel, 2015; Chase, 2016, etc.). 
Secondly, the common pitfalls in the theory’s application have been pointed out and explained 
(see the figure below), how these arise, and why the use of the correct theoretical approach 
matters. Lastly, based on a case, the scholars highlight the major turning-points about how to 
predict whether the businesses will grow or fail. In order to illustrate the latter path, 
Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015) claim, that (1) disruptive innovations arise in low-
end or completely new markets, and (2) disruptive innovations do not target mainstream 
customers at first; it becomes a threat to incumbents when the quality is in line with the 
customer’s standards. To explain this theory in more detail, Christensen, Raynor & McDonald 
(2015) highlight some common points that usually lack attention or get misunderstood.  
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First, disruption is perceived as a process. It is stated that generally every innovation, 
including disruptive innovation, starts as a small-scale experiment. Disrupters, or new 
entrants, tend to focus on adopting the business model, and not only the product or service. 
If succeeded, they move from the low end of the market towards the mainstream market and 
become a threat to incumbents’ market share and their profitability. Since this is a long-taking 
process, generally incumbents find creative response strategies throughout the time. For 
instance, Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015) provide an example that there are many 
mainstream retail firms operating in their traditional old department-store manner despite the 
actions of disruptors (discount department stores in this case). Scholars argue, that the 
complete substitution, if possible at all, can take decades. For companies, it takes time to 
rethink of their current profit-generating old business model and adapt it for the new emerging 
market needs.  
Second, as a consequence, new entrants often adopt business models that are different 
from those of incumbents. Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015) provide an example from 
the health care industry: many contemporary convenient care clinics are choosing a disruptive 
direction and adopting a ‘process’ business model which allows them to diagnose and heal an 
increasing number of disorders by following standardized protocols. 
Third, it is important to stress that some disruptive innovations succeed, while some do 
not. Therefore, Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015) claim that companies make a 
common mistake by thinking that disruption by virtue is a key to success and by focusing too 
much on the results obtained. It is stressed that the company’s success is not built into the 
concept of disruption and not all disruptive paths leads to it. In addition, not every successful 
new entrant follows the disruptive direction either. An example from the internet-based retail 
market which took a disruptive path in the 1990’s illustrates that only a small number of these 
companies became competitive. Therefore, it is highlighted that the occurring failures cannot 
be perceived as evidence of the deficiencies of the disruptive innovation theory. Moreover, 
these business cases are only boundary markers for the application of the latter theory. 
Lastly, according to Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015), the idea of ‘disrupt or 
be disrupted’, if wrongly interpreted, might become deceiving. The scholars highlight that 
incumbent firms do need to respond to disruption by all means, because they might lose 
a profitable business. Instead, firms should focus on developing relationships with their core 
customers by investing in sustaining innovations. As a proper response strategy, according to 
Christensen, Raynor & McDonald (2015), a company might create a new unit focused only 
on the market growth opportunities arising from the disruptive innovation. Indeed, the latter 
research suggests that the success of the adoption of disruptive innovation depends on 
keeping it apart from the core business. In the essence, structure-wise, it indicates an 
incumbent to operate in two very different paths. 
However, even different from Christensen’s understanding, new adaptations of the 
theory are still very popular in the contemporary academic papers. For instance, Denning 
(2016b) presents his approach to disruptive innovation and adds that the term ‘disruption’ is 
one of the most overused terms in contemporary business literature. The way Hagel (2015) 
perceives the disruptive innovation concept is this: in order to be a true disruption, it has 
to exclude the leading incumbents in a particular industry. Therefore, to his mind, it is 
not sufficient to companies to take the risk or to add pressure to the market; it is about the 
capability to change the rules of the game in a given industry. Hagel’s (2015) approach seems 
to have some differences from Clayton Christensen’s approach, starting with the definition of 
the concept, the ‘disruption’. According to Hagel’s (2015) research, there are certain types, 
or patterns of disruption that are perceived as threats for more than one industry, but at the 
same time, not for all industries. Hence, the author presents nine patterns of disruption, 
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their peculiarities and the way of doing business in a disruptive environment dealing with 
incumbent market players.  
Next to innovative theory adaptations, Chase (2016) argues that the theory of disruptive 
innovation should be expanded and bases his assumptions on business cases. Christensen, 
Raynor, and McDonald argue that Uber is not disruptive because it offers neither a low-end 
service, nor establishes a new market. By using this lens, Chase (2016) agrees that Uber is 
basically a taxi service with a well-developed application that took the dispatch function out 
of the traditional taxi services. Indeed, this was not a disruption. But what Chase (2016) sees 
absolutely disruptive was when Uber adopted Lyft’s model. The model enabled ordinary 
people to drive their own cars as taxis, as the UberX service in particular. The disruptive 
innovation is perceived in tapping excess capacity and making money from using one’s own 
car. The notion of the aforementioned excess capacity is missing in the definition offered by 
Christensen. Chase (2016) advocates that Uber offered the market a way to take advantage of 
already existing assets that have had been paid for but from which new value proposition 
derives. According to Chase (2016), this is how Uber has disrupted the market of taxi services 
and has been growing exponentially, currently operating in 68 countries of the world. 
Then, Chase (2016) questions Christensen, Raynor, and McDonald’s (2015) notion that 
the Apple Inc., was disruptive by launching iPhone. Chase (2016) highlights that the 
achievement has been made not merely through product innovation, but also by the adoption 
of an innovative business model. With the creation of a value network, connecting 
application developers with end users, Apple has changed the rules of the game. In addition, 
Chase (2016) describes the whole business case from a different perspective, from the excess 
capacity point of view. iOS is perceived as a platform for participation that gathered the excess 
capacity available in users’ iPhones, as well as in the previously unexplored imaginations of 
app developers, who worked on their own time. As a result, the disruption is perceived as the 
harnessing of excess capacity led to more than 2 million applications being developed in less 
than seven years, some even adopted by users at outstanding rates. One of the application 
examples, given by Chase (2016), is the phenomenal growth of WhatsApp. Counting 400 
million customers within its first three years and doubling in five years of operation would 
have been impossible if users had been required to purchase a new device. And even though 
Chase (2016) considers Christensen’s argumentation and the classic theory of disruptive 
innovation as important, it is still inquired if the author was not missing the notion of the ‘new 
disruption’.  
To conclude, a disruptive innovation is perceived as an innovation, employing a 
‘technology’ in management, marketing activities and investment policy, which transforms 
information, labour, capital, and materials into products or services of greater value, which 
becomes the main goal of a company, and, as a consequence, fundamentally changes the 
established ‘rules of the game’ in many industries. The latter notions regarding the changing 
rules imply that a disruption affects transformations in a given company’s business model. 
Therefore, in the next paragraph, it is important to discuss how business models and disruptive 
innovations are interrelated by considering managerial as well as technological perspectives. 
 
1.2. Disruptive innovation in the general strategy discourse 
 
The linkage between an organization and its environment is a primary component of 
strategic management (Rabin, Miller & Hildreth, 2000), and strategic sense making is the key 
organizational cognition-action processes of environmental scanning, interpretation and 
associated responses (quot. Thomas et al., 1993), or strategic analysis, strategic choice, 
and strategy implementation, as Grant (2016) suggests. Scanning in this context means the 
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search of the external environment events or issues that possibly affect the company. This 
draws attention to analyze environmental uncertainty as a source of disruption. The scientific 
literature of strategic management suggests that the term ‘uncertainty’ can be divided in two 
categories, such as perceived environmental uncertainty and decision making under 
uncertainty (Rabin, Miller & Hildreth, 2000). As disruptive innovation often emerges due to 
some catalysts in the environment, it is crucial to link and develop the discussion comprising 
three concepts: strategic management, uncertainty and disruptive innovation. The more 
turbulent and disruptive is the environment, the more responsive and flexible the company’s 
strategy should be (Grant, 2016). 
Hagel (2015) suggests, that in order to avert disruption for incumbents, it is essentially 
important to see it coming. Therefore, (1) understanding the shape new disruptions are likely 
to assume (patterns of disruption); (2) understanding what particular response strategies the 
industry should adopt; and (3) understanding what external factors will act as catalysts of 
disruption, is crucial. By having this understanding, companies engaged to disruptive 
innovation can start not only to anticipate the environmental changes, but also transform the 
‘unexpected’ into ‘expected’ and get the competitive advantage. Indeed, a strategy could be a 
matter of (Henderson, 1989; McGrath & McMillan, 1995; Porter, 1996; Prahalad & Hamel, 
2006; Ovens, 2015): 
 Seeking a single ideal competitive position in an industry; 
 Benchmarking and adopting best practices; 
 Aggressive outsourcing and partnering to improve efficiencies; 
 Focusing on a few key success factors, critical resources, and core competencies; 
 Rapidly responding to ever-evolving competitive and market changes. 
 
Moreover, in the light of disruptive innovation research, a strategy of  a company  is  
perceived  as  an  integrated,  overarching  concept (Stankevice  &  Jucevicius, 2010) of  how  
the company will achieve its objectives and certain goals (Grant, 2016) and responds to ever-
evolving competitive and market changes (Ovans, 2015; Porter, 1996; McGrath & McMillan, 
1995).  Therefore, a strategy is seen not as a plan, but as a direction (Grant, 2016). Strategy 
is also perceived as a cohesive response to an important challenge (Rumelt, 2011, quot. in 
Grant, 2016), and therefore, the term response strategy is the most related to this research. 
A strategic choice, on the other hand, is defined as the selection of the best possible course of 
action based on the evaluation of your available strategic options; therefore, a strategy can be 
perceived as a decision support. Thus, the main components of strategy, as a direction (Grant, 
2016), could be named as: vision statement, mission statement, performance goals, guidelines 
for development, priorities for capital expenditure, R&D, growth modes (organic growth, 
M&A, alliances).  
Researchers (e.g., Teece, 2010, Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010) highlight that a 
strategy can be also related to other, more specific business-related concepts. In fact, 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2010) argue that a reflection of a company’s realized strategy 
can be illustrated by a business model. More generic than a strategy, a business model can be 
linked to several strategies capturing value from innovation, according to Teece (2010). 
Hence, a shift from a general strategy to a business model research explains market behavior, 
industry competition, innovation, and sources of competitive advantage. The latter notions 
allow to ground the importance of the business model analysis in the strategy and response 
strategy discourse. 
As Battistella, Biotto & De Toni (2012) state, companies and their business models are 
always in transition, carrying meanings based on the path that they made. And although a 
business model, as mentioned before, is the organization’s way towards creating value, 
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companies do need to transform models as the core logic for explicating how a firm will be 
able to generate profit and how will it change over time (Najmaei, 2011) considering 
disruptive market changes. While literature investigates how value and meaning can be 
communicated to the internal part of the organization, some works (Chesbrough, 2007) 
identify how the innovation of the business model can generate new value in an industry (in 
value proposition, target market, value chain, revenue mechanisms, value network or 
ecosystem, competitive strategy). Only a few researches exist on how new meanings can 
shape a new business model and therefore be conveyed to the external part of the company. 
In other words, a business model innovation is not only a modification of an existing product 
or service; it describes the creation and development of a new activity system for the creation 
and capture of value (Amit & Zott, 2010) creating a totally new set of customer value and 
wealth (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004). Moreover, a business model innovation makes the 
competition irrelevant (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004) if the innovative business model takes place 
in an entirely new competitive direction (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005, quot. in Najmaei, 
2011) or operates in an existing one through radical changes in established paradigms 
(Markides, 1997; Hamel & Valikangas 2003, quot. in Najmaei, 2011) or, alternatively, takes 
a hybrid form. As Najmaei (2011) explains further, given these descriptions, the logic and 
dynamism of business model innovation necessitates a specific set of interrelated parts that 
not only create and capture the value based on an existing business model but also opens ways 
to diagnose, re-design, improve or transform models. Consisting of various parts, or 
components (according to Mitchell & Coles, 2004; Clear Channel, 2004; Loewe & Chen, 
2007), these components are the who, what, why, how, and how much, and a business model 
innovation means changing a minimum four of them. In this case, an innovative business 
model can mean (Mitchell & Coles, 2004; Clear Channel, 2004): 
 altering prices to make customers buy more. This can sometimes even create the 
perception that you are providing more for less; 
 offering additional products/ services without increasing prices. This will benefit the 
customer and help to expand sales, as the ‘extras’ will persuade existing customers to 
buy more and lure new customers; 
 reducing operating costs of the firm, the customers or other end users; 
 combining solutions to help customers grow the market faster. 
 
The more of these processes that can be incorporated into the model, the greater the 
scope for advantage (Clear Channel, 2004).  So the value lies also in discovering new or 
applying different business models, or, as mentioned before, implementing a business model 
innovation. Business model innovation creates value for the business by establishing a 
sustainable competitive advantage in defined markets (Battistella, Biotto & De Toni; Pohle & 
Chapman, 2006; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Markides, 1999). Giesen, Berman & Bell 
et al. (2007) identified three main types of business model innovation: innovation in industry 
models, in revenue models and in enterprise models: 
 Industry model: The latter model involves innovating the ‘industry value chain’ and 
it can be accomplished via horizontal moves into new industries. An example of an 
industry model is the Virgin company that has expanded its business from music and 
retail industries into airlines, railways, beverages, financial services, etc., thus 
leveraging its superior skills in consumer management. This industry model refers 
also to redefining existing industries as Dell has done by eliminating intermediaries 
and reaching customers directly, or as Apple has done by delivering music to users 
via iTunes. Most drastical industry model innovation involves the development of 
entirely new industries or industry segments as Google and other Internet search 
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engine companies have done in the past decades. This dimension leverages white 
spaces in the competitive environment as well as unique assets. 
 Revenue model: The latter approach involves innovations in how firms generate 
revenue by reconfiguring offerings (product/ service/ value mix) and/ or by 
introducing new pricing models. This dimension influences customer experience, 
choices and preferences, and can also leverage new technologies. An example is 
given based on Cirque du Soleil’s experience on reconfiguring new and old elements 
related to value proposition regarding the circus experience, and thus, targeting new 
audience. An example of a pricing innovation is Gillette’s strategy of underpricing 
razors to sell razor blades. Also, Netflix’s introduction of a movie rental option, and 
other similar digitized music or movie industry examples, based on monthly 
subscription offerings can be named as revenue model innovations. 
 Enterprise model: The latter model involves innovating the structure of a company 
and the role it plays in new or existing value chains. The aforementioned innovation 
focuses on redefining organizational boundaries and can be achieved through 
integration. An example of the Japanese keiretsu corporate groups/ structures, where 
what might typically be a supply chain is owned and managed by one firm or 
conglomerate is provided to present the logic of an enterprise model innovation. In 
the clothing retail industry, company Zara manages design of clothes by creating 
feedback loops from customer data at stores. Enterprise model innovation can also be 
achieved via specializing on core competencies or high-margin activities and 
outsourcing the rest (example of an Indian telecommunications company Bharti 
Airtel, which focuses on marketing, sales and distribution, and outsources IT and 
networking services), or via networking, when companies rely on external 
collaboration along the value chain, as the company Illy does. 
 
Interestingly, having an intention to facilitate technological innovation and the 
management of technology, firms view the business model itself as a source of innovation 
(Mitchell & Coles, 2003), often named a key to company performance. Two complementary 
ideas seem to sustain the notion. The first is linked to the fact that companies commercialize 
innovative solutions and technologies through their business models. The second is that the 
business model represents a new subject of innovation which complements process, product, 
and organizational innovation by involving new forms of cooperation and collaboration (Zott, 
Amit & Massa, 2011). Hence, a business model innovation itself can be a pathway to 
competitive advantage if the model is sufficiently differentiated and hard to replicate for 
incumbents and new entrants alike (Teece, 2010). By following this approach, in this research, 
business models are seen from a technological, as well as from a managerial innovation point 
of view, as in Cristensen’s (1997) disruptive innovation theory. 
 
‘Hard’ innovation: Technological innovation 
Technological innovation is lionized in most technologically progressive societies as it 
is a natural and desirable reflection of the society values. Technological innovations, mostly 
ICTs, have been particularly important and fast growing over the last decades (Chapman, 
Soosay & Kandampully, 2003). Technological innovation often needs to be aligned to a 
business model innovation if the innovator is willing to capture new value: a technological 
innovation creates both the need to bring discoveries to market and the opportunity to satisfy 
unrequited customer needs (Teece, 2010; Battistella, Biotto & De Toni, 2012), so basically 
technological innovation often leads to the creation of new products or services (Chapman, 
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Soosay & Kandampully, 2003). At the same time, new business models can be perceived as 
a form of innovation (Teece, 2010; Battistella, Biotto & De Toni, 2012). 
Proponents of business model innovations suggest that new technology and innovative 
business practices provide the potential for organizational efficiency gains that are variously 
referred to as improvements in (Chapman, Soosay & Kandampully, 2003): 
 value (Porter, 1985); 
 quality of service production and delivery (Parasuraman & Grewal, 2000); 
 R&D cost-efficiency (Rao, 2001); 
 transaction costs (Garicano, Kaplan & 2001); 
 productivity, inventory, and demand management (Kaplan & Sawhney, 2000); 
 production lead-time reduction (Velocci, 2001); 
 reduced search costs for customers (Bakos, 1997); 
 selling process improvement (Feeney, 2001); 
 increased customisation capabilities (Bakos, 1998); 
 supply chain and relationships improvement (Feeney, 2001); and 
 an increasingly long-term perspective of the firm, subsequently leading to business 
performance (Fox, 2001). 
 
Thus, improving efficiency and effectiveness in all economic activities of the firm is 
imperative for the business model success and, as indicated above, business model innovation 
may help establish a competitive advantage for a company. 
Osterwalder (2004) states that the technological change in business environment plays 
an important role in setting a firm’s business model. And the more disruptive the innovation 
is, the more challenging the revenue architecture is, the greater the improvements are likely 
to be required to traditional business models. For instance, the internet became an essential 
factor for the emergence of new forms of business, such as online search engine providers 
(Google) or social networks (Facebook). At the same time, technological innovation can also 
undermine the dominance of incumbent business models by creating such opportunities 
for new models to emerge. The case of the internet again serves to illustrate a case of the on-
line book retailer’s Amazon.com dominance over the high-street book sellers (Hannon, 2012).  
In the industries of rapid technological change, such as the media, or TV industry, companies 
should evaluate the pros coming from the possible convergence points with the internet 
technologies. Having said that, it is essential to discuss the most common technological 
innovation’s ‘outcome’ in business modelling – the emergence of e-business models. 
Ontologically, e-business model derives from two ontologies for comparison: the 
Business Model Ontology (BMO) (Osterwalder, 2004) and the e-value ontology (Gordijn & 
Akkermans, 2001; Gordijn, 2003). In BMO, a business model is perceived as a conceptual 
tool containing a set of interrelated elements, which allows to express the business logic of a 
specific firm; its roots are found in management science and information systems research. 
Its four basic areas of preoccupation of a business model, the value proposition, the customer 
interface, the infrastructure management and the financial aspects stem from management 
literature. From the perspective of e-value, a business model is seen as a constellation of 
companies and final customers that jointly create, distribute and consume things of economic 
value; its roots are found on the one hand in computer science and on the other hand in 
management science (Gordijn, Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2005; Hayes & Finnegan, 2005).  
By comparing, discussing and mapping similar elements in both ontologies, the e-
business model ontology explains what an e-business model actually is. Botto (2003) defines 
e-business models as descriptions of work processes utilized in virtual or electronic 
24 
environments (quot. in Hanafizadeh & Nikabadi, 2011) like the internet in order to carry out 
transactions and create value for clients and other stakeholders (Currie, 2004; quot. in 
Hanafizadeh & Nikabadi, 2011). E-business models can be classified according to the degree 
of economic control, value chain and functional integration, managerial and technological 
innovation (Hayes & Finnegan, 2005). The latter approach sustains the importance of e-
business models in the fast changing technologically advanced industries. 
Indeed, the relationship between technology and business models derives from the 
business model concept’s roots in transaction cost economics: cheap information technology 
and communication possibilities made it easier for companies to collaborate in value networks 
because of relatively small transaction costs (Amit & Zott, 2001). That is why the business 
design is linked to cheaper and available information technology (Osterwalder, Pigneur & 
Tucci, 2005). On the other hand, Porter (2001, quot. by Hayes & Finnegan, 2005) argues that 
the companies that succeed with e-business will be those that use the Internet in 
conjunction with their traditional business models and activities. Indeed, this notion will 
be tested further in the empirical research in the TV broadcasting industry. In other words, 
the e-business model is understood in a broader way rather than the model of an Internet-only 
organization. Thus, an e-business model is also perceived as a company’s business model. 
The creative usage of IT, according to Chapman, Soosay & Kandampully (2003), offers 
numerous benefits to firms that undertake business functions via the electronic marketplace. 
Firms that establish new business models often get high rewards from ideas that generate new 
sources of revenue streams by using applications of technology and market demand. 
Considering a case of the media industry, the iTunes website, a successful music downloading 
service, the main role of this service is seen not only as a music selling business, but also as 
business enhancing the company’s sales of iPods, portable digital music players. Thus, in 
terms of industry sectors, this website combines the software, online, hardware, and music 
industries. In terms of business models, this website creates a whole set of business design 
choices that sustain one another (Osterwalder, Pigneur & Tucci, 2005). Moreover, the success 
of CNN, Amazon.com, eBay, and others serves are testimonies of new types of resources that 
can be utilized through innovative business models. New business models provide alternative 
approaches to business practices for firms to consider not only in terms of what is done, but 
also in terms of how it is done. 
Having identified how technological innovation can influence business model 
innovation, it is also important to analyze how a business model innovation can influence 
technological innovation. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom (2002) explain that a business model 
constitutes a crucial link between technological development and economic value creation by 
helping commercialize and thus promote the uptake of an innovative technology by revealing 
its potential. Chesbrough (2010) emphasizes the importance of business models to 
technologies by explaining that an average technology pursued within a great business model 
may be of a greater value than a great technology exploited via an average business model, 
meaning that it is likely to enjoy higher levels of adoption.  
 
 “Soft” innovation: Managerial innovation 
As Mills, Platts & Bourne (2003) state, research in economics evolves from the 
pioneering theory of the growth of the company (cit. Penrose, 1959), to the evolutionary 
economic theory (quot. Nelson & Winter, 1928), and to the dynamic capabilities research 
(Teece et al., 1997). They all have highlighted the importance of a company’s tangible and 
intangible assets, or resources as a basis for sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, the 
managerial interest in competence and resource-based ideas is grounded. 
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From the Resource-based theory’s perspective which was conceptualized by Wernerfelt 
(1984), a resource can belong to a company, or be accessed by it (e.g., third party consultants 
or the skills and expertise of its staff). Accepting this definition, a competence is defined as 
an activity a company carries out. At a corporate level, where the ‘core competence’ idea is 
proposed by Prahalad & Hamel (1990), the main issue is to use these competencies to generate 
new businesses (Mills, Platts & Bourne, 2003). 
IBM’s Global CEO Studies for 2006 and 2008 show that top management in a broad 
range of industries is actively seeking guidance on how to innovate their business models to 
improve their ability to both create and capture value (Pohle & Chapman, 2006; Casadesus-
Masanell & Ricart, 2010). Moreover, in some enterprises, the CEO is the initial source of 
business model innovation concepts to test (Mitchell & Coles, 2004). Thus, designing a new 
business model requires creativity, insight, intelligence and a great deal of customer, 
competitor and supplier information. There are also significant tacit components taking place: 
a businessman may be able to intuit an innovative business model but not be able to rationalize 
and articulate it fully. Hence, experimentation and learning are required (Teece, 2010). But 
as far as the analysis of the scientific literature shows, scholars have not yet focused on how 
important this driver is. 
Chesbrough (2007) argues that many organizations have a ‘business model innovation 
leadership gap’. That is, not a single person in the organization gap has the authority and the 
capability to innovate the business model. It depends on who is responsible for the business 
model innovation in the company. It canot be left to the chief technology officer and his or 
her staff alone; business model innovation clearly requires the participation of top 
management. Yet scholars analyse who within a company, other than the CEO, is responsible 
for the ways the business creates value in its products and services and captures that value in 
the form of revenue. Consequently, Zott, Amit & Massa (2011) note that a specific 
management agenda might be required for business model innovation (quot. Svejenova, 
Planellas & Vives, 2010). To overcome the rigidity that accompanies established business 
models, Doz & Kosonen (2010) propose that companies can become more agile by 
developing three meta-capabilities: strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource 
flexibility. In a similar vein, Smith, Binns & Tushman (2010) highlight how the effective 
management of complex business models depends on leadership based on dynamic decisions, 
building commitment to both overarching visions and agenda specific goals, learning actively 
at multiple levels and engaging conflict. Santos, Spector & Van Der Heyden (2009) also 
emphasize the importance of the behavioral aspects involved in business model innovation. 
They suggest that mutual engagement and organizational justice are essential and that 
managers should focus on the relational dynamics at the informal organization level. 
It is often the case that the right business model may not be apparent up front, so learning 
and adjustments will be necessary: new business models represent provisional solutions to 
user/ customer needs proposed by represent entrepreneurs/ managers. The right business 
model is rarely apparent early on in emerging industries: managers who are well positioned, 
who have a good but not perfect business model design but who can learn and adjust, are 
those more likely to succeed (Teece, 2010). 
Clearly, designing good business models is in part an art. The chances of good design 
are greater if managers have a deep understanding of user needs, consider multiple 
alternatives, analyze the value chain thoroughly, can reveal how to deliver value that the 
customer wants in a cost-effective and timely manner, adopt a perspective to outsourcing 
decisions, and are good listeners and quick learners. Useful tools include the various types of 
market research that lead to a deep understanding of the user, along with elements of the 
profiting from innovation framework (Teece, 2010). 
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Pohle & Chapman (2006) argue that four out of every ten business model innovators 
thought it very likely that a competitor with a radically different business model would upset 
the competitive dynamics of the entire industry. During their research, one interviewed CEO 
described his predicament in this way: ‘Since 70 percent of our business is based on a service 
that will no longer exist as we know it, we need to adapt our enterprise to survive’. 
When a company has doubts about the legitimacy of this fear or the dangers of waiting 
too long to change your business model, the Eastman Kodak Company is a good example of 
illustrating a common situation. It has been a long process for the company to redefine itself 
from the traditional film business (with its 60 percent margins) to the digital company. Kodak 
has focused on a business model turnaround. According to the company, 2005 marked the 
halfway point of its transformation, and it was also the first year in Kodak’s history when 
digital sales (at 54 percent of total revenue) surpassed traditional revenue (Pohle & Chapman, 
2006). 
Thus, global connectivity (created through telecommunications, IT infrastructure and 
open standards) makes new skills and partners accessible and practical to employ and enables 
innovative forms of collaboration and business models. Of course, the same global 
connectivity also exposes firms to new competitors with very different business models and 
cost bases, which, in turn, can force business model innovation. Instead of focusing on the 
threat, the CEOs, based on Pohle & Chapman’s (2006) research, have described the top-line 
potential offered by business model innovation, or its adaptations. Major strategic 
partnerships and organization structure changes topped the list of most significant business 
model innovations are related to (Pohle & Chapman, 2006): 
 Organization structure changes; 
 Major strategic partnerships; 
 Shared services; 
 Alternative financing/ investment vechiles; 
 Divestitures/ spin-offs; 
 Use of a third-party operating utility. 
 
As global connectivity reduces collaboration and transaction costs, companies are 
taking advantage of the expertise and scale that lies hidden in their own organizations and 
across the globe. They are creating business models combining internal expertise and scaling 
through shared services centers with the capabilities of specialized partners to create truly 
differentiating business designs (Pohle & Chapman, 2006). So from the managerial 
perspective, the management of technology, as well of other components’ transfer processes 
is crucial. 
 
Business model (as integral business logic) transfer 
The transfer of a business model is a very ambiguous issue. From one perspective, a 
business model is a set of separate components, such as profit formula, product/ service 
and so on. But from the other perspective, every business model has the components that 
are hardly transferable: firm’s key resources, expertise, value proposition. According to 
this notion, a firm can hardly transfer a business model as integral business logic. Stähler 
(2011) proposes that a good business model is not protected by patents or high-tech but by 
the excellent interaction of all its variables, particularly, by the human factor. 
Despite this logic, many business strategists talk about the transfer of a business model. 
Especially when a business model is a technology-based, including ‘hard’ components, rather 
than one based on ‘soft’ components. This approach is sustained by Shenkar (2010), stating, 
that business models are the least protected and often most promising targets for imitation in 
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that they offer an opportunity to replicate a business system. However, entire business models 
are also the most difficult to copy because they require the so-called corporate ‘mirror 
neurons’ necessary for resolving the correspondence issue. 
Also, despite talking about open innovation as one of the basic theories for the business 
model elements’ transfer, Chesbrough (2003), Chesbrough & Appleyard (2007), Trott (2008) 
firstly argue that the concept of innovation is linked to the business strategy. They note that 
the traditional business strategy has led firms to become defensive against the competition 
and the value chain, highlighting the importance of constructing barriers to competition, rather 
than promoting openness, while recently firms and industries, such as the software industry, 
are experimenting with innovative business models based on collective creativity through 
open innovation. The so-called ‘open strategy’ combines the principles of traditional business 
strategy with the concept of open innovation. It embraces the benefits of openness for 
expanding value creation for businesses. Van de Vrande et al. (2009) and Lichtentaler (2009) 
propose that open innovation is the combination of outside-in and inside-out movements of 
technologies and ideas. In addition, as Gassmann & Enkel (2004) argue, open innovation 
means that companies have to open up the boundaries for the new knowledge streams from 
outside in order to create opportunities for innovation processes with partners, customers and 
suppliers. As a consequence, open innovation influences spillovers of a company’s business 
model (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006).  Thus, here innovation is perceived as a 
strategy to increase the firm’s competitive advantage that can be reached together with other 
agents in the value network.  
Talking about specific industrial technology-related contexts, media industry in a broad 
sense, Chesbrough (2006) explains that the Hollywood film industry has been using the open 
innovation approach throughout its value network by involving production studios, producers, 
directors, talents, actors, scriptwriters, and other subcontractors. Thus, the open innovation 
approach is evident when transforming existing business models in industries with many 
external ideas, high labour mobility, the presence of start-ups, and the existing cooperation 
with universities. Similarly, since a TV’s value network is spread, executing open innovation 
is relevant here, too. 
To conclude, companies, engaged to disruptive innovation, can start not only to 
anticipate the environmental changes, but also transform the ‘unexpected’ into ‘expected’ and 
get the competitive advantage by adopting a strategy as a cohesive response to an important 
challenge. For the purpose of this research, the term Response strategy is the most related and 
relevant. In relation to various disruptive changes, companies do need to adjust or choose their 
strategies, as well as transform their business models. Here it is to note that, according to 
scientists, companies that succeed with innovative business models are mostly those that use 
the Internet in conjunction with their traditional business models and activities. Business 
model in this case is the core logic for explicating how a firm will remain profitable and how 
will it change over time. Therefore, it is essential to identify how the innovation of the 
business model can generate new value in an industry. A business model innovation 
comprising different variations can be linked to ‘soft’ innovation (e.g., impact of leadership, 
management or vision), or ‘hard’ innovation, and become technological ‘outcome’ in business 
modelling, e.g., an e-business model. 
 
1.3. Variety of response strategies of incumbent firms in the context of 
disruptive innovation 
 
As Christensen (1997) claims, the concept of disruption is about competitive response, 
which is adjacent to growth. Therefore, it is important to (Denning, 2016a) it is not a theory 
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of growth. Denning (2016b) adds that, according to Hagel (2015) it is possible to identify 
specific patterns of disruption – disruptive strategies that, when combined with certain 
marketplace trends, can topple industry incumbents. So firstly, in the disruptive innovation, 
or growth-oriented context, incumbents are often seen as:  
• having two choices (Christensen, 1997): (1) to create a new business unit, or (2) to 
sustain innovation;  
• or, alternatively, five choices (Charitou & Markides, 2003): (1) focus on and invest 
in the traditional business, (2) ignore the innovation, (3) disrupt the disruption, (4) 
adopt the innovation by playing both games at once, or (5) embrace the innovation 
completely and scale it up. 
 
The diversity of response strategies are also analysed from the perspective of disruptive 
business models (Markides, 2006; Worlock, 2007; Yovanof & Hazapis, 2008), disruptive 
innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000;  
Markides, 2006; Georgantzas et al. 2005; Sandström et al., 2009), technological convergence 
(Bores et al., 2003), or transformation (Medina, 2011) are proposed as follows:  
 
(1) traditional business and sustaining innovation 
strategy 
   
(2) ignore the innovation strategy    
(3) disrupt the disruption strategy    
(4) innovation adoption with focus on existing 
businesses (considering creating a new business 
unit) strategy 
   
(5) embrace the innovation strategy    
(6) merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy    
Figure 1. Response strategies (adapted from Markides, 2006; Worlock, 2007; Yovanof & Hazapis, 
2008; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000;  Markides, 
2006; Georgantzas et al. 2005; Sandström et al., 2009; Bores et al.; 2003; Medina, 2011) 
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Even though in this part of research the author seeks to identify the generic response 
strategies, at the same time, it is attempted to illustrate the current strategies with mini 
business examples. In addition, scientific literature suggests that the above mentioned 
strategies can be linked to specific areas of business, TV broadcasting, for instance. Research 
on the TV industry implemented by Schindler, Upreti & Goswami (2011) revealed that the 
contemporary TV broadcasters, considering the market maturity and being incumbent 
companies themselves, variety of choices and wide reach, is, and will likely stick to its 
primary revenue stream, traditional TV broadcasting. Therefore, the challenge for the 
incumbents in the TV industry is to strengthen the existing offerings, at the same time 
achieving greater agility in operations in order to respond to disruptive innovation caused by 
market dynamics. Thus, the TV broadcasters should focus on:  
 Continuing to grow and ensuring revenues from the main TV broadcasting business 
by strengthening operational capability and efficiency. By its essence, this strategy 
corresponds to traditional business and sustaining innovation strategy. 
 Keeping the current position in the broadcasting value network and attempting to 
build stronger multi-platform content delivery capabilities, especially in the cases of 
online TV and mobile TV. The latter response strategy is similar to innovation 
adoption with focus on existing businesses (considering creating a new business 
unit) strategy. 
 Adopting a more integrated, efficient and service oriented operating structure in order 
to achieve and deliver long term goals could be the case of innovation adoption with 
focus on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) strategy 
adoption as well. As an example, Apple TV case is given. A multinational technology 
company Apple has launched a TV device using apps, such as Netflix, Hulu, 
WatchESPN, and iTunes to watch TV shows. Unlike Netflix and Amazon, Apple is 
not planning to invest in original video content and therefore remains in its core 
business.  Differently from many big companies pursuing this strategy, Apple Inc. 
does not have a separate business unit exclusively for Apple TV (Lashinsky, 2011; 
Apple, n.d.; Gewirtz, 2015; Yarow, 2015; Bolton, 2015). 
 Innovating to monetize on emerging opportunities in new customer segments. 
Responding accordingly would mean the adoption of embracing the innovation 
strategy. 
 Disrupt the disruption strategy. An example of such strategy adopter is Netflix. The 
firm established as a website where people could rent DVDs online and receive them 
through the mail was perceived as a disruptor in the TV industry: after some time, 
Netflix proposed to market on-demand content, as well as that tailored for different 
countries (e.g., Italy, Lithuania, etc.). This innovation caused the response of the TV 
networks that started offering VOD content to its viewers. Finally, Netflix began 
competing with TV networks directly for original content (e.g., Game of Thrones; 
House of Cards) and also forced the TV industry to change its ways by giving viewers 
the flexibility to see content in the way they want (Zuliani, 2015; Netflix, 2015). 
 Merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. These company transactions, according to 
BCG (2016), establish ever-larger conglomerates, leaving smaller TV groups more 
vulnerable as independent companies. The Disney and Pixar merger, for instance, 
provides TV industry giants the competitive advantage towards smaller TV networks 
to accept lower fees for their content broadcasting. Hence, new ventures of large 
corporations that are incubating or otherwise funding start-ups as their own path to 
innovation. Start-ups operating under a large-company umbrella have long been 
common in the tech industry, in which the pace of innovation is fast and the fuel for 
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disruption (venture funding) is so prevalent. In many cases, tech giants acquire 
successful start-ups to remain ahead of the innovation curve (Kon et al., 2016). 
In contexts of rapid change (BCG, 2016), the latter strategy is evident.  
 
In highly competitive and innovative markets, when an action of an incumbent cause 
the reaction of the other incumbent is very common. Therefore, a combined strategy approach, 
or a strategy mix is also possible. Thus, the choice of response strategy also depends on 
whether the incumbent, facing the disruption, is the first-mover, or the second-mover, as 
indicated by King & Baatartogtokh (2015). The latter authors argue that the before setting the 
strategy, there are many alternative factors influencing the disruption, like shifting economies 
of scale, first-mover advantage, legacy costs, etc.  Therefore, it can be stated that the first-
mover and the second-mover approaches serve as crosscutters between companies’ response 
strategies. Following the strategic choice analysis, this part is based on the analysis of 
imitation strategies and second-mover advantages, as well as first-mover advantages, 
which are relevant for this research in depth analysis. Indeed, in case of small open economies, 
like Finland (Pajarinen, Rouvinen, & Ylä-Anttila, 1998) or Lithuania (OECD, 2016) for 
instance, incumbents have more to achieve rather than to lose while imitating. Valdani & 
Arbore (2007) add that incumbents, feeling threatened by a disruptive innovation in the 
market, choose the imitation strategy immediately or shortly after a having met a threat. 
Taking examples of Nike Air and Adidas Megabounce, it has already been mentioned that 
whenever a disruptive innovation derives from another incumbent, the imitative response is 
even quicker. 
Imitation strategies and second-mover advantage. Imitation (Shenkar, 2010), late 
entry (Zhou, 2002; Trott & Hartmann, 2009; Trott, 2008) strategies, or second-mover 
advantages by its origin mean borrowing, importing, or adapting ideas, practices, and models 
from someone else. The main point of imitation relies in these questions (Shenkar, 2010): 
where (the industry or domain from which to draw the imitation), what (the object of 
imitation: a product, a process, a business model), who to imitate (the entity behind the 
model), when (the timing of imitation), and how (the form and process of imitation). 
The imitator, or a second-mover can be the even the fifth company which comes into 
the existing market. Late movers are those who enter a market after it has been explored. 
Lieberman & Montgomery (1988) classify the second-movers according to the sequence they 
entered the market, the elapsed time since entry of the pioneer or by general categories: early 
followers (companies which enter an existing market early), late followers (companies which 
enter a mature market), differentiated followers (companies which create a niche in an 
already existing market), me-too followers (companies which enter an existing market with 
existing products).  
Imitation strategies (Shenkar, 2010) can be a part of a set of activities that is distinct in 
its derivative form or combinative architecture and has the potential to deliver unique value, 
especially in conjunction with innovation. In an organization acting as an adaptor, the 
innovation concerns the process of organizational change affecting both the technical and the 
social systems of the organization. In this case, the process is composed by the stages of 
‘imitation’ and ‘implementation’. In organizations acting as adopters, the measure of success 
is given by its capability to institutionalize an innovation in order to improve its performance 
(Jofre, 2011).  
Second-movers may benefit from: 1) the opportunity to free-ride from the investments 
made by the first-movers, 2) resolution of technological and market uncertainty, 3) 
technological discontinuities that open for a new entry, and 4) for various types of incumbent 
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inertia that make it difficult for the incumbent to adapt to environmental change (Lieberman 
& Montgomery, 1988).  
By nature, imitation is easier and much cheaper (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 
2006). By imitating the key characteristics of the pioneering brand, late pioneers thus could 
be easily recognized as possessing a similar product to the pioneer, which means that they 
may be readily acceptable by the market (Zhou, 2002). Still, this strategy also requires a 
substantial technology base so that the company may develop improved versions of the 
original in terms of lower costs, different design, additional features, etc. The company needs 
to be agile in manufacturing, design and development and marketing. This will enable it to 
respond quickly to those companies that are first into the market. Without any in-house R&D, 
their response would have been much slower, as this would have involved substantially more 
learning and understanding of the technology product (Trott & Hartmann, 2009).  
It may not be possible to exactly replicate the Southwest Airlines model with its 
indicately interrelated elements, but it is possible to do a Ryanair, copying and exceeding 
codified aspects, or an EasyJet, which mimics the original and its JetBlue derivative. It is also 
possible, like Apple or Wal-Mart, to be an assembler that borrows from others and combines 
the imports with indigenous areas of strength to create a competitive advantage (Shenkar, 
2010). In a similar vein, Valdani & Arbore (2007) distinguish three different types of such 
imitations: 1) parasite imitation; 2) incompatible or redundant imitation; and 3) induced 
imitation. From the business model innovation perspective, it is to note, that a BMI in one 
industry is not necessarily an innovation in another sector, and vice versa. This statement is 
based on some case studies in different industrial contexts, where business models were 
transferred/ adapted successfully. Valdani & Arbore (2007) also draw attention to different 
motivations that incumbents have when choosing an imitation strategy to implement a BMI. 
From the one side, it can be related to the incumbent’s reaction to the element of surprise, 
when success is evident and when market conditions demonstrate a risk of market share loss. 
From the other side, some incumbents make strategic choices towards imitating when the 
success about the industry’s innovation development is clear. 
Having considered the imitators, however, based on King & Baatartogtokh’s (2015) 
notions, incumbents can also profit from the first-mover advantage. By definition, a first-
mover advantage is based on the ability of surviving pioneering firms to enjoy a larger 
market share or earn more positive economic profits than surviving late entrants (Lieberman, 
Montgomery, 1988; Zhou, 2002). In other words, the first-mover is the company (product) 
that enters a market first. As Zhou (2002) continues, a first mover may achieve economic 
benefits such as scale and experience economies. A pioneer can also gain advantage by pre-
empting rivals in the acquisition of scarce resources such as the most attractive space or 
locations. Technological factors such as innovations may also reward a first mover in terms 
of cost or differentiation advantage. From a behavioral perspective, pioneering advantage can 
arise from the process by which consumers learn about brands and form their preferences. 
The process can produce a preference structure that favors the pioneer, making it difficult for 
late entrants to ‘compete away’ the pioneer’s large market share, even if brands can reposition 
and if the switching costs are minimal. 
As mentioned above, there are lots of advantages for the first-movers; however, Zhou 
(2002) distincts some important disadvantages the latter companies face: 1) free-rider effects, 
2) shifts in technology, 3) shifts in customer needs, and 4) incumbent inertia. First, because 
imitation costs are usually much lower than innovation costs, late entrants may be able to free 
ride on a pioneering firm’s investments in a number of areas such as technology development, 
buyer education, and market development. Second, late entrants may exploit technological 
discontinuities to overtake the pioneers. Innovative late entrants can revolutionize existing 
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industries with new products and processes, and become first movers in the next technological 
phase. Third, shifts in consumer needs create opportunities for late entrants to better deliver 
customer values than pioneers. A market is usually not very well formed at the beginning, 
which means that the early adopters may be quite different from later adopters (e.g., personal 
computer industry). Market change and consumer-need shifts thus provide great opportunities 
for late comers. Finally, incumbent inertia may inhibit the ability of the pioneers to respond 
to environmental change or competitive threats. Although incumbent inertia is often a rational 
and profit-maximizing response, it may lead to organizational inflexibility when the firm is 
locked into a specific set of assets or is reluctant to cannibalize existing product lines. 
If an organization is considered as acting as a generator of innovation, the innovation 
process regards problem-solving and decision-making in connection with the design or 
development of new products. In organizations acting as generators, the successful outcome 
of the process is often determined by the organization’s capability to improve its performance 
or to set new industrial standards through the competent diffusion of its innovation (Jofre, 
2011). As mentioned in previous sections, the external knowledge plays an important, but 
supplemental role in business model innovation. A firm often focuses on its the internal 
activities, or internal sources of innovation, like the strategy. 
The strategy here centres on the advantages to be gained from a monopoly, in this case, 
a monopoly of the technology. The aim is to try to ensure that the product is launched into the 
market before the competition. This should enable the company either to adopt a price-
skimming policy, or to adopt a penetration policy based on gaining a high market share. Such 
a strategy demands a significant R&D activity and is usually accompanied by substantial 
marketing resources to enable the company to promote the new product (Trott & Hartmann, 
2009). 
To conclude, based on the literature analysis, the following main response strategies 
have been pointed out: (1) traditional business and sustaining innovation strategy; (2) ignore 
the innovation strategy; (3) disrupt the disruption strategy; (4) innovation adoption with focus 
on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) strategy; (5) embrace the 
innovation strategy; and (6) merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. In addition, these 
strategies can be perceived from the first-mover, as well as the second-mover perspective. 
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2. Choice of response strategy to disruptive innovation by incumbent firms: 
integrated theoretical framework linking strategies with sets of factors 
 
In this part, the choice of the response strategy is linkded to the external nature of 
disruptive innovation, as well as to factors influencing the choice of the response strategy. 
 
2.1. Nature and type of disruptive innovation  
 
Disruptive, fast-developing and technology-based businesses of downloads, online 
streaming, and content piracy, highly influenced by various digital technologies, has been 
transforming some specific industries for quite some time. But only recently this matter has 
gained scientific attention by attempting to understand what exactly is happening in, for 
instance, the media business. Disruptive changes in digital distribution, the demand for 
production of lower-cost content, digitization of production and exhibition have totally 
changed the shape of this industry. Therefore, researchers and practitioners have been 
inquiring if digital dissemination would cause a massive disruption to the media industry, as 
it did to mail delivery services, bookselling, and other industries, or if TV and movie 
industries go online (Iordanova & Cunningham, 2012; Christopherson, 2008). 
Hagel (2015) provides a general list of representative catalysts of disruption, describing 
shifts that occur in the global environment when facing a disruptive innovation. As the 
researcher continues, these drivers precede any action that an individual company would take. 
Therefore, the catalysts are perceived as shifts outside of a company’s direct control rather 
than company-made decisions. The most relevant catalysts for anticipating disruption are 
related to enabling technologies, customer expectations and preferences, platforms, 
macroeconomics, and public policies. It should be noted that catalysts often exist independent 
or industry situations, although specific market conditions may shape the degree of impact a 
catalyst has on that market. The external factor is perceived as a change in the broader 
environment that is an early indicator of possible disruption. The catalysts of disruption can 
change the desirability of an offering or the viability of a business model by either making a 
new offering technically feasible, enabling a new offering to equal or exceed the features of 
current offerings, or by changing the market conditions or the economics of production such 
that a new offering becomes desirable even if its quality or functionality falls short of existing 
offerings. Generally, the catalysts of disruption occur before the actions that companies would 
take. 
For the purpose of the present thesis, the theoretical investigation of disruptive 
innovation will be limited to some of Gassmann, Enkel & Chesbrough’s (2010) research 
streams. Indeed, under the spatial stream, the research distinguishes such trends as 
globalization of innovation, research internationalization, the related enabling technologies 
(including ICT) and platforms, as well as decentralized innovation processes. 
 
Table 1. Catalysts of disruption (Hagel, 2015) 
Catalyst of Disruption Specifics in brief 
Enabling technology Digital infrastructure providing richer connectivity 
Affordable access to sophisticated tools of production 
Cheaper, faster, more reliable shipping making the world 
smaller 
Affordable sensors making the invisible 
visible 
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Customer mindset From ‘wanting the best’ to ‘accepting the basics’ 
From accepting standardized to expecting personalized 
From ownership to access 
From passive customer to active customizer 
Platform Aggregation and social platforms reducing isolation 
Aggregation platforms reducing inventory and distribution 
costs 
Scalable learning platforms reducing barriers to entry 
Learning and aggregation platforms increasing collaboration 
Economy Sense of scarcity increasing willingness to share 
Constrained buying power decreasing willingness to pay up 
front 
Lower purchasing power increasing demand for affordable, 
versatile products 
Challenging economic conditions increasing demand for 
‘good enough’ 
Public policy Self-regulation and open source in place of protected IP 
Regulatory and legislative structures adopting the ‘wait and 
see’ approach 
Local decision making and budgeting 
Changes in the tax or legal code 
 
Firstly, according to Ringel, Taylor & Zablit (2015) and Hagel (2015), directly or 
indirectly, enabling technological breakthroughs influence change in society and in the 
economy, in both the personal and the public sphere. Advances in core enabling technologies 
are at the root of most of the disruptive innovations and can be applied to drive radical change 
in the capabilities, structure, or economics of a business, customer, or even the culture. Hagel 
(2015) gives an example of the music industry, where the transition from analog to digital 
music allowed for audio content to be distributed online. As a consequence, the latter market 
disruption quickly led to new file-sharing protocols and protections, new payment systems, 
and the development of streaming services and specialized digital marketplaces, therefore, it 
has significantly transformed the music industry’s business model. The other evident 
examples come from 3D printing technology and related industries, etc. 
Following the presented Gassmann, Enkel, and Chesbrough’s (2010) logic, Ringel, 
Taylor & Zablit (2015) and Hagel (2015) also advocate, that platforms help make resources 
and participants more accessible to each other. They can become powerful catalysts for rich 
ecosystems of resources and participants. While there are many types of platforms and the 
term is used in many contexts, well-functioning platforms share two key elements: a gover-
nance structure, derermining the participants and their interacions, and a set of enabling proto-
cols facilitating coordination and collaboration process. In his research, Hagel (2015) 
identified four types of platforms: 
 Aggregation platforms facilitate transactions, connect users to resources, and tend to 
operate on a hub-and-spoke model.  
 Social platforms facilitate social interactions, connect individuals to communities, 
and tend to foster mesh relationship networks. 
 Mobilization platforms facilitate people taking action together around a cause or 
vision. They tend to foster longer-term relationships to achieve shared goals. 
35 
 Learning platforms facilitate sharing insights over time. They tend to foster deep, 
trust-based relationships as participants work together to achieve more of their 
potential. 
 
As presented in the strategic management literature, the linkage between a company and 
its environment is a primary component of strategic management (Rabin, Miller & Hildreth, 
2000); therefore, the knowledge collected from external sources during this first stage is 
essential in the strategic innovation processes (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006). 
Von Hippel (1988) identifies four sources of external knowledge for innovation, one of which 
is suppliers and customers. The accumulated and/ or created knowledge not only enables 
proactive market orientation (Voola & O’Cass, 2010; quot. in Kindström et al., 2013), but 
also enables establishing a relative customer mindset. Indeed, Hagel (2015) argues, that 
businesses are driven by customer demand. Thus, talking about B2B, as well as B2C 
markets, consumers have expectations that are shaped by what they see in the environment, 
by their values, experiences in personal and professional life, and by financial and social 
pressures. It is also noted that consumers today are oriented towards personalized products 
for an affordable price, while some time ago the primary idea was about the price, which was 
linked to a ‘standard’, mass-market product or service. Therefore, in the era of disruption, it 
is essential to reprioritize customers’ values and preferences.  
According to Schumpeter (1934, cit. in Hagel, 2015), macroeconomic indicators, such 
as economic growth, interest or exchange rates, affect how companies and customers operate 
and make decisions. Significant changes in ecomonies and economic crisis generally have a 
strong effect on the priorities and decisions about purchases and investments. Specifically, it 
influences, making challenges or providing opportunities for both, incumbents and new 
entrants. Here, the fluctuating customer mindset, sometimes becoming more cost-conscious 
and interested in reducing non-essential purchases disrupts economy in a way that it 
consumers might switch to cheaper products and services and even after the crisis keep using 
the same poducts or services. Considering an example of Airbnb, which was launched in 
economic uncertainty and was not targeted to mainstream customers, currently it delivers 
value to upstream markets.  
Based on different economic situations when the government changes main public 
policies regulating business or society, the result can limit options for businesses or open up 
new opportunities (e.g., Jackson, 1997; Hagel, 2015). It is also to note that the public policy 
in this case refers to legislation and regulation procedures, changes to tax policy, labor and 
environmental law, trade regulations, tariffs, and political stability on industries and 
individuals. Therefore, public policy, as a catalyst of disruption is perceived in a broader way. 
For example, the legalization of marijuana demonstrates how the changes in regulation 
policies open new business opportunities and indeed, become disruptive in some industries, 
as in pharmaceuticals, for instance. In other industries, in media business, Hagel (2015) 
provides an example based on differences of country regulations. For instance, torrenting of 
pirated material is not a good idea in Germany or in the Netherlands, but it is not so dangerous 
in Eastern Europe or in Russia (Hagel, 2015).  
To finalize, it is noted, that there is a variety of business cases where catalysts of 
disruption were evident, but companies did not have a prepared response strategy. The case 
of Kodak Company (Hagel, 2015) demonstrates that the first catalyst of disruption was a 
changing technology, and it changed the customer mindset as a consequence: the decreasing 
price and increasing quality of technology made photo digitization possible for the mass user, 
which was well received by the customers. As a consequence, different platforms became a 
necessity and a part of everyday life, and opened up a possibility to share and spread digital 
36 
images.  The example demonstrates that one catalyst of disruption is followed by another, and 
the process fosters disruptive innovation. In the markets of rapid technological change, such 
as books, movies, TV industries, the latter trend is very evident.  
To summarize, in order to avert disruption for incumbents, it is essentially important to 
see it coming and evaluate the latter catalysts of disruption: Enabling technology, Customer 
mindset, Platform, Economy, and Public policy. 
 
2.2. Human/ managerial factors and response strategies to disruptive 
innovation 
 
Business specific factors are drawn on the existing literature of psychological 
foundations of strategic management (Healey & Hodgkinson, 2013) and managerial cognition 
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Stubbart, 1989), starting with dynamic capabilities, managerial 
factors, organizational capabilities and enterpreneural capabilities to foresee the changes. 
Here, researchers insist that, in order to attain success, companies have to constantly 
strengthen their organizational capabilities – intangible assets and possible sources of strategic 
advantage (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Cordes-Berszinn, 2013; Galdo, 
2016). 
According to Healey & Hodgkinson (2013), the psychology of strategic management 
draws inspiration from the behavioral sciences to understand why firms act in particular ways. 
This approach draws attention to how managers’ mental processes influence strategic action. 
Rather than assuming that strategizing is objectively or even intendedly rational, a 
psychological approach holds that strategy formulation and implementation are always 
exercised within the bounds of human cognitive limitations and that strategic action often 
reflects subjective perceptions, judgments and goals as much as objective analysis or 
normatively valued choice. Quoting Hodgkinson & Healey (2011), Healey & Hodgkinson 
(2013) for instance, argue that emotional and affective processes – and the effective 
management of these processes – might ultimately enable or undermine the dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, 2007; Teece & Pisano, 1994) of sensing opportunities and threats, seizing 
new strategic directions, and transforming internal assets. On the other hand, not only the 
internal factors influence the manager’s choice to implement one or the other strategy. 
According to Kiesler & Sproull (1982), managers are charged with formulating, directing, 
coordinating and managind the organization’s responses to rapid environmental change. 
Therefore, it is relevant to understand based on what managers analyze a changing 
environment. Stubbart (1989) argues that there are three topics in managerial cognition 
relevant to strategic management: categories, semantic netwoks and inferences. It is crucial 
because the rationality of managers is often limited, their knowledge often incomplete, and 
their attention often overloaded. Yet, simultaneously, many managers are skilled at 
strategymaking, adept organizational experts, and ingenious innovators. Nor do managers all 
think alike in terms of their vision, expertise, risk-profiles, motivations, or goals. These 
conflicting views leave the field in a quandary regarding managerial cognition. 
According to various researches, the common Human/ managerial factors are 
highlighted in the table below. 
 
 
Table 2. Human/ managerial factors (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Viellechner & Wulf, 
2010; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Denning, 2015) 
Human/ managerial 
factor 
Author(s)  Context 
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Managerial propensity 
toward myopia, or 
Managerial myopia 
Christensen & Bower, 
1996; King & 
Baatartogtokh, 2015 
The failure of leading firms can 
sometimes be ascribed to managerial 
myopia. 
Non-autonomous 
decision making 
Christensen & Bower, 1996 Non-autonomous decisions can be a 
threat to investments, or delay investing, 
in a variety of new technologies. Also, 
this study links these two streams by 
showing how the impetus that drives 
patterns of resource allocation (and hence 
innovation) within firms does not stem 
from autonomous decisions of risk 
conscious managers. 
Expertise and 
competency 
Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Day & Lord, 1992 
Christensen & Bower (1996) argue that 
the failure of leading firms can 
sometimes be ascribed to insufficient 
expertise. Day & Lord (1992) link 
organizational decision-making and the 
influence of expertise. 
Strategic direction/ 
vision 
Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Vlaar, de Vries & 
Willenborg, 2005; 
Chesbrough, 2001 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) provide a 
contention that managers are powerless 
to change the strategies of their 
companies in directions that are 
inconsistent with the needs of their 
customers as resource providers (cit. in 
Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
Executives’ 
psychological and 
observable 
characteristics 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Viellechner & Wulf, 2010 
Viellechner & Wulf (2010) propose a 
comprehensive set of top management 
team characteristics along individual 
members, team structure and team 
process influence the impact of the 
identified causal factors to ultimately 
lower routine rigidity. 
Risk propensity Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Viellechner & 
Wulf, 2010 
Christensen & Bower (1996) 
observed that risk management and 
career management were closely 
linked in the resource allocation 
process. Also, this study links these 
two streams by showing how the 
impetus that drives patterns of 
resource allocation (and hence 
innovation) within firms does not 
stem from autonomous decisions of 
risk conscious managers. The authors 
also prove that sustaining 
investments appeared far less risky 
than investments in the disruptive 
technology, because the customers 
were there. 
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As Teece et al. (1997); Chesbrough (2003); Wang & Ahmed (2007); Teece (2007); 
Kindström et al. (2013) advocate, the latter capabilities, often linked to human/ managerial 
practices, or factors, help organizations effectively deal with new challenges, create advanced 
configurations of resources and find relevant solutions, allowing companies to obtain and 
sustain their high performance as well as innovatively-shaped competitive advantage by 
setting the ‘right’ response to disruptive innovation strategy. 
To summarize, for the purposes of the research, these common Human/ managerial 
factors are used: (1) Strategic direction/ vision, (2) Non-autonomous (team) decision making, 
(3) Risk propensity, (4) Executives’ psychological and observable characteristics, (5) 
Expertise and competency, and (6) Managerial myopia. 
 
2.3. Structural/ organizational factors and response strategies to disruptive 
innovation 
 
According to Sandström et al. (2009), it appears reasonable that the capacity to respond 
to disruptive innovations depends largely on the formal characteristics of the incumbent. 
Based on the analysis of scientific literature, the following Structural/ organizational factors 
are pointed out in the table below. 
 
Table 3. Structural/ organizational factors (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Sandström et al., 2009; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011) 
Structural/ 
organizational factor 
Author(s)  Context 
Corporate 
governance, 
bureaucracy and 
policies 
Dutton & Duncan, 
1987 
In some cases the responses of the companies 
are effective in the sense that they more 
correctly align the organization’s internal 
structure or systems with the demands of the 
external environment. 
Investments Christensen & Bower, 
1996 
Sustaining investments appeared far less risky 
than investments in the disruptive technology, 
because the customers were there. They also 
show that the mechanism through which 
customers wield this power is the process in 
which impetus coalesces behind investments in 
sustaining technologies, directing resources to 
innovations that address current customers’ 
needs. 
Organizational 
propensity toward 
lethargy, or 
Organizational 
lethargy 
Christensen & Bower, 
1996 
The failure of leading firms can sometimes 
be ascribed to organizational lethargy. 
Resources Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Sandström et al., 
2009 
Christensen & Bower (1996) claim that the 
failure of leading firms can sometimes be 
ascribed to insufficient resources. According 
to Sandström et al. (2009), in the discourse 
regarding disruptive innovation, incumbents 
are often treated as one population vis-à-vis 
entrants rather than as many populations with 
different resources, market positions and 
strategies. 
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Heterogeneity   Sandström et al., 2009; 
Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011 
For managers and forecasters the Madjdi & 
Hüsig’s (2011) study indicates that they 
should consider the impact of the 
heterogeneity in firms when formulating a 
response strategy based on their respective 
perception of the impact of a potential 
disruptive technology on their business. 
Company structure Christensen & Bower, 
1996 
The 8,5.25 and 3.5-inch designs initially were 
rejected by the leading, structurally 
complicated incumbent computer 
manufacturers, and were deployed instead in 
emerging market applications for disk drives: 
minicomputers, desktop PCs and portable 
PCs, respectively. 
Value network Sandström et al., 
2009 
The authors claim that a key determinant 
of the probability of success for an 
innovation is the extent to which it 
addresses the needs of actors in an 
incumbent’s current value network. 
 
As a matter of fact, over time, successful companies often become letargic, bureaucratic, 
complicated structure-wise, and rigid (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992, quot. in Kindström et al., 2013). Slight adjustments to the business 
model and therefore, its value network, might be then necessary. If environment changes and 
new competitive situations arise, learning and knowledge creation processes and the mastery 
of these competencies might be of help to prepare a serious response strategy. In such a 
situation, reconfiguration and transformation activities become fundamental to the company 
(Boccardelli & Magnusson, 2006) which has to rearrange primary elements of its business 
model as well as available resources. Therefore, the latter structural/ organizational factors, 
they all might provide a ‘value-enhancing combination’ inside an enterprise (Teece, 2007) 
and might help set the proper response strategy to disruptive innovation. 
To summarize, for the purposes of the research, these common Structural/ 
organizational factors are highlighted: (1) Value network, (2) Heterogeneity, (3) Investments, 
(4) Resources, (5) Organizational lethargy, (6) Company structure, and (7) Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies. 
 
2.4. Integrated theoretical framework 
 
From the perspective of a small open economy (OECD, 2016; Pajarinen, Rouvinen, & 
Ylä-Anttila, 1998), as discussed in the introduction, and different theoretical approaches 
towards disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000; Charitou 
& Markides, 2003; Georgantzas, Peeva, & Weinberg, 2005; Markides, 2006; Benson, 2007; 
Sandström, Magnusson & Jörnmark, 2009; Viellechner & Wolf, 2010; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011; 
Tesfaye & Nguyen, 2012;), combining the catalysts of disruption (Kindström et al., 2013; 
Gassmann, Enkel & Chesbrough, 2010; Iordanova & Cunningham, 2012; Jackson, 1997; 
Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006; Von Hippel, 1988; Christopherson, 2008; Hagel, 
2015; Ringel, Taylor & Zablit, 2015), response strategies (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000;  Markides, 2006; Georgantzas et al. 2005; 
Sandström et al., 2009; Markides, 2006; Worlock, 2007; Yovanof &  Hazapis, 2008; Bores et 
al., 2003; Medina, 2011) and human/ managerial (Christensen & Bower, 1996; King & 
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Baatartogtokh, 2015; Day & Lord, 1992; Vlaar, de Vries & Willenborg, 2005; Chesbrough, 
2001; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010) and structural/ 
organizational(Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Sandström et al., 2009; 
Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011) factors the picture below illustrates the conceptual research model 
and the linkages of the components. 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model 
 
This model illustrates the linkages how the catalysts of disruption challenge the rise of 
disruptive innovation in the market and how the incumbents respond to the disruption, 
considering the factors shaping the choice of a selected response strategy. Hence, based on 
the scientific literature analysis, the author pointed out the main components of the model: 
1. Catalysts of disruption (Kindström et al., 2013; Gassmann, Enkel & Chesbrough, 
2010; Iordanova & Cunningham, 2012; Jackson, 1997; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke 
& West, 2006; Von Hippel, 1988; Christopherson, 2008; Hagel, 2015; Ringel, Taylor 
& Zablit, 2015): (1) Enabling technology, (2) Customer mindset, (3) Platform, (4) 
Economy, and (5) Public policy. 
2. Response strategies (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Overdof, 2000;  Markides, 2006; Georgantzas et al. 2005; Sandström et al., 2009; 
Markides, 2006; Worlock, 2007; Yovanof &  Hazapis, 2008; Bores et al., 2003; 
Medina, 2011): (1) traditional business and sustaining innovation strategy; (2) ignore 
the innovation strategy; (3) disrupt the disruption strategy; (4) innovation adoption 
with focus on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) strategy; 
(5) embrace the innovation strategy, and (6) merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. 
3. Human/ managerial factors (Christensen & Bower, 1996; King & Baatartogtokh, 
2015; Day & Lord, 1992; Vlaar, de Vries & Willenborg, 2005; Chesbrough, 2001; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010): (1) Strategic direction/ vision, 
(2) Non-autonomous (team) decision making, (3) Risk propensity, (4) Executives’ 
psychological and observable characteristics, (5) Expertise and competency, and (6) 
Managerial myopia. 
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4. Structural/ organizational factors (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Sandström et al., 2009; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011): (1) Value network, (2) 
Heterogeneity, (3) Investments, (4) Resources, (5) Organizational lethargy, (6) 
Company structure, and (7) Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. 
 
To conclude, the research model combines four different theoretical pillars: (1) 
Catalysts of disruption; (2) Response strategies; (3) Human/ managerial factors; and (4) 
Structural/ organizational factors. In the subsequent chapters, based on research methodology, 
the model is tested in the case of TV broadcasters in Lithuania, as a small open economy 
(OECD, 2016).  
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3. Research methodology 
 
In this chapter, the author introduces to the specifics of the TV industry and presents the 
chosen research methodology.  
 
3.1. TV industry: its specifics, trends, and data in the era of disruption 
 
To begin with, in this part, the author makes an overview of the global TV industry and 
the local Lithuanian TV industry, which provides a greater understanding of the market. First, 
it is essential to clarify what is the role of broadcasting in the media industry, and in the TV 
industry. According to Wells (1996), broadcasting is the most important component of the 
contemporary mass media industry, comprising both, TV and radio broadcasting. Since the 
current research investigates the TV industry, we fill focus on TV further on. There are 
basically two types of television broadcasting (Wells, 1996):  
 Commercial broadcasters. Funded by commercial advertisements and supported by 
selling time, are profit, mostly private, channels, networks, TV groups or services, 
providing programming to the public. 
 Public broadcasters. Non-profit programming providers, generally publicly owned 
channels, networks or TV groups, mostly supported by license fees, government 
funds and other grants, corporate underwriting, audience memberships. 
 
In the latter research, the author presents both types, commercial and public 
broadcasters’ cases. By all means, despite the form of funding, all TV industry players face 
certain market challenges and trends linked to disruptive innovations. 
 
Global TV industry: disruptive perspective 
In this part, the author presents the TV industry from the perspective of disruption it 
makes to the largest television market, the U.S., influencing the main American TV networks: 
ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, CW, as well as small market players (Sanz, 2012). Considering the 
fact that the latter TV networks belong to media conglomerates, it is also to confirm, that the 
leading worldwide media companies in 2015 comprise some of them. Comcast, being the 2nd 
with NBC, as well as the News Corp/ 21st Century Fox, being in the 3rd position, are the 
highest position-wise media conglomerates, possessing TV networks (Statista, 2015). 
However, it is also to mention that the latter trends are relevant in most European cases, since 
the EU is generally ranking the second with its turnovers in the TV industry (Sanz, 2012). 
The innovative and fast-developing world of downloads, online streaming, and content piracy 
highly influenced by various digital technologies has been transforming the media industry 
for quite some time. But only recently has this matter gained scientific attention while 
attempting to understand what exactly is happening in media business. Disruptive changes in 
digital distribution, the demand for production of lower-cost content, digitization of 
production and exhibition have totally changed the shape of this industry. Therefore, 
researchers and practitioners have been inquiring if digital dissemination would cause a 
massive disruption to the media industry, as it did to mail delivery services, bookselling, and 
other industries, or if TV and media industries go online (Iordanova & Cunningham, 2012; 
Christopherson, 2008). According to Kon et al. (2016), BCG (2016), BCG Perspectives 
(2016), Steel & Gelles (2014), Tartaglione (2014), these are the trends that have 
fundamentally altered or are about to change significantly the current TV industry: 
 New TV companies and innovative business models are capturing significant 
value online. An example from the U.S. market is given to demonstrate that online-
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advertising revenue increased sevenfold during the years 2010 to 2015, and the 
growth shows no signs of decrease. 
 Online and mobile viewing is expected to exceed facilities-based video viewing. 
In the U.S., the time people spent watching TV internet increased 50% from 2013 
through 2014. In addition, the above mentioned BCG (2016) market research 
advocates, that by 2018, online video content will likely account for about 80% of 
fixed-data traffic and accordingly, to 70% of mobile traffic.  
 Online and mobile viewing will exceed facilities-based video viewing. In the US, 
the amount of time people spent watching television shows on a television set dropped 
marginally (1%) from 2013 through 2014. However, an increasing amount of content 
is being delivered online, leaving video-only distributors (for example, satellite 
service providers) with an asset – facilities-based video distribution – that is quickly 
declining in relevance. Online viewership, on the other hand, is growing quickly. The 
amount of time people spent watching television shows online jumped 50% from 
2013 through 2014. By 2018, online video will likely account for nearly 80% of fixed-
data traffic and close to 70% of mobile traffic. 
 On-demand (VOD) viewing is expected to exceed live, linear viewing. Currently, 
the share of VOD viewing in the U.S. is just about 20%, but this percentage is 
expected to double to more than 40% by 2018 and continue on growing exponentially. 
The same trend is expected in the European TV industry. Another evident trend is the 
shift from ‘watching what is on’ to ‘watching what I want, where and when I want it’ 
(BCG Perspectives, 2016). The DVR was the first disruptive innovation in the 
industry, and current online mobile VOD technologies only accelerated the change in 
the U.S. and Europe. However, entertainment (e.g., sports, events, news) should still 
be still excluded (it makes up 50%) from the shift, as they are quite viewed through 
linear programming. 
 Virtual Reality (VR) is expected to replace the contemporary TV. While the VR 
is still lacking behind due to some factors, like the absence of real-world personal 
interaction, high cost, processing power, and little content, still, in the long run 
(within the next decade), VR applications, live experience and games will likely take 
over a substantial amount of video consumption. Currently, in video, TV is still king. 
The real issue for the televisions to confront is related to market share maintenance. 
Since VR content is delivered over the Internet, the real challenge for traditional TV 
broadcasters is to protect their market margins. On the second thought, from the 
content creation perspective, the question is whether a large infrastructure network 
with TV broadcasters is desired. 
 Minor TV channels plan their survival under the Major TV networks. The latter 
trend fosters the creation of larger conglomerates leaving small independent TV 
groups more vulnerable. The latter mergers (e.g., AT&T and DirecTV, Warner Bros 
and Eyeworks) give TV Majors an advantage towards smaller TV channels or groups 
to accept lower fees for their program broadcasting.  
 
Consequently, considering the above-mentioned trends as disruptive trends that shape 
the TV industry, four scenarios can be defined, according to Boston Consulting Group’s 
research (BCG, 2016): 
1. ‘The Universal Remote’. Those TV companies, which are willing to become the 
anytime-anywhere TV access points, have a possibility to gain an important 
competitive advantage. The latter advantage derives from a fact that even though the 
fragmented industry, consisting of TV broadcasters, pay TV, and Internet TV exists, 
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but viewers cannot view and stream all video content through pathways and devices 
using a single point of navigation.  
2. ‘The Walled Garden’. Since certain content, like TV series or sports events are 
becoming very popular among viewers, the content broadcasters can monetize from 
this trend by encoding the exclusive entertainment content. It is perceived, that the 
aforementioned exclusive content might generate subscribers and might become a 
strategic competitive advantage for a TV broadcaster. 
3. ‘Distribution Disintermediation’. TV companies, having strong brands in the 
market and top-tier programming can gain the competitive advantage by delivering 
content directly to viewers. 
4. ‘Live TV Online’. It is advocated that the traditional TV viewers do not switch to 
online because the traditional TV still offers live programming and content across all 
categories, including news and sports. Therefore, it is essential for online broadcasters 
to integrate live content within their video on demand offerings. The right pricing 
package may transform the TV’s value proposition for viewers. 
 
Having presented the possible scenarios and expanding the topic on disruption and its 
influence towards the online TV video content, it is essential to note other fundamental 
movements in the TV industry’s business models. Boston Consulting Group (BCG 
Perspectives, 2016) highlights that innovative technologies, and high quality online content 
in particular, led to the increase of the online audience share. In order to respond appropriately, 
TV companies have to capture value from the possibilities online, and rethink their own 
business model. Online and mobile TVs are generating revenues from one of the following 
business models: (1) advertising-supported video on demand (AVOD), which gives free 
access to video content for its viewers, while the company earns from advertising; (2) 
transaction-based video on demand (TVOD) that allows viewers to get or rent content for a 
one-off fee; and (3) subscription-based video on demand (SVOD) that allows viewers to 
watch the content for a monthly fee. It is also to mention that the advertising techniques are 
also developing hand in hand with the rise of disruptive business models and eventually the 
advertising will catch up the viewers online. In addition, since more and more U.S. viewers 
choose watching online TV content instead of traditional TV, their choices and tastes 
regarding the broadcasted content change. Indeed, the trend of online and mobile viewing 
changes the traditional subscription-TV business model. And since for many years the viewers 
were used to buying larger video packages, currently the situation is changing as they want to 
unbundle those packages. Interestingly, in case of all the aforementioned disruptive models 
in the U.S., the online economics have been scaling up from 2 to 7 times between the years 
2010 – 2015, and continues growing. However, according to BCG Perspectives (2016), the 
decline of traditional pay TV in the U.S., as well as in Western Europe, should not be as quick 
as within the newspaper and magazine market. The report suggests that in Eastern Europe the 
decline of TV subscriptions should be even smoother.  
Content-wise, there is an evident shift towards the ‘long tail’ production – its unique 
content and niche programming. This also causes the competition for the desired content and 
is mostly seen in the U.S. and the UK, where the combat for exclusive top-tier programming 
is quite robust. As it is mentioned in the report (BCG, 2016), the incentives to create original 
series has caused the increased share of expenditures towards original programming in both, 
traditional TVs and online TVs. It is also stressed out that companies like Amazon, BBC, 
Microsoft, and YouTube have created original programming, while Netflix is also 
experiencing the doubling of licensing costs in 2017, compared to 2013. 
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Lithuanian free-TV broadcasting industry: structure and innovation 
Similarly to the leading global counties in TV market, European countries are also 
experiencing global disruptive changes and following TV industry trends. Lithuanian case is 
presented, as the country has a distinctive characteristic in the European TV broadcasting 
context: Lithuania has a very high percentage of free TV viewers: there are 43 percent of 
viewers watching free TV. Such figures were found only in Italy and in Lithuania before 
moving to digital platform. In addition, the context is compatible with the Fontaine & Kevin’s 
(2016) classification of pan-European groups of TV channels: Lithuanian broadcasting 
market contains a multi-country broadcaster Times Media Group (MTG). Therefore, the case 
of Lithuanian TV broadcasters is relevant and at the same interesting context to test theory.  
To begin with, the Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry’s structure is presented in the 
table below. It is to note, that all the operating Lithuanian free-TV broadcasters are incumbent 
companies and no new players are found. 
 
Table 4. Incumbent companies: Free-TV broadcasters in Lithuania (RRT, 2013; 2017) 
No Name Owner Type Launched 
LRT Televizija Lithuanian National Radio and Television 
(LRT) 
Public-
owned 
1957 
LRT Kultūra Lithuanian National Radio and Television 
(LRT) 
Public-
owned 
2003 
TV3 UAB TV3 (a part of Modern Times Group 
(MTG)) 
Private 1993 
TV6 UAB TV3 (a part of Modern Times Group 
(MTG)) 
Private 2002 
TV8 UAB TV3 (a part of Modern Times Group 
(MTG)) 
Private 2011 
LNK UAB Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas (LNK) Private 1995 
TV1 UAB Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas (LNK) Private 2003 
Liuks! UAB Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas (LNK) Private 2007 
Info TV UAB Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas (LNK) Private 2007 
BTV UAB Laisvas nepriklausomas kanalas (LNK) Private 1993 
4. Lietuvos rytas 
TV 
UAB Lietuvos rytas (a part of Lietuvos Rytas 
Media Group) 
Private 2004 
 
As seen from the table, there are four TV broadcasting groups, or players, in Lithuania: 
(1) LRT Group. For research purposes, these market players will be called TV groups. It is 
also noted, that the second and the third Groups are the main market competitors. 
Innovation-wise, in Lithuania, the most innovative sector is J Information and 
communication sector, comprising TV broadcasters of the country. According to the data 
provided by the Statistics Lithuania, the number of innovative enterprises grew yearly: in 
2004-2006, there were 27.8 percent of innovative enterprises, and, accordingly, in 2006-2008, 
the percentage was 47.4, in 2008-2010 – 62.4%, in 2010-2012 – 60.4%, and lastly, in 2012-
2014, the percentage was 63.6%. Compared to the closest competitor’s numbers in the last 
time slot, it was the B Mining and quarrying sector having 58 percent of innovative enterprises 
(Statistics Lithuania, 2013). Therefore, the local TV broadcasters are interesting to analyze 
from the disruptive innovation point of view. The author assumes that if it is a highly 
innovative sector, there must have been many disruptions. Consequently, it has much to do 
with the response strategies and underlying factors, which are being identified in the context 
of disruptive innovation in the thesis. 
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First of all, an overview of market indicators and innovation indicators is made. In terms 
of TV broadcasters, the following indicators are retrieved (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. J60, Programming and broadcasting activities (Statistics Lithuania, 2013) 
 
According to LRTA (2013) the revenues of the commercial TV broadcasters in 
Lithuania have been increasing: In 2013, all the commercial broadcasters received 
152,222,131 LTL (approximately 44,086,576 EUR), and in 2014, these broadcasters received 
157,215,688 LTL (approximately 45,532,810 EUR). Also, the indicators of innovative 
enterprises are retrieved (see Table 6). 
Thus, it is an increasing and innovative business sector investing in various innovative 
activities. The latter analysis implies testing the theory of disruptive innovation in the case of 
Lithuanian free-TV broadcasting industry. 
 
From global to local: manifestations of disruptive innovations  
In this research, it is relevant to raise questions and reveal what is and what is not a 
disruptive innovation in TV and in a TV broadcaster’s case. The common sense tells us that 
an innovation can be related to technology, design, process and business model. Specifically, 
disruptive innovations start in particular consumer or non-consumer segments and create 
new markets and customer segments (Scott et al., 2008), and therefore, disruptors 
basically do what competitors do not: they create new revenue streams, build and 
develop new models, new processes, and work with different partner network.  So 
essentially, a disruption describes a situation, whereby a smaller company with fewer 
resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent firms (Christensen, Raynor 
& McDonald, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audio and video 
outlets (N) | units
Number of persons 
employed in 
television 
programming and 
broadcasting 
enterprises | 
thousand
Sales income of 
television 
programming and 
broadcasting 
enterprises (VAT 
excluded) | EUR 
thousand
Number of 
television 
programming and 
broadcasting 
enterprises | units
Total by television 
type
Cable
Digital microwave 
multipoint 
distribution service 
(MMDS)
Digital terrestrial  
(DVB-T)
Satellite
Internet protocol 
(IPTV)
2010 455 1.1 51806.7 638284 404976 20005 63695 78873 70735 37
2011 428 1.1 54467.3 664125 406389 18725 71865 83661 83485 38
2012 412 1.1 54957.4 723626 426975 17506 75808 100874 102463 40
2013 402 1 55961.2 729909 428073 14742 67754 100379 118961 36
2014 460 0.9 59053.7 722964 414244 13371 56965 92584 145800 39
2015K1 14602.7 717734 406908 13095 54551 90484 152696 47
2015K2 16612.2 718506 404891 12772 52512 88804 159527 47
2015K3 12728.2 719684 401175 12563 50742 86469 168735 47
2015K4 19351.4 718662 393836 12552 48650 83647 179977 46
2015 total 63294.5
Television subscribers | units
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Table 6. J60, Type of innovation in programming and broadcasting activities (Statistics 
Lithuania, 2013) 
 
 
Taking into consideration incumbent firms immersed in TV broadcasting business and 
their direct and indirect competitors, a representation of possible threats has been elaborated 
in the table below. 
 
Table 7. Manifestations of disruptive innovations in TV-related contexts (based on 
Netflix.com; Hulu.com; Filmai.in; Teo TV; LNK Go; TV3 Play; Lrytas.tv; LRT Mediateka; 
Aereo; GatesAir; Linkomanija.net cases) 
Industry Key activity Global 
disruptive 
innovation 
Application of 
global 
disruptive 
trend in local 
context 
(Lithuania) 
(targeting non-
consumers of 
traditional TV) 
Outcome: 
application in 
local TV 
broadcasters’ 
context 
(Lithuania) 
(targeting 
traditional TV 
consumers) 
Nature of 
disruption and a 
possible threat to 
TV broadcasters  
Netflix.com, 
Hulu.com 
 
Filmai.in LNK Go; TV3 
Play; 
Lrytas.tv; LRT 
Mediateka  
Over-the-top (OTT) 
video streaming 
platforms; 
New flavours in 
OTT; 
VOD market is 
dominated by 
Netflix, Hulu and 
Amazon;  
2004-2006 NCA NCA
2006-2008 NCA NCA
2008-2010 40 80
2010-2012 20 37.5
2012-2014 50 100
2004-2006 NCA NCA
2006-2008 NCA NCA
2008-2010 5 10
2010-2012 6.7 12.5
2012-2014 14.3 28.6
2004-2006 NCA NCA
2006-2008 NCA NCA
2008-2010 10 20
2010-2012 33.3 62.5
2012-2014 NAP NAP
2004-2006 NCA NCA
2006-2008 NCA NCA
2008-2010 35 70
2010-2012 13.3 25
2012-2014 35.7 71.4
2004-2006 NCA NCA
2006-2008 NCA NCA
2008-2010 45 90
2010-2012 46.6 87.5
2012-2014 35.7 71.4
Technological and 
non-technological 
innovators
Non-technological 
innovators
Innovative enterprises | per cent
compared to all companies
compare to innovative 
companies
Total by employees J60 Programming and 
broadcasting 
activities
Technological 
innovators
Technological 
innovators only
Non-technological 
innovators only
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VOD services 
launched by pay-TV 
channels;  
Advertising VOD 
market embodied by 
YouTube;  
TV channels are 
reaching users 
adopting 
innovations like the 
WWE Network, 
HBO Now and Starz 
Play; 
HD content;  
Multi-platform 
(using internet-
connected devices) 
TV streaming TV 
content. 
Teo smart TV LNK Go; TV3 
Play; 
Lrytas.tv; LRT 
Mediateka  
VOD; 
Teo smart TV 
viewers have 
possibilities to 
watch exclusive 
content (e.g., global 
cinema events). 
LRT  LRT app for 
smart 
Samsung TVs 
Launch of the 
application.  
3D content 
broadcasting 
Teo smart TV 
channel ‘3flow’ 
for nature and 
extreme sports 
fans 
n.d. Possible threats to 
free TV industry. 
HD content 
creation  
HD content 
creation 
HD channels; 
LRT HD seen 
via cable TV, 
choice of a 
language and 
subtitles; 
LNK live HD 
TV program 
onetime 
launched in 
2011 
Possible threats to 
Movie industry 
(cinema); Sports 
events.  
 
Youtube.co
m (other 
online and 
mobile 
viewing 
sources) 
Internet TVs LNK Go; TV3 
Play; 
Lrytas.tv; LRT 
Mediateka  
Possible threats to 
free-TV industry. 
Content 
creation 
airtel Pocket 
TV App 
(India) 
Mobile TVs  Possible threats to 
general TV 
industry. 
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Advertiseme
nt 
  TV3, to some 
extent works 
without 
traditional 
intermediaries 
Possible threats to 
advertisement 
industry. 
Aereo   n/a Aereo makes tiny 
antennas that pick 
up broadcasters’ 
channels for free: 
possible threats to 
pay-TV industry. 
Global 
telecommuni
cations 
equipment 
manufacture
rs  
GatesAir, will 
implement the 
HD television 
network  for the 
national 
broadcaster in 
the U.S. 
LRT HD Possible threats to 
pay-TV industry. 
Rise of 
torrents and 
apps 
Napster; 
thepiratebay.
se 
Linkomanija.net LNK Go; TV3 
Play; 
Lrytas.tv; LRT 
Mediateka  
BitTorrent program; 
apps. 
Virtual 
Reality (VR) 
VR content; 
gaming 
platforms; 
Nintendo’s 
next 
generation 
HD gaming 
platform, 
The Wii U 
includes TV 
remote 
control 
features in 
addition to 
IPTV 
streaming 
features like 
Netflix. 
LRT LRT’s VR 
creation 
initiatives 
In the long run, VR 
is likely to win over 
some to a 
substantial amount 
of video 
consumption; 
 
 
  
The table above includes but is not limited to a list of various nature disruptive 
innovation or embryonic disruptive threats influencing the current incumbent TV companies. 
Based on some examples of global disruptive innovation and their form/ application in local 
Lithuanian context, the major outcome represents the response that Lithuanian TV broadcsters 
choose to deal with the disruption. The above mentioned cases are given to make a generic 
impresson of the sector-specific examples, illustrating the outcomes, or responses that, based 
on the analysis of internet sources, Lithuanian free-TV broadcasting incumbents are choosing. 
In order to test these and many other initiatives in practice, in the chapter below, the research 
methodology is presented.  
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3.2. Empirical research design and variables  
 
Fontaine & Kevin (2016) exclude two main categories of pan-European broadcasting 
groups: 
1. TV broadcasting groups, generally the subsidiaries of global and major U.S. media 
conglomerates, having a wide range of specific niche brands that are broadcast in 
Europe (e.g., Discovery, Viacom, Time Warner, 21st Century Fox). 
2. TV broadcasting groups, or multi-country broadcasters having generalist channels 
that are found as important in different national markets having a high market share 
(e.g., CEME, RTL, MTG).  
 
In this research, the author presents cases from both pan-European TV broadcasting 
groups: first, the pilot research, a global FOX International Channels case, is prepared in order 
to identify the general trends, which is then followed by the main research, the multi-case and 
within-case analysis in the Lithuanian context, where such multi-country broadcasters, as 
MTG operate. The sequence and the logic of the latter research is represented below. The 
mentioned cases are enriched with the statistical and other data provided in chapter 3.1. 
Choice of research paradigm: qualitative. To start with, the qualitative research 
paradigm is suitable for context-specific research, as in the latter case. As Bitinas et al. (2008) 
suggest, some researches require the qualitative approach, as the conclusions can be made 
only by implementing this approach. And indeed, only qualitative approach is relevant when 
trying to identify different opinions, knowledge diffusion and storytelling. For instance, 
Bitinas et al. (2008) provide an example of the qualitative research paradigm when identifying 
an appropriate motivation strategy. Therefore, in order to reveal the factors determining the 
choice of response strategy by local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations, the qualitative research paradigm is perceived as relevant. 
Choice of research strategy: hermeneutic. Essentially, Heidegger’s (1927; 1962) 
theory of hermeneutics derives from the fact that we exist in an already interpreted world 
(Seymour, 2007) and the latter approach is dependent upon and mediated by ‘prejudices’ 
(quot. Seigfried 1976). The hermeneutic approach helps understand utterances on the basis of 
a common background of meaning (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2014), therefore, hermeneutics 
works as the methodology and practice of interpretation (Paterson & Higgs, 2005). Put 
differently, hermeneutics tells that we are always making investigations under the light of 
subjectivity and all we can do is interpret. According to Gummesson (2003), hermeneutics 
incorporates preunderstanding, understanding and explanation and there is a constant 
oscillation between what we know and what we have learned. Therefore, hermeneutics was 
chosen as an appropriate research strategy since any hermeneutic perspective proposes that: 
(1) a researcher has a preliminary knowledge and practical understanding of what the 
investigated people are ‘up to’ (Packer 1985, quot. in Seymour, 2007) and (2) that the 
information respondents tell about their activities and experiences are a prime locus of 
discovery (Thompson 1997, quot. in Seymour, 2007). By following this approach, the chosen 
research strategy helped to reveal how the representatives of the TV industry perceive the 
phenomenon of disruptive innovation in theory and to find out what were the most common 
response strategies and underlying factors towards disruptive innovation in practice.  
The research objective is to reveal the factors (and their combinations) determining 
the choice of response strategy by local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. 
Research problem. The current research in the field of TV industry mostly analyzes 
one of the perspectives: response strategies and influencing factors (Christensen, 1997; 
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Charitou & Markides, 2003; Sandström et al., 2009; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010) towards 
disruptive innovation or disruptive innovation in TV industry (Benson, 2007; Sarkis, 2009; 
Storsul & Krumsvik, 2013). Thus, the current research does not investigate the factors 
determining the choice of response strategy by local incumbent TV broadcasters to global 
disruptive innovations. Therefore, these research questions are raised: 
1. What are the key trends and new disruptive business models in TV industry? 
2. What are the key challenges for TV broadcasters as specific actors within the modern 
media value chains? 
3. What are the strategies of Lithuanian TV broadcasters in the context of disruptive 
innovation? 
4. What main factors determine the choice of response strategy by local TV broadcasters 
to global disruptive innovation? 
 
Research methods: 
1. Multiple case analysis; 
2. Within-case analysis; 
3. Data analysis; 
4. Semi-structured interview; 
5. Content analysis. 
 
1. Pilot research. With an objective to reveal and understand the general trends and 
challenges in a global TV broadcasting industry, a pilot research has been carried out. Based 
on a semi-structured interview, the latter research highlights the most visual factors and 
strategic incentives, which partially constitute to the main research. Where possible, the latter 
factors have roughly been structured into environmental (Catalysts of disruption), company-
specific (Human/ managerial and Structural/ organizational) factors and other variables. It is 
to note, that the pilot research did not imply to reveal a full spectrum of factors (variables) or 
strategies at first. Later, having pursued the TV industry analysis and further literature 
analysis, additional factors were added to the main research instrument, as well as the 
response strategies, while some other variables have been not taken into consideration in the 
main research. 
2. Main research. In order to disclose how the factors behind response strategies 
determine and manifest within incumbent TV broadcasting companies facing disruptive 
innovation, multiple cases have been prepared. Multiple case studies have been designed in 
two steps, according to Eisenhardt (1989). First, a within-case analysis has been implemented 
in order to reveal different perceptions of factors and response strategies in all TV groups in 
Lithuania. Second, the comparison of manifestations of factors and response strategies have 
been provided. As a matter of fact, multiple cases enable the creation of more generalizable 
theory compared to a single case analysis and increase the reliability of findings in a given 
industry (Sarkar, 2016; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Multiple case studies have been 
illustrated by the results of 11 semi-structured interviews of Lithuanian free TV broadcasting 
companies (or TV groups). The number of interviews that has been taken at one TV group is 
related to the number of free TV channels the latter TV group possesses in Lithuania. The 
interviewees were top managers or members of top management team at Lithuanian TV 
groups. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The qualitative data and content 
from all the cases has been analyzed with Maxqda software, which allows to identify the 
manifestations and its frequencies within-case and the relations between multiple cases. In 
addition, the content analysis method has been used to draw an outline of each TV group 
according to public quantitative data. The multiple case and within-case analysis have pointed 
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out the main factors influencing the choice of response strategies at incumbent forms, engaged 
in disruptive innovation. 
 
Data collection method and appropriateness for research goals 
According to Bewley (2002), if the research goal is to understand the nature of a 
phenomenon with a view to formulating new theories, then in qualitative research, the style 
of an interview conducted should be less structured in the hopes that interviewees will come 
up with unexpected descriptions and arguments. In order to reveal factors behind the response 
strategies, a semi-structured interview method was chosen as an appropriate method. Thus, in 
the latter case, in order to ground the conclusions of the empirical research, both, qualitative 
and quantitative research data, obtained from different stakeholders enables the realization of 
these aspects: 1) better understanding of the phenomenon; 2) the appropriateness and validity 
of interview questions.  
 
Sample definition 
The researcher chose probability sampling and the relevant sampling methods, in order 
to ensure to each population element a chance of being chosen for the sample. 
1. Pilot research. Stratified sampling was chosen for a pilot research, as global TV 
industry consists of various media companies and conglomerates. However, FOX 
International Channels was chosen as an example and as one of the Majors in media business, 
no. 3 global media company according to revenues (Statista, 2015), Twenty-First Century 
FOX, representing the global TV arena.  FOX is perceived as a global TV industry giant, 
together with such companies as Time Warner, CBS, Viacom, etc. (BCG Perspectives, 2016). 
2. Main research. Cluster sampling was chosen as a sampling approach due to the fact 
that the 
Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry consists of 11 TV broadcasters, according to RRT 
(2013), which belong to four different TV groups: 
1. LNK Group: LNK, BTV, TV1, Info TV, LIUKS!  
2. TV3 Lithuania: TV3, TV6, TV8  
3. LRT: LRT Televizija, LRT Kultūra 
4. Lietuvos rytas media group: Lietuvos rytas.tv 
 
Profile of the interviewees and the confidentiality & disclosure of results: Bourne 
& Jenkins (2005) highlight that recent research on micro strategy investigates how individual 
managers make their choices in terms of strategy. Bewley (2002) also agrees that it is 
important to find key informants, or critical people in companies that are very knowledgeable 
about the topic. Therefore, the latter profile of interviewees has been selected for both, pilot 
research and main research parts. Position: a top management or middle management position 
within a company (not to be disclosed further for confidentiality). Areas of responsibility: 
general management, international development, development management, finance 
management, program management, content creation, management consulting and other 
similar areas. Some Lithuanian interviewees asked for the personal confidentiality level, 
therefore, in order to keep the unique structure of the research, all interviewees are numbered 
1-11. Bewley (2002) stresses, that it is essential to keep confidentiality of the interviewees for 
personal and economic reasons of a company. 
 
Sequence of the research 
The sequence of this research is illustrated below: 
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Figure 3. Sequence of the research (according to McDaniel & Gates, 2007) 
 
 
This research consists of two main parts (1-2) and one overlapping part (3):  
1. Pilot research (semi-structured interview) on FOX International Channels. 
2. Semi-structured interviews with the experts of Lithuanian TV broadcasters. 
3. Secondary data and statistical data analysis on global TV industry, as well as 
Lithuanian TV industry, its local incumbent TV broadcasters, and its innovations 
(presented in part 3.1 and linked to within-case or multiple cases in part 4).  
 
 
Determine the problem 
and research objective 
Choice of research type 
 
Choice of research 
methods 
 
Determine sampling 
method and sample size 
Data collection 
Analysis of the 
empirical data 
 
Discussion of the 
findings 
Research type: qualitative research 
Research methods: multiple case, within-case analysis, semi-
structurized interviews (qualitative method) content analysis, 
data analysis (quantitative method) 
   Sampling method: Stratified sampling for Pilot research (1); 
Cluster  sampling for Main research in Lithuania (11, equal to 
the population size) 
Research problem: Current research in the field of TV industry 
mostly analyzes one of the perspectives: response strategies and 
influencing factors but do not investigate the factors 
determining the choice of response strategy by local incumbent 
TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovations. 
Research objective: to reveal the factors (and their 
combinations) determining the choice of response strategyby 
local incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. 
 
Research findings are presented in the 4th chapter and discussed 
in detail in the 5th chapter 
The interviews were analyzed by content analysis method 
(using Maxqda software). Statistical and other public data is 
generalized according to industry structure and economic 
activities 
Data was collected from November, 2015, to June, 2016, in two 
ways: 1) semi-structurized interview; 2) secondary data from 
public sources 
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The empirical research framework is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 4.  Empirical research framework 
 
Firstly, in order to design the main research, the theoretical background, as well as the 
pilot research have been used as a basis for formulating and redesigning questions for the 
main semi-structured interviews. This descriptive pilot research is an attempt to describe what 
is the TV industry facing globally. The pilot interview was conducted on November 26, 2014 
in Rome, Italy. The duration of the interview is 1 hour and 52 minutes. The interview 
questionnaire consisted of 9 items, and some questions were raised during the interview in 
order to obtain complete answers. At the same time, the Lithuanian cases have been chosen. 
Secondly, the analysis of secondary data and secondary statistical data provided by 
various global TV industry reports and the data from Statistics Lithuania is employed to 
explore the industry and local incumbent TV broadcasters in Lithuania. Secondary statistical 
data shows relevant market information and innovation-specific factors of the analyzed 
companies. In addition, semi-structured interviews represent the views of experts of 
Lithuanian TV broadcasters on disruptive innovation and its impact on its response strategies. 
There were 11 interviews conducted with the experts on the basis of the questions of the pilot 
case study and the analysis of literature and secondary statistical data. The interviews were 
arranged from March to June, 2016, in Lithuania. The interview time varied from 44 minutes 
to 2 hours and 9 minutes. 
Lastly, based on data and content analysis (the latter has been elaborated with Maxqda 
software) from the cases, a within-case and multiple cases were created. Afterwards, general 
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conclusions were drawn according to the data. According to the extracted data, the theoretical 
contribution was made by modifying the existing scientific literature on influencing factors, 
response strategies, and disruptive innovation topics. 
 
Factor measurement 
In order to reveal the manifestations of factors (or variables, as named in the 4th part; 
the concepts are used interchangeably) behind response strategies within-case and the 
relations between cases, the qualitative data from all the cases has been analysed with Maxqda 
software, which allows to identify the frequency the code has been used throughout the 
interviews. The latter analysis allows to point out the main factors, their antecedents, the 
response strategies to disruptive innovation, as well as their relations and combinations. 
 
Validation of results 
Bitinas et al. (2008) argue that the validity of research results is one of the main 
objectives for a researcher, however, complete validity is impossible to reach. It is also 
stressed that the validity depends on the chosen research strategy, research objectives and 
research methods. Thus, in a qualitative research, the validity is important to interpret the 
results and make the conclusions accordingly, which are based on the relevance of the 
research instrument (Kardelis, 2002, quot. in Bitinas et al., 2008). It is suggested by the latter 
researchers that the results of a research can be perceived as valid if one of the methods have 
been applied: (1) triangulation; (2) the researcher made a part of the research; (3) there were 
other researchers involved in the research; (4) mechanic data recording and storing 
technologies have been used; (5) other researchers have participated during the phase of result 
analysis. In addition, it is also essential to ensure that the results obtained can be transfered to 
the general set. Therefore, in order to assure the validity of results, further steps were made. 
First, the questions of the semi-structured interviews (both, for a pilot research and a main 
research), were sent by email in advance to the interviewees to prepare. Second, all the 
interviews have been recorded and stored in various digital devices. Third, the results between 
pilot research and the main research have been compared in order to understand, if the 
interviewees interpreted the trends and challenges in the industry accordingly. Lastly, the 
results of the research are applicable to the general set as the pilot research gave an idea of 
what is happening in the TV broadcasting market, while all the free Lithuanian TV 
broadcasting companies (or TV groups) have participated in the research. It is also to mention, 
that the researcher tried to keep the ‘open’ atmosphere during the interviews and did not try 
to constrain the mind flow of the respondents. By doing this, the researcher captured the 
required information and other significant industry facts. However, all the questions have 
been answered by providing lots of extra information to consider. And since every research 
has its limitations due to validity-related issues (Bitinas el at., 2008), in the paragraph below 
the research limitations are being presented.  
 
Research limitations 
Scientific literature (e.g., Bogner & Menz, 2009) advocates that the interviewees 
engaged in their field of expertise will always have their own particular interest and opinion 
in the investigating subject. Thus, differences among conversations with experts exist and a 
proliferation of ways of proceeding is inevitable. Therefore, interpretations of opinions and 
facts have been compared to the other interviewees of the same TV group. 
The implemented research was based on 1 global case and 11 Lithuanian cases. Even 
though the pilot interview had to give the researcher an idea of how the TV broadcasting 
industry functions on a global scale, in order to apply these findings in a broader context, 
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further research and the collection of different data is needed. In the case of local (Lithuanian) 
cases, the amount of interviews represents the number of free TV channels in Lithuania. Given 
the fact, that some TV Groups, LNK for instance, possesses 5 channels (equal to 5 interviews 
in this case) in the market, the results of the interviews are to some extent in favor to this 
market player. It is also claimed that to some extent these results represent the commercial 
televisions (9 interviews) better than the public broadcaster (2 interviews accordingly). Thus, 
given the named limitations, further research on topic might include triangulation strategy or 
a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
 
Research instrument 
1. Pilot research 
The pilot research was based on an interview (see questions below) that allowed to 
describe the global television broadcasting market and its trends, as profiled in the chapter 
3.1. The questions were structured according to the theoretical category. 
 
Table 8. Semi-structured interview questions for FOX International Channels 
No. Variable(-
es) 
Question References 
1. Business 
Model, 
Industry 
Structure 
What is a dominant Business Model (BM) design in 
your industry? 
 
Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2010 
2. Business 
Model 
Do the competitors in this industry compete more 
in terms of different products/ services (value 
proposition), or by approaching the market with a 
different BM? Or is there basically the same BM, 
just different product/service provided?  
Osterwalder, 2004; 
Osterwalder, Pigneur 
& Tucci, 2005 
3. Business 
Model, 
Catalysts of 
Disruption 
Key rules, according to which the businesses play 
in your industry, by offering the specific value 
proposition (commercializing, monetizing the 
offering; managing costs)? 
Zott & Amit, 2007; 
Hagel, 2015 
4. Business 
Model 
What is your company’s BM? Several BM that you 
can mention? How do they relate to each other? 
Any conflicts? 
Casadesus-Masanell 
& 
Ricart, 2010; 
Casadesus-Masanell 
& Zhu, 2013 
5. Business 
Model 
To what extent does your company replicate the 
dominat BM design? If so, in what elements do you 
seek to differentiate it from the competitiors? Does 
your differentiation go beyond the value 
proposition (offering different product/service)? 
Morris, Schindehutte, 
Allen & 2005; Teece, 
2010 
6. Factors; 
Catalysts of 
Disruption 
What are the key factors that determine the shape of 
your company’s BM? Is it more internal (perception 
of a manager, existing structures, processes, 
resources - brand, key competences that you have), 
or external (such as the key technology trends, 
economic conditions (purchasing power of the 
customers), lifestyle changes, etc.)? 
Pohle & Chapman, 
2006; Chesbrough 
2007; Teece, 2010; 
Hagel, 2015 
7. Factors; 
Catalysts of 
Disruption 
If both, which are the most important (see the lists 
above) of internal and external factors in your 
company? Your industry? 
Porter, 1990; 
Christensen, 2004; 
Pohle & Chapman, 
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2006; Von Stamm, 
2008; Hagel, 2015 
8. Factors Do the customers/ competitors have a greater 
influence towards the BM dynamics in your 
company? When you decide to make adaptations to 
your current BM, what are the key things you look 
at? Changed customer preferences? New BM 
adopted by the competitors? What other factors 
come to your mind? 
Porter, 1990 
9. Factors To what extent the interplay of Structural/ 
organizational and Human/ managerial factors 
depend on the company’s competitive position in 
the industry? 
Porter, 1990; Dutton 
& Duncan, 1987; 
Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; 
Sandström et al., 
2009; Madjdi & 
Hüsig, 2011; 
 
It is to note that the pilot research had a primary objective to reveal and help understand 
the general trends and challenges in a global TV broadcasting industry. The pilot research 
highlights the most visual factors and strategic incentives, which partially constitute to the 
main research questions. However, the the main research was constructed not only on the pilot 
research basis; in addition, the TV industry analysis and further literature analysis have been 
implemented in order to extract additional factors and the response strategies for the main 
research instrument. 
 
2. Main research: semi-structured interviews  
In addition to what has been noticed from the global statistical data in the chapter 3.1. 
and revealed during the pilot case analysis, certain questions should be modified and added 
in order to represent the Lithuanian incumbent TV broadcasters: 
 
Table 9. Semi-structured interview questions for Lithuanian TV broadcasters (see Annex 1 
for the full Lithuanian version) 
No. Variable(-es) Question (in English) References 
1 Key trends and 
challenges in 
industry 
What trends do you foresee in your company’s 
case? What are the key challenges for TV 
broadcasters as specific actors within the modern 
media value chains? 
Pilot research  
 Business Model 
Trends 
What are the key trends and new disruptive 
business models in TV industry? Do the 
competitors in this industry compete more in terms 
of different products/ services (value proposition), 
or by approaching the market with a different BM? 
Or is there basically the same BM, just different 
product/service provided? What is the role of 
technology as a key success factor in competition? 
Do companies compete more on technologies, or 
on its products/services? 
Osterwalder, 2004; 
Osterwalder, Pigneur 
& Tucci, 2005 
Enabling technology: 
How did the enabling technology (e.g. digital 
infrastructure providing richer connectivity; 
affordable access to sophisticated tools of 
production; cheaper, faster, more reliable shipping 
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making the world smaller; affordable sensors 
making the invisible visible) influence this 
industry and the company you represent? 
Customer mindset: 
How did the customer mindset (e.g. from “wanting 
the best” to “accepting the basics”; from accepting 
standardized to expecting personalized; from 
ownership to access; from passive customer to 
active customizer) influence this industry and the 
company you represent? 
Platform: 
How did the platform itself (e.g. aggregation and 
social platforms reducing isolation; aggregation 
platforms reducing inventory and distribution 
costs; scalable learning platforms reducing barriers 
to entry; learning and aggregation platforms 
increasing collaboration) influence this industry 
and the company you represent? 
Economy: 
How did the economy (e.g. sense of scarcity 
increasing willingness to share; constrained buying 
power decreasing willingness to pay up front; 
lower purchasing power increasing demand for 
affordable, versatile products; challenging 
economic conditions increasing demand for “good 
enough”) influence this industry and the company 
you represent? 
Public policy: 
How did the public policy (e.g. regulatory and 
legislative structures adopting “wait and see” 
approach; local decision making and budgeting; 
changes in the tax or legal code) influence this 
industry and the company you represent? 
3 Response 
strategies 
Is there a common response strategy in the TV 
industry? If yes, what is it? Which of the 
mentioned strategies exist in Lithuanian TV 
broadcasters facing disruptive innovation: (1) 
traditional business and sustaining innovation 
strategy, (2) ignore the innovation strategy, (3) 
disrupt the disruption strategy, (4) innovation 
adoption with focus on existing businesses 
(considering creating a new business unit) 
strategy, (5) embrace the innovation strategy, (6) 
merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. If your 
company did not experience any disruptive 
innovations, please choose one or a few strategies 
which, in your opinion, should work in your 
industry facing disruption. 
Christensen, 1997; 
Charitou & Markides, 
2003 
Human/ managerial actions/ variables: Does the 
quality of management have the strongest impact 
on misunderstanding the importance of an 
emerging threat, such as disruptive innovation? If 
yes, in your opinion, what main managerial factors 
determine the choice of response strategy by local 
Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Viellechner & 
Wulf, 2010; King & 
Baatartogtokh, 2015; 
Denning, 2015; 
Pilot research 
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TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovation 
(E.g. non-autonomous decision making, expertise, 
executive’s vision, executive‘s characteristics, or 
his risk propensity)? 
Structural / organizational variables: 
Which structural/ organizational variables have the 
strongest impact on misunderstanding the 
importance of an emerging threat, such as 
disruptive innovation? Which of the following 
factors determine the choice of response strategy 
by local TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovation: corporate governance, bureaucracy 
and policies, policy of investments, resources, 
heterogeneity, company structure or value 
network? 
Dutton & Duncan, 
1987; Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; 
Sandström et al., 
2009; Madjdi & 
Hüsig, 2011; 
Pilot research 
 
Tested global disruptive innovation. The author chose to test local incumbent TV 
broadcasting companies’ response strategy towards the launch of an Internet TV as a global 
disruptive innovation, which has been adopted by many of the global TV networks. 
Accordingly, the factors are engaged to sustain or ignore the latter choice. 
Having set the appropriate research methodology, in the 4th chapter, the analysis of the 
global pilot research and the local multiple cases are being presented. 
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4. TV broadcasters and global disruptive innovation: strategies and underlying factors 
 
In this part, a conceptual model is analyzed from the practical perspective by naming 
the response strategies and underlying factors in case of global player and local TV 
broadcasters in the light of global disruptive innovation in the TV industry. 
 
4.1. A global TV broadcasting company: key findings  
 
FOX International Channels (FIC), as the pilot research case, has revealed the actual 
situation of the global TV industry, the business models companies are using to compete, the 
challenges it is facing in global media value chains and a spectrum of antecedents and factors, 
influencing incumbent TV firms, engaged in disruptive innovation.  
 
4.1.1. Key trends and new disruptive business models in global TV 
industry 
 
Observations made by a representative of a multinational TV network, FOX 
International Channels (FIC), draw attention to the key trends in the TV industry. According 
to the interviewee, there are at least three common trends that are seen as crucial in the 
global TV business: the internationalization processes, new possibilities provided by 
internet and digitalization, and relevant content creation and distribution for the 
television. The representative highlights that digital-oriented TV provides another important 
revenue stream. When asked about the future of TV industry, the interviewee mentions that 
in 10 years things can change drastically, but the context will still be very important: 
companies should play according to the rules of the industry, existing laws, and know well 
the competitors and consumers. Indeed, Schindler, Upreti and Goswami (2011) sustain the 
idea that the context and the relevance of content is about to become a crucial sales 
proposition, just as the quality of its delivery in the TV industry.  
Talking about the variety of TV business models the interviewee summarized that there 
is no one business model, it depends on several things: context – first of all, competitors, 
economy, vision of the company. Being asked for more details about the business models that 
are becoming disruptive due to global challenges, the respondent argues that business models 
are very different depending on the context. If the context is more or less similar business 
models are similar. Basically, a typical TV business model contains key activities and revenue 
streams from advertising, broadcasting, and producing. The interviewee adds more facts about 
the revenue streams: if you produce new contents you could have publishing revenues, music 
revenues, if you do sports you can have also that kind of revenues. The main sources are 
affiliates revenues, advertising revenues, distribution revenues, production and co-
production revenues. Production can be also paid by sponsor. The respondent continues: if 
you run a channel you can have basically one main business model based on affiliates 
revenues and other revenues, and you can have different business models with joint ventures 
and partners, or if you can’t channels to platforms so you have to sell it to intermediator. In 
some places you might be in a position that you sell service <...>. Further investigation of TV 
broadcasters as specific actors within modern media value chains is provided in the 
subsequent chapter.  
The interviewee from FOX International Channels comments the above-mentioned 
trends in more depth. The respondent argues that when doing business, especially in the 
expansion, or in the very early stage of the startup, you can be very flexible, you can 
experiment, and at a certain point you have to think of two points: you can’t risk forever 
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because you will have competitors, changing technologies, and second – what to do next, 
where do you want to go. You don’t have to abandon what you are doing, but you have to 
follow and focus on your next journey. Sometimes they do the mergers, sometimes you need 
it to expand through investing.  
 
4.1.2. TV broadcasters as specific actors within the modern global media 
value chains: key challenges 
 
As a representative of FOX International Channels explains, TV broadcasters’ business 
models differ according to the context, competitors, economy, and vision. However, the 
majority of them have some common activities which are advertising, broadcasting, and 
producing (content creation). In this chapter some examples are given about how certain 
business models are interrelated with the modern media value chains. To begin with, an 
overview of FOX, as a part of a multi-media company, is provided: FOX International 
Channels is a multi market company, a part of 21st Century FOX which is the company that 
they care of the media, there are several different tracks on divisions. In <…> movie division 
we have the studios, distribution, everything. The other is television in terms of broadcasters, 
for example Sky Italy, which is partially owned by Murdoch (Rupert Murdoch is the Executive 
Chairman of News Corp, the largest news media and entertainment company; author’s 
insertion), and then there are FOX International Channels. Again, coming back to the 
specifics of the context, the interviewee says that there are some similarities of running 
different kind of channels, but at the same time you have to evaluate the opportunities, 
competition and government: it means that in some countries you have an opportunity for 
joint ventures for new channels. In some countries you can’t and you have to run channels 
through one lucky brand. Talking from the perspective of the value chain, the respondent 
explains that the content is global, marketing is global, the launch of content of the premieres 
tries to be simultaneous. <...> however, there are other contents or channels that are relevant 
for context or country, and not relevant and not possible in other countries. Further on the 
respondent provides some specific facts about launching different channels. For example, in 
Italy, one of strongest channel is Fox Crime. It was born in Italy with a very specific crime 
identity. <...> in other countries this was not relevant at all so they don’t have Fox Crime, 
they don’t like crime. Another example is Fox Live. It is a very different channel depending 
on the country. In Italy it has specific identity, which is very much female, American TV series 
like Gray Anatomy, Scandal, or Kastl; younger, which is specific in lifestyles context. In Latin 
America it is mainly reality shows, live production, fiction, and very much unreal lifestyle 
channel, while in Italy it is between lifestyle channel and TV series channel. The interviewee 
ends this part with a statement that FOX is between local to global, and global to local.  
As the interviewee mentioned one of the global response strategies, to disruptive 
innovation, namely, mergers and acquisitions strategy, it is important to analyze what leads 
a company to adopt this strategy. Indeed, Fontaine & Kevin (2016) advocates, that, globally, 
consolidation at the national level, expansion and acquisition of major national players, as 
well as cross consolidation between telecommunications and cable companies are evident in 
the TV industry. In the case of FIC, a provided example was more related to the resources. 
However, it is worth mentioning that in some countries you might need an acquisition when 
you export everything from another country and you just run business with a very few people, 
like one in operations, one general manager, one commercial guy, and programming. But if 
you want to be consistent you have to produce the contents that match to the audience, to 
provide advertising, so that is something that needs resources. Changing rules of the game, 
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new competitors, disruptive technologies make companies think of mergers, or expansion 
through investing. 
Also, joint venture channels are popular within different countries, which implies to 
think of the value chain differently. An example from Turkey is given: in Turkey we launched 
a Kitchen channel and in it we invited local families. We asked for 24Kitchen chef to provide 
a lot of suggestions for Unilever products. In this case you generate revenues outside TV 
with partnership: create an event or launch books, use a special event with a partner, special 
show. Therefore, by taking different opportunities from outside, FOX can generate a 
substantial amount of money.  
Broadcasting as such is: when you distribute the content that you create or buy. It is a 
part of a business model but for FOX particularly it is not very significant. FOX produce TV 
series, but FIC don’t distribute this. This distribution in business overall is up to the movies 
<...>. But if FIC produce something in Italy, for example, Boris, or TV series, they can 
distribute by themselves, because it is just started a global sales arm for FOX International 
Channels. If you produce a show you can distribute this internally or to the third party. 
Internally means, for example, if you produce in Italy you could send content to FOX 
Denmark. Also, if you did a premiere in pay-TV window you can go to the third party.  
Differently, in other companies, like in Disney there was one distribution arm which 
distributed everything – movies, television, channels, digital. <...> In FOX – no: they run 
channels, not production, not contents. So what they broadcast, what they premiere is 
something acquired. So broadcasting is a cost, not a profit. However, the revenues are coming 
from affiliates. It is the platform – Sky Italia, Sky Deutchland. <...> it is called affiliates 
business. So the platform pays you in order to run a channel. 
The other broadcasting-related revenue stream concerns co-production:  if you, as a 
company enter in co-production with free-TV broadcasters you can have a show which is very 
important to your country, is split between pay-TV and free-TV, so you can have a revenue 
share. If you do this in Latin America, you split the revenues between you and co-producer. 
From the production, or content creation perspective, the interviewee named the main 
‘products’: movies, TV series in minor studios for small cables for the network, they do locally 
television for FOX channels, so they have diversified production. In the Italian context, they 
do movies production and co-production with partners, but Warner is much stronger in that 
field in terms of producing, co-producing movies in the countries because they have 2 things: 
consistent amount of money in the country and they are willing to take the risk because the 
product portfolio is big so you can sustain risk. It is difficult to produce a blockbuster, usually 
you have to produce 10 movies and if you are lucky one can become a blockbuster. And you 
have to have 1 – 3 failures. So FOX does movies but not on the scale that Warner does in 
Italy, with actors like Tornatore. <...>. Big player in Italy is Medusa, which is of Mediaset, 
also Sony. They compete in significant way. Trying to understand better the scale of business 
between broadcasting and producing in countries, the interviewee explains that FOX is more 
likely to produce more for the cinemas, movie business, not for television, but this is a part of 
a business model. But again, television is not left behind.  
It is important to note that FIC tries to keep their niche customers by providing them 
niche channels for niche audiences with a specific advertisement. Sometimes niche channels 
are more profitable because they need much less structural costs and gives more revenues, 
so are very profitable. Also, not all channels are supported in all countries due to local 
opportunities. The other distinction is that in some countries you have Sports, in some 
countries you have Movies, in some not. So FOX Movies is in Latin America, but it is not 
broadcasted by Sky Italia, because they pay much more. So why Sky Italia has to pay to FOX 
when they have Sky Cinema? On the contrary, if you have a very small pay-TV platform that 
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doesn’t have a lot of money <...> to sustain FOX Movie channel we give the content to 
premiere the channel. 
Lastly, negotiating production-related businesses, the respondent gives an example of 
the High School Musical, which after some time turned into big business that controlled 
everything – TV, publishing, music. Therefore, the interviewee claims, you have to do 
business inside business. Also, the case of National Geographic is worth mentioning in this 
part, because this channel is very focused on affiliates revenues, plus video and publishing 
magazine revenues. 
Talking about the advertisement, the respondent claims that if you want to be strong in 
advertisement and CPS platform, you need a strong platform, like Sky Italy. Not in Germany, 
because Sky in Germany is not strong because the free TV is super popular. Also, it is 
important to note that the company has important partnerships in advertising, for instance: for 
National Geographic there was a partnership with Unilever, Shell. Moreover, the Channels 
have a separate advertisement company within the company, called FOX One Stop Media: 
the advertising of FOX is divided by regions and there is one person responsible for one 
region. They do traditional advertising, and do global projects with partners. Then inside 
advertising you can have sponsorship, the respondent adds. The interviewee highlights the 
importance of strong brands: the competition is important in terms of advertisement, because 
if you are a successful channel, brands will advertise. Also, advertisement shows the main 
differences and risks between pay-tv and free-TV. The last one is considered to be more risky 
because it is totally based on advertisement. And much more profitable one is pay-TV 
business. 
After having analyzed FIC from the value chain perspective, the main revenue streams 
can be pointed out: affiliates revenues, advertising revenues, distribution revenues, production 
and co-production revenues (also, production can be paid by a sponsor). 
 
4.1.3. Catalysts and factors manifesting globally in the light of disruptive 
innovation 
 
Starting from the global perspective, according to the representative of FOX 
International Channels (FIC), the most common factors, describing the choice of the strategy, 
can be distinguished and analyzed by implementing the qualitative research technique content 
analysis. The figure below represents encoded fragments, elaborated using Maxqda software, 
of the latter interview. In order to reveal chosen variables and its groups’ manifestations 
within the present research, the data from the pilot case has been encoded and analyzed. Thus, 
the research distinguishes smaller codes (variables or contexts), as illustrated below.  
Within the Catalysts of Disruption category, the variables had very different 
manifestations frequencies: Trends and challenges (mentioned 2 times); Enabling technology/ 
Digitalization (mentioned 7 times); Platform (mentioned 11 times); Customer mindset 
(mentioned 2 times); Economy (mentioned 3 times); Public Policy (mentioned 1 time). It is 
to mention, that there are other, not labeled Factors, or Contexts, indicating a company or a 
context, which were mentioned as extremely important during the interview (e.g., Context 
was mentioned 32 times). However, Context, according to the extracts from the interview, 
makes part of Catalyst of Disruption. 
Within the Factors category, the most popular sub-categories were excluded: Structural/ 
organizational variables and Human/ managerial variables. The most popular factor within 
Structural/ organizational variables was Value network (mentioned 16 times), while in the 
other sub-category the most frequent one was named Strategic direction/ vision (mentioned 
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17 times). The factor part, as one of the distinctive parts of this research, is presented further 
in more detail. 
Lastly, within the Business Model, Industry Structure category, the variables were quite 
frequently used: Content (as a value proposition in BM) (mentioned 13 times); Response 
strategy (mentioned 1 time); Competitors/ competition (mentioned 10 times); Business model 
(mentioned 19 times). Within the Business model, the most frequent sub-code was Revenues 
(mentioned 15 times). 
 
 
Figure 5. Variables behind the disruptive innovation in global TV broadcasting companies  
 
As seen from the figure, the times the representative used one code is provided on the 
right side of the picture. Thus, the most mentioned codes, or fragments, talking about the 
global view of the TV industry (mentioning cases not only from FIC, but also Disney’s ABC, 
Mediaset, etc.), are extracted and illustrated in the table below. In addition, the content 
analysis of the interview’s data is provided further in the chapter. 
 
Table 10. Factors and catalysts determining the choice of response strategy globally 
Code 
(Factor) 
Freque
ncy 
Description Example 
Context  
 
(N=32) Catalyst of 
disruption 
(Economy, Public 
<...> context is very important, because you operate in 
the context, and you can't ignore it; 
Full 
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policy, Customer 
mindset) 
There is no one business model, it depends on several 
things. Context first of all, competitors, economy, vision 
of the company;  
there are other contents or channels that are relevant in 
context of a country, and not relevant and not possible in 
other countries; 
Channel which is specific in lifestyles context; 
Producing the contents that should be relevant to the 
local context. 
Business 
model 
(N=19) Business model 
trends 
Industry the business model contains advertising, 
broadcasting, producing if broadcasting in terms of 
affiliates. Revenues come from affiliates revenues, so the 
platform pay you in order to run a channel. And you 
advertise. <…> you can have sponsorship. Then, in 
addition to this, you have 2 other things – distribution – 
if you produce a show you can distribute this internally 
and to 3rd party <…> if you produce in Italy you could 
send content to FOX Denmark. To the 3rd party means if 
you did a premiere in pay-TV window you can go to the 
3rd party. The 4th potential stream is to enter in co-
production with free-TV broadcasters <…>, split 
between pay-TV and free-TV, so you can have a revenue 
share.  
You produce more for the cinemas, movie business, not 
for television <…> but this is a part of a business model. 
<…> you don’t produce for the television only. Maybe 
this was long time ago. When context was different.  
if you run a channel you can have basically one main 
business model based on affiliates revenues and other 
revenues, and you can have different business models 
with joint ventures and partners, or if you can't channels 
to platforms so you have to sell it to intermediator. 
Strategic 
direction/ 
vision  
 
(N=17) Human/ managerial 
factor 
those channels can change because of the vision of the 
president; 
with the new president the vision is to focus on the main 
brand; 
at first I didn’t believe on our president's vision because 
it is very much a status quo; 
The vision of the former European President and 
Worldwide President was expanding the channels where 
the channels are not yet and in terms of channels plus 
adding additional businesses, narrow businesses. The 
vision of two new Presidents is pretty much the opposite: 
let's focus on the brand that we do have; 
Vision is very important as well. The vision comes from 
the top manager of course. 
Value 
network 
(N=16) Structural/ 
organizational 
factor 
We are a multi market company, a part of 21st century 
FOX <…> there are several different tracks on divisions. 
<…> it is movie division, we have the studios, 
distribution, everything. 
Better if you produce locally with local talents, artists 
that can create significant content. 
FIC makes “movies production and co-production with 
partners <…>. But Warner is much stronger in that field. 
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In terms of producing, co-producing movies in the 
countries because they have 2 things: consistent amount 
of money in the country and they are willing to take the 
risk because the product portfolio is big so you can 
sustain risk. <…> so FOX does movies but not on the 
scale that Warner does in Italy <…> A big player in Italy 
is Medusa, which is of Mediaset. Also Sony. 
Content  
 
(N=13) Business Model, 
Structural/ 
organizational 
Factor 
<...> content which can provide the identity of FOX; 
<...> contents should be relevant 
Strong content can make your channel relevant and 
different from other ones, because there is a range of 
channels that you can watch on a free TV. For a strong 
distinctive content <...> local production can be very 
successful; 
contents make you very distinctive; 
Produce the contents that match the audience. 
Platform (N=11) Catalyst of 
Disruption 
(Platform) 
If you want to be strong in advertisement and CPS in 
platform, you need a strong platform, like Sky Italy. Not 
in Germany, because Sky in Germany is not strong 
because there free-TV is super popular. 
If you have to choose between a pay-TV television 
platform that pays you, like CBS, Sky, and I go (as a 
digitally-oriented company) to the web for free based on 
advertising. 
Enabling 
Technolo
gy/ 
Digitaliz
ation 
 
(N=7) Catalyst of 
Disruption 
(Enabling 
Technology) 
<...> market is very much advanced and sophisticated in 
terms of channels, digital channels; 
in countries, where they have digital terrestrial channels 
they are basically strong in regards to Pay TV; 
We try to be digital, have many digital platforms on 
demand; 
digital-oriented because they give you a lot of money. 
 
According to the interview material, the first most important factor is vision, perceived 
as a Human/ managerial factor in the theoretical part of the thesis. Talking more deeply 
about the core factors mentioned during the interview, it is important to mention some vision-
related factors, such as risk propensity, competency, and expertise. As the representative 
claims, everything starts from the vision. <...>. The vision is something that you can’t buy. 
You have it or you don’t. For me it is very simple. You might be a very good manager, a very 
good executive in terms of company’s needs, company’s requirements, but those that had 
vision take the major risk. And then they match on how strong they are in terms of background 
so if they prove in the period of time that they are working, they are successful or mainly 
successful. Also, the respondent points out an example of a vision-related response strategy: 
for example, the director of Sky Italy rejected constantly to do digital platform, because he 
didn’t believe it. (Wanted to stay in his business) so that was his vision, that was completely 
wrong but that was the vision. It was right in the sense that taking away the core business is 
wrong. Therefore, the interviewee adds, the vision of concentrating on your own business is 
general manager's decision. And to expand the business where the channels are not. 
Interestingly, as a representative of the company, the interviewee said he/she I was totally 
against the vision of my boss, while making his/her own strategic decisions at the company. 
The respondent supports this statement by mentioning later on: I care about my vision. And 
my boss was about the rules. We have always exceptional guys, very strong executives in 
terms of skills, the way they do jobs, but visionaries – not so many. My vision crashed with 
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the company’s. When asked if the vision of the Global CEO was very much in line with all 
the different regions, the interviewee answered that it was not necessarily because of different 
contexts and approaches: particularly FOX gives a lot of freedom to local countries. If a 
President in Latin America writes projects that are relevant to Latin America, that's very 
much FOX attitude I would say. 
The last excerpt provides an explanation between two very important factors – vision(s) 
of the President(s) and context. Thus, the following research paragraph explains in more 
depth the context, the second most important factor that the respondent mentioned throughout 
the whole interview. It is important to mention that context is a very broad category which is 
closely related to a few catalysts of disruption (in this case economy, public policy, and 
customer mindset), as highlighted in the theoretical part. As the interviewee claims the 
business models of the industry depend on a few things: context first of all, competitors, 
economy, vision of the company. In this part, the representative speaks of the interests of 
countries regarding specific, local channels. While trying to identify the priorities in different 
contexts the company analyzes why some channels exist in different countries as joint 
ventures: in France, they have a joint venture channel Voyage which is a traveler’s channel 
and in the Netherlands they have a joint venture channel Kitchen which is basically for 
cooking. <...>. So those channels are very local, based on the opportunities of the country 
and some rules. From the context perspective, the interviewee mentions not only the choice 
of different channels, but also the different content. Therefore, the TV companies should be 
aware of producing the contents that should be relevant to the local context. Again, the shift 
from global to local is very important in this case. Talking about European context the 
respondent argues that Europe is complex, because it is a region made of very different 
markets in terms of: a) maturity b) government c) broadcasting context.  
Since context and content are very interrelated in this interview, as shown in the 
previous paragraph, next step is to analyze the content, which, from the company perspective, 
is perceived as an identifying factor of a certain TV channel and from a user perspective is 
seen as a relevant value proposition. It is indeed perceived as an internal company factor, 
very much related to the company’s value network, investments, resources and overall 
company structure. Therefore, content is named a Structural/ organizational factor in this 
case. Talking about the linkages between the context and the content, the interviewee argues 
that in some countries American content is very popular, and in others this is not very relevant. 
So you can match it with some local contents. Better if you produce locally with local talents, 
artists that can create significant content.  It is also highlighted that strong content can make 
your channel relevant and different from other ones, because there is a range of channels that 
you can watch on a free TV. For a strong distinctive content <...> local production can be 
very successful. Content is also seen as a competitive advantage for the companies: you 
compete by contents with free TV. If you are premiering a movie, you are competing in a time 
slot with free TV. If you have similar contents, you compete by contents with channels. In 
relation to value network, the interviewee gives an example: if you produce in Italy you could 
send content to FOX Denmark. If FOX wants to sell contents to RAI, they are competing for 
the same customers with different portfolio. Talking about the investments it is also claimed 
that investing to the content is very important in case of every segment. The importance of 
the resources that a company has is revealed in this quote: if you want to be consistent you 
have to produce the contents that match to the audience, to provide advertising, so that is 
something that needs resources. Also, to some extent, a lack of resources plays a big role in 
this business: the brand tries to stay away from the opportunities, because this requires less 
resources in long run and more consistency from global to local, marketing campaigns can 
be applied everywhere, processes are more easy. 
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Finally, the role of digitalization and its linkages with the above mentioned factors is 
discussed. When entering new markets, the relevance of digitalization plays an important role. 
For example, in the UK it is difficult because the market is very much advanced and 
sophisticated in terms of channels, digital channels. Talking about the interviewee’s previous 
career in the global TV networks, an example of competitors is given, which lets the author 
understand the importance of digitalization: Disney is a strong believer in digital for example. 
A competitor to Disney is cartoon network or digital terrestrial channels. Therefore, global 
TV broadcasters are facing the digital challenges from the competitor‘s perspective. The 
respondent argues, that in countries, where they have digital terrestrial channels they are 
basically strong in regards to Pay TV. When linking vision to digitalization, one example is 
given: <...> the director of Sky Italy rejected constantly to do digital platform, because he 
didn’t believe in it. <...>. I don’t believe they will substitute traditional business completely. 
Television has to please too many people. But when it comes to the younger segment the 
interviewee agrees that they are digitally-oriented. But all in all FOX is digital-oriented 
because they give you a lot of money. 
Interestingly, when analyzing relations between factors and catalysts only in the case of 
FIC company, a different picture is seen. In short, in case of FIC, the most common codes 
were these (see figure below). 
 
 
Figure 6. Variables behind the disruptive innovation in FIC 
Thus, Maxqda software allowed to relate the codes to the analyzed company (FIC) and 
extract the most evident ones. In case of FOX International Channels, the disruption-related 
variables, or factors are: 
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1. Structural/ organizational variables (company structure and corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies); 
2. Human/ managerial variables (expertise, competency and strategic 
direction/ vision). 
 
In addition to the above mentioned factors, other important variables are related to 
company’s business model, its revenue streams, and competitors (Disney ABC in the latter 
case). It is highlighted that the context in which the company operates is undeniably 
important. Thus, further on, it is important to analyze the specifics of Lithuanian broadcasting 
TV’s context and reveal the manifestations of the context-specific factors in the light of 
disruptive innovation.  
 
4.2.  Lithuanian TV broadcasters: key findings using within-case and multiple 
case analysis 
 
To start with, within-case analysis is used to represent the specifics of the four TV 
Groups in Lithuania. The current part of the cases has been prepared based on secondary 
statistic public data. 
But, first, it is essential to present the competitive environment. When talking about the 
main market competitors, it should be noted that the most popular channels were the 
commercial TV3 and LNK, the main competitors on the scale of ratings in the television 
market of Lithuania (Nugaraite, n.d.; Račas et al., 2011). All in all, the three main competitors 
– broadcasting groups are the following (MAVISE, 2016): 
a. The Swedish Modern-Times Group, operating 10 channels, including the 
leading TV channel, TV3 Lithuania; 
b. MG Baltic, operating 6 channels, including the 2nd ranking TV channel in 
terms of audience market share, LNK; 
c. The Public Service Broadcaster Lithuanian National Radio and Television 
(LRT) is operating a total of 4 TV channels, including the 3rd ranking TV 
channel in audience, LRT; 
d. Lietuvos Rytas Media Group, including Lietuvos Rytas TV.  
 
Having presented the industry specifics, next, the TV groups are presented separately.  
 
1. LNK TV Group: a general outline 
The purpose of this general outline is to investigate the factors determining the choice 
of response strategy by Lithuanian incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. The actual part of the case presents LNK Group’s background, based on 
secondary data analysis. The subsequent parts of the case analysis reveal the choice of 
response strategy and underlying factors based on five interviews with top managers of LNK. 
The amount of interviews was based on the amount of free TV channels the television 
broadcasts for the Lithuanian market. 
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Table 11. LNK TV Group overview (Apie LNK, n.d.; MG Baltic, 2013; MG Baltic Media, 
2013; Rimkuviene, 2012; MG Baltic, n.d.; TNS, 2015; TNS, 2016; Lietuvos televizijos 
rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2016; LNK vadovai, n.d.; LNK 
darbuotojai, 2016; LNK registracinė informacija, 2016). 
Section Main facts 
Company (TV group) 
overview 
LNK TV broadcasts entertainment programs, consisting of TV series, 
popular shows, and new movies. LNK TV program duration is of 19 
hrs per day/ 133 hrs per week. Original production – 35 %. Foreign 
production – 65 %. The LNK Group that includes LNK, BTV, TV1, 
Info TV and Liuks! TV had retained its leading position in the 
Lithuanian TV market in 2013. The Group has also launched the 
Internet TV LNK Go. 
Establishment Founded in 1995, March 1. 
Development On 22 May 2013, the Competition Council cleared a merger wherein 
UAB ‘Laisvas ir nepriklausomas kanalas’ acquired 100 per cent of 
BTV shares. BTV channel has been the most quickly growing TV in 
Lithuania. BTV is the only channel that has been growing during the 
last three years. The BTV audience share has increased up to 6.7 % 
from 5.6 % in 2012. In 2013, the channel has become the 3rd most 
popular TV, having displaced LRT. On 31 December 2011 the first 
high definition (HD) Lithuanian TV program was countrywide 
broadcasted to the public by LNK. 
Brands LNK Group belongs to the MG Baltic Media Group (as well as 
Mediafon and Alfa Media). UAB ‘Laisvas ir nepriklausomas kanalas’ 
owns 5 free national television programs – LNK, BTV, TV1, Info TV, 
Liuks! and the Internet TV LNK Go. UAB ‘Laisvas ir nepriklausomas 
kanalas’ has the biggest TV group in the country, comprising the most 
popular channels LNK, BTV, also TV1, which is tailored for women 
audience, information channel ‘Info TV’ and entertainment channel 
‘Liuks!’ 
Audience share LNK retained 17.1% of the audience which is owned by LNK Channel 
Group (joint audience share of LNK Group amounted to 31.5%: LNK 
17,1%; BTV 7%; TV1 3,6%; Info TV 2,9%; Liuks! 0,8%). As the year 
before, in 2015 the TV market leaders rankings remained unchanged – 
LNK, run by LNK Channel Group (overall audience share amounting 
to 29.7%: LNK 15,9%; BTV 7,1%; TV1 3,4%; Info TV 2,7%; Liuks! 
0,6%), had one of the biggest audience in terms of share, 15.9%. 
Monthly reach of the 
audience, 2014 
Monthly reach of the audience in case of LNK was more than 80 %; 
BTV – more than 70%; TV1 - more than 70%; Info TV - almost 60 %; 
Liuks! - n.d. 
Daily reach of TV 
channels, %. 
Jan 2015: LNK 41.2%; BTV 26.6%; TV1 19.2%; Info TV 19.4%; 
Liuks! 8.9% (KANTAR TNS, 2015). Jan 2016: LNK 40.3 %; BTV 
27.0%; TV1 17.1%; Info TV 19.1%; Liuks! 6.0% 
Popularity of TV 
channels among different 
target groups, 2014 
LNK is popular within the age group of 44. 
Company (TV group) 
structure 
The administrative structure of the LNK Group is as follows: 
General Director, Finance Director, Program Director, Editor-in-chief, 
Sales Director, Promotion and Marketing Director, Technical Director, 
Director of Operations, Development Director. Number of employees. 
63 (as of 11/10/2016). 
Revenue streams and 
other financial data 
Turnover of UAB ‘Laisvas ir nepriklausomas kanalas’, 2013: 
18,421,281 Eur; 2014: 21,186,284 Eur; 2015: 25,238,000 Eur. 
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2. TV3 Group Lithuania: a general outline 
The purpose of this general outline is to investigate the factors determining the choice 
of response strategy by Lithuanian incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. The actual part of the case presents TV3 Group’s background, based on 
secondary data analysis. The subsequent parts of the case analysis reveal the choice of 
response strategy and underlying factors, based on three interviews with top managers of TV3. 
The amount of interviews was based on the amount of free TV channels the television 
broadcasts for the Lithuanian market.  
 
Table 12. TV3 Group Lithuania overview (Apie TV3, n.d.; MAVISE: TV3, n.d.; 
Bloomberg, 2016; Nugaraite, n.d.; MTG, 2003; TNS, 2015; TNS, 2016; Lietuvos televizijos 
rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2016; TV3 
registracinė informacija, 2016). 
Section Main facts 
Company (TV group) 
overview 
TV3 Group is the most watched television group in Lithuania. 
Entertainment channel belongs to the MTG Group, which broadcasts 
several TV3 channels in Nordic and Eastern European countries. The 
main channel, TV3 was previously known as Tele 3, and was the first 
private channel in Lithuania. Nowadays, TV3 is the leader in terms of 
audience in the Lithuanian market. 
Establishment Founded in 1992. 
Development TV3 Lithuania, UAB owns and operates TV channels. The company 
was formerly known as Tele-3, UAB and changed its name to TV3 
Lithuania, UAB in 1996. As of June 3, 2003, TV3 Lithuania, UAB 
operates as a subsidiary of Modern Times Group (MTG) AB. On June 
3, 2003 MTG acquired the remaining 16 percent of the shares in TV3 
Lithuania, increasing its ownership to 100 percent. MTG owns 100% 
of TV3 and other channels in the Baltic States Estonia and Latvia. 
Brands TV3 Group belongs to the international media and entertainment 
business group Modern Times Group (MTG), which also broadcasts 
TV6 and TV8 channels in Lithuania, owns entertainment and news 
portal www.tv3.lt with TV3 Play and the radio station Power Hit 
Radio. 
Audience share The vast majority of the audience in 2014 belonged to TV3 (17.2%), 
which was run by MTG Channel Group (joint audience share of MTG 
Group amounted to 24.3%: TV3 17.2%; TV6 4.4%; TV8 2.7%). As the 
year before, in 2015, the TV market leaders rankings remained 
unchanged - TV3, run by MTG Channel Group (overall audience share 
amounted to 23.1%: TV3 16.2%; TV6 4.3%; TV8 2.6%) 
Monthly reach of the 
audience, 2014 
Monthly reach of the audience in case of TV3 was more than 80 %; 
TV6 – more than 70 %; TV8 – about 60 % 
Daily reach of TV 
channels, %. 
Jan 2015: TV3 41.0%; TV6 21.3%; TV8 15.3%. Jan 2016: TV3 
40.0%; TV6 19.7%; TV8 15.6%. 
Popularity of TV 
channels among different 
target groups, 2014 
TV3 and TV6 are popular within the age group of 37. 
Company (TV group) 
structure 
Number of employees. A team of more than 140 people in Lithuania. 
Specifically, there are 131 employees at UAB TV3 (as of 10/10/2016). 
Revenue streams and 
other financial data 
Turnover of UAB TV3, 2013: 23,069,009 Eur; 2014: 22,517,294 
Eur; 2015: more than 23,000,000 Eur. 
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3. Lietuvos Rytas TV: a general outline 
The purpose of this general outline is to investigate the factors determining the choice 
of response strategy by Lithuanian incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. The actual part of the case presents Lietuvos Rytas TV’s background, based on 
secondary data analysis. The subsequent parts of the case analysis reveal the choice of 
response strategy and underlying factors, based on one interview with a top manager of 
Lietuvos Rytas TV. The amount of interviews was based on the amount of free TV channels 
the television broadcasts for the Lithuanian market. 
 
Table 13. Lietuvos Rytas TV overview (Balčiūnienė, 2015; MAVISE: Lietuvos Rytas TV, 
n.d.; Lietuvos rytas TV, n.d.; TNS, 2015; TNS, 2016; Lietuvos televizijos rinkos 2014 
metais apžvalga, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2016; Lietuvos televizijos 
rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga, 2015; Lietuvos ryto TV administracija, n.d.; Lietuvos ryto TV 
apyvarta, n.d.). 
Section Main facts 
Company (TV group) 
overview 
UAB ‘Lietuvos Rytas’ group comprises daily Lietuvos Rytas, internet 
portal, printing house and Lietuvos Rytas TV. Previously known as 
Penktas Kanalas (Channel 5), Lietuvos Rytas TV takes 55% of all 
showing programs from foreign countries. 
Establishment Founded in 2008, on October 12. 
Development Lietuvos Rytas TV replaced Lithuanian Penktas Kanalas (Channel 5). 
Lietuvos Rytas TV is part of Lietuvos Rytas Media Group. 
Brands Lietuvos Rytas TV and Lietuvos rytas. 
Audience share 4.1% in 2014; 3.7% in 2015. 
Monthly reach of the 
audience, 2014 
Monthly reach of the audience in case of Lietuvos Rytas TV was 
almost 70%. 
Daily reach of TV 
channels, %. 
Jan 2015: 24.6%. Jan 2016: 21.9%. 
Popularity of TV 
channels among different 
target groups, 2014 
Lietuvos Rytas TV is popular within the age group of 50. 
Company (TV group) 
structure 
Administration of the TV channel is composed of the Manager of the 
unit, Program and Acquisitions Director, Creative Director, Production 
Director, Marketing Director, Sales Director, News Service Director, 
Technical Director, and the Press Agent. Number of employees. 
About 70. 
Revenue streams and 
other financial data 
Turnover in 2013 and 2014 was between 2-3 mln Eur, in 2015 it was 
between 3-5 mln Eur. The company tends not to make profit, but it 
loses 8 times less during the last 3 years. In 2014, the only non-
profitable unit, UAB ‘Lietuvos ryto’ televizija, generated income 
which was 22% higher compared to previous years amounting 2,8 mln. 
Eur. TV’s losses were transferred to its printing house in order to 
derate its tax rate on corporate income. The shareholder, UAB 
‘Lietuvos rytas’ provides all the financial support for the TV. In terms 
of sales, Lietuvos Rytas TV works together with TV3 group but also 
makes its own sales. 
 
4. Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT) Group: a general outline 
The purpose of this general outline is to investigate the factors determining the choice 
of response strategy by Lithuanian incumbent TV broadcasters to global disruptive 
innovations. The actual part of the case presents LRT Group’s background, based on 
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secondary data analysis. The subsequent parts of the case analysis reveal the choice of 
response strategy and underlying factors, based on two interviews with top managers of LRT. 
The amount of interviews was based on the amount of free TV channels the television 
broadcasts for the Lithuanian market. 
 
Table 14. Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT) Group overview (About 
LRT, n.d.; LRT HD, n.d.; LRT-TELEVIZIJA, n.d.; MAVISE: LRT, n.d.; TNS, 2015; TNS, 
2016; Lietuvos televizijos rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga, 2015; KANTAR TNS, 2015; 
KANTAR TNS, 2016; Lietuvos televizijos rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga, 2015; LRT 
biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos, 2015; LRT biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos, 2016). 
Section Main facts 
Company (TV group) 
overview 
Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT) is a non-profit public 
broadcaster that has been providing regular radio services since 1926 
and television broadcasts since 1957. LRT operates three national 
television channels, three radio channels and an internet portal. It also 
provides satellite and live internet broadcasts, radio and television 
podcasts. Since the 1st January 2015, the Act amending the Law on the 
Lithuanian National Radio and Television came into force, which 
prohibited the commercial advertising in case of LRT but provides 
sustainable State funding.  
Establishment Lithuanian Television commenced its activity on 30 April 1957. 
Development Beginning with 1975, Lithuanian Television began regular 
broadcasting of color programs. LRT sets up its website lrt.lt in 2000. 
On 16 February 2003 Lithuanian Radio and Television launched its 
second TV channel LTV2. In 2007, lrt.lt starts real time broadcasts of 
LTV and LTV2 TV channels. On 2007 LRT has launched international 
TV channel LTV World created with the view of broadcasting via 
satellite. July, 2012. The updated Lithuanian National Radio and 
Television presents its new trade marks in TV market: LRT 
TELEVISION (former LTV), Internet Portal LRT.LT and specialized 
channels: LRT KULTURA (former LTV2) and LRT LITUANICA 
(former LTV World) for the Lithuanian emigration from all over the 
world. In 2016, LRT TELEVIZIJA HD was launched. 
Brands In total, Lithuanian National Radio and Television owns these brands: 
LRT-TELEVIZIJA (and LRT TELEVIZIJA HD); LRT KULTŪRA; 
LRT LITUANICA; LRT RADIJAS; LRT KLASIKA; LRT OPUS, out 
of which it has three TV brands for the national market: LRT Kultūra 
(2003); LRT (1957). 
Audience share 2015: LRT group 9.9%: LRT Televizija 8.8%; LRT Kultūra 1.1%. 
2016: LRT group 10.3%: LRT Televizija 9.2 %; LRT Kultūra 1.1%. 
Monthly reach of the 
audience, 2014 
Monthly reach of the audience in case of LRT was almost 80%. 
Daily reach of TV 
channels, %. 
Jan 2015: LRT TV 31.8%; LRT Kultūra 13.1%. Jan 2016: LRT TV 
33.2%; LRT Kultūra 12.0%. 
Popularity of TV 
channels among different 
target groups, 2014 
LRT is popular within the age group of 50+. 
Company (TV group) 
structure 
The LRT Council is the highest decision-making body of the 
Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT), and its duty is to ensure the 
public interest. The Council is composed of the 12 professionals 
responsible for different activities – social, science and culture. The 
formation of the LRT Council is organized by the Seimas committee 
on Education, Science and Culture. The Committee elects the 
74 
Chairman of the Council, for the term of 3 years. Number of 
employees is around 600 people. 
Revenue streams and 
other financial data 
LRT subsidy plan for the year 2016 was 33,674,000.00 Eur; 
accordingly, for the year 2015 it was 29,964,666.00. 
 
Differently from the commercial channels, the LRT Group has its vision, mission, 
values, strategy and goals. The LRT mission is inherent in methods intended for 
implementing purposes and values, which apply to LRT daily activities. The LRT 
Management seeks to impart its clear vision of the LRT mission and values to its staff, 
audience and general public. Its vision is to be responsible, reliable and modern public 
broadcaster connecting Lithuanian society and its diaspora (2012–2017 m. Lietuvos 
nacionalinio radijo ir televizijos (LRT) valstybinė programų strategija). 
Having presented separate cases, in the successive chapters, the multiple case analysis 
has been performed with Maxqda software, in order to reveal key trends, catalysts of 
disruption, disruptive business models, response strategies, and factors, underlying the chosen 
response strategies to disruptive innovation. 
 
4.2.1. Key trends and new disruptive business models in Lithuanian TV 
industry 
 
In order to reveal the key trends and business models of the Lithuanian TV broadcasting 
companies, facing disruptive innovation, a Maxqda code matrix analysis is carried out. 
Similarly to the precedent part of analysis, the Figure below, representing the spectrum of the 
variables, manifesting within Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry, has more precise and 
defined code categories, that have been based on the theoretical and pilot research. By doing 
so, the investigation identifies the most evident, yet important, variables or their groups and 
revealing their specific contexts in Lithuanian TV broadcasting companies. 
The within-case analysis allows to identify the most evident variables that are illustrated 
by the examples all the 11 interviewees from all the 4 TV Groups have provided. As seen 
from the Figure above, the most commonly in absolute used codes, related to disruptive 
innovation during the interviews were the latter ones: 
Within quite a generic category, comprising 1. Trends and challenges (mentioned 109 
times) and 2. Business model (mentioned 148 times), evidently, both codes were frequent 
when talking about Lithuanian TV broadcasting companies, as incumbents, engaged to 
disruptive innovation. 
Within the Catalysts of Disruption category, the variables had quite different 
manifestations frequencies, yet were still popular to mention during the interviews: 3. 
Enabling technology (mentioned 194 times); 4. Customer mindset (mentioned 108 times); 5. 
Platform (mentioned 144 times); 6. Economy (mentioned 7 times); 7. Public Policy 
(mentioned 33 times).  
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Figure 7. Manifestations of variables in Lithuanian TV broadcasting companies facing disruptive 
innovation 
 
Within the Factors category, the sub-categories remained the same, as in the research 
methodology and in pilot research: Structural/ organizational variables, or factors, and 
Human/ managerial variables or factors (it is to remind, that the author uses these concepts 
interchangeably). In total, all Structural/ organizational variables have been mentioned in 
different contexts 375 times, while Human/ managerial variables have been mentioned in 
different contexts 201 times. The three most popular factors within Structural/ organizational 
variables were Investments (mentioned 108 times); Corporate governance, bureaucracy and 
policies (mentioned 68 times); Resources (mentioned 64 times). Within the Human/ 
managerial variables sub-category the three most frequent ones were named Strategic 
direction/ vision (mentioned 50 times); Risk propensity (mentioned 40 times); Executives’ 
psychological and observable characteristics (mentioned 36 times). Interestingly, while the 
calculations of codes indicate the relative importance of the Structural/ organizational 
variables, the interview extracts demonstrate the opposite situation. In the words of the 
respondents, Human/ managerial variables have a relatively stronger impact on the 
choice of response strategy to disruptive innovations. In order to analyse these 
contradictions, the Factor category, as one of the distinctive parts of this research, is presented 
further from different research angles (also sustained by manifestations of Other variables) 
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in more detail, based on the extractions of interviews. It is also to mention, that the code 8. 
Response strategy (mentioned 20 times) is linked to the factors, therefore, is described in the 
latter and following paragraphs in more detail. 
Lastly, within the Other variables category, the variables were not identified in the 
primary research methogology, but due to the interview approach (semi-structured), were 
quite frequently used by the interviewees and can be linked to sustain some Factors, or the 
Response strategy. The three most popular codes were indicated as follows: Competition, 
Competitors (mentioned 167 times); Age (mentioned 72 times); Channel groups (mentioned 
47 times). 
Since some contradictions among research results and Other factors group have been 
distinguished, relevant extractions of the interviews are being presented in the subsequent 
research parts.  
 
4.2.2. TV broadcasters as specific actors within the modern local media 
value chains: key challenges 
 
Theoretically and context-wise, Lithuania, as a small open economy (OECD, 2016), can 
profit from imitating (Pajarinen, Rouvinen & Ylä-Anttila, 1998) and following the pathways 
global companies follow. Put differently, according to the theoretical notions and 
implemented research results, there is a linkage between the first mover or the second mover 
advantage and a value network. 
Another notion for this chapter derives from the practical perspective. According to 
PwC (2013) and Schindler, Upreti & Goswami (2011), the traditional value chain for media 
companies has been changing recently. Therefore, instead of having a linear value chain, 
containing content creators, aggregators, distribution system and consumer devices, 
ultimately it became a fluid and adaptable network, facing disruptive changes. 
Therefore, considering the above mentioned insigts and its contemporary linkages to 
the value chain, or value network in the latter case, it is important to analyze it from the 
relational perspective. In the Figure below, a relational Maqxda matrix is provided. 
In order to do so, the author has set the main variable, Value network, and has attempted 
to reveal the manifestations and indicate relations among Value network and other variables. 
Obviously, the most related code to Value network is a Business model, as value network 
makes part of it. On the one hand, this relation is inevitable and does not raise scientific 
questions according to definition (e.g., Osterwalder, 2004; Gordijn, Osterwalder & Pigneur, 
2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Sandström et al., 2009). On the other hand, such a link might 
indicate the transformation of the business model from the value network perspective, facing 
disruptive innovation. Hence, the author argues, that the latter relationship reveals the 
business model transformation process and advocates Business model innovation (BMI) for 
Lithuanian TV broadcasting companies. As the context for the BMI, the analysis reveals 
the engagement in disruptive innovation, which is supported by two catalysts of 
disruption: Trends and challenges (interrelated to Value network 16 times) and 
Enabling technology (interrelated to Value network 13 times).  
By linking the above mentioned statement to the interviews in terms of Value network, 
the Value network is very important, as the TV does not produce in-house, Interviewee 7 
confirms it, and the quality of a manager is judged according to what kind of product he/ she 
buys, which simplifies the Business model. Interviewee 1 adds that their strategy towards 
Value network has changed significantly over the last few years. The latter notion might be 
linked to Trends and challenges in the industry. The Value network is an important topic in 
Representative 5 case. It is said that there are certain needs that TV creates, and certain needs 
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Figure 8. Relations among Value network and other variables 
 
they satisfy. The latter company thinks to hav satisfied the trendy need to be in the Internet. 
The latter idea combines Trends and challenges, Customer mindset and Enabling technology 
paradigms. Interviewee 8 shares his insights on Value network and Financial revenues. 
Concerning the revenues, you are not only looking for customers who want to cover 
broadcasting; you should search for those who want to cover the creation of the content, he 
says. Therefore, it is essential to create a content that would useful to both the client and the 
TV. Moreover, the link of the latter context to enabling technology was found. Talking about 
TV producers as a part of the Value network, Interviewee 8 finds the situation more difficult 
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to adapt to for those producers who have worked for a long time, and only with the TV 
production. For them, it is difficult to create for the Internet. Thus, the division of producers’ 
market exists and still, traditional TV seems a more solid place for them. Therefore, the 
content is being created separately for traditional TV viewers and for those who chose the 
Internet. Again, technology-wise, Value network works as a partner network to create an 
innovation in Representative 3 case. It is possible to finalize with the Interviewee 1 words, 
that the Value network is doing a great impact on the choice of the response strategy (to 
disruptive innovation). 
Thus, the latter within-case analysis allows to state the following: the business model, 
in terms of value network in Lithuanian TV broadcasting companies, is changing and facing 
the technological and customer mindset-related catalysts of disruption. Further on, it is 
important to recognize the response strategy, or strategies, the Lithuanian TV broadcasting 
companies are chosing in order to respond properly to the disruptive innovation.  
 
4.2.3. Response strategies of Lithuanian TV broadcasters in the context of 
disruptive innovation  
 
The response of the Lithuanian broadcasters, when chosing the response strategy, was 
mostly linked to the Internet-related decicions, or to the launch of the Internet TV service. 
Hence, the analytical part from this section mostly investigates the strategies and factors 
influencing the choice of response strategy to distuptive innovation from the perspective of 
the Internet TV project. The response strategy towards the Internet TV, as briefly indicated in 
the previous part, is linked to industry’s Trends and challenges, changing Customer mindset, 
the Internet, as both, an Enabling technology and a disruptive innovation, and Value network. 
So far, the obtained investigation result allowed the researcher to go in depth and analyse the 
response strategies of Lithuanian TV broadcasters in the context of disruptive innovation, or 
the launch of an Internet TV, in this particular case. 
According to the results of the interviews with the representatives from Lithuanian TV 
broadcasters, 10 out of 11 respondents confirmed that in order to respond to disruptive 
innovation, they have chosen (4) innovation adoption with focus on existing businesses 
(considering creating a new business unit) strategy. 1 of 11 respondents has claimed, that 
the company he represents has chosen (1) traditional business and sustaining innovation 
strategy. However, in some cases (mostly in LNK TV’s cases) (6) merger and acquisition 
(M&A) strategy was also mentioned. Interestingly, these results basically confirm 
Christensen’s (1997) idea when facing the disruptive innovation, that suggests: (1) to create 
a new business unit, or (2) to sustain innovation. However, in order to analyze in more depth 
the relations between the response strategy and all research factors, or variables, the Figure 
below is presented. 
Interestingly, the relations matrix reveals that as separate categories, the most evident 
ones, can be highlighted the latter categories, which influence the response strategy: 
Variables 1-2:  
1. Trends and challenges; 
2. Business model; 
Variables 3-7, Catalysts of disruption: 
1. Enabling technology; 
2. Customer mindset; 
3. Platform; 
4. Public policy. 
Variables 9a: Human/ managerial factors 
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Variables 9b: Structural/ organizational factors 
Other variables: 
1. First mover/ second mover; 
2. Channel groups; 
3. Competition, competitors; 
4. Niche channels. 
 
 
Figure 9. Relations between Response strategy and other variables 
 
In case of Variables 1-2, Trends and challenges, as well as Business models, Interviewee 
9 admitted that the launch of their Internet TV was clearly the result of a global trend because 
the world has been going that way. Interviewee 7 agrees that their company implements 
constant monitoring of all kinds of new global information. The representatives receive 
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professional online daily news. On the global scale, they get the information about what goes 
on in the world, what the latest formats, the latest Trends, and even personalities are. The 
representatives of the company attend main global TV fairs and bring back the ideas. 
Regarding the TV formats, Interviewee 7 implements constant monitoring of what interests 
the company and whether it is worth or not buying. Thus, in terms of launching an Internet 
TV, information from global market has facilitated the decisions made within Lithuanian TV 
broadcasters. An interesting link between customer mindset and Trends and challenges was 
named by Respondent 2 who sees great opportunities of cooperation and integration of TV 
and the Internet. Representative 2 thinks that a company which has a television channel will 
also have to possess the Internet channel/ platform. Interviewee 4 has ensured that TVs are 
competing only by content. The technology is the least important factor here, she says, even 
though 3 years ago there were continuous discussions, whether the Internet will cannibalize 
TV, or if the TV will cannibalize the Internet. But now it is mainly a merger, a consolidation, 
where the Internet explicitly declares that they will not survive without the video content, 
therefore it is necessary for them to go hand in hand with the TV. Nevertheless, the ‘TV 
Everywhere’ solution is absolutely a must for televisions in order to have the viewer on every 
device. So, the main challenge remains to make the viewer happy. Indeed, Interviewee 4 
perceives the decrease of the Put level of 10–15 percent per year, meaning that traditional 
TVs will experience fundamental changes in terms of TV viewer structure. Interviewee 8 said 
that a younger or more educated viewer uses the Internet and chooses pay TV programs. He 
continues that the great difference between the online viewer and the television viewer is 
about content availability and accessibility. Nowadays, people have smartphones, computers, 
tablets, and smartwatches. Interviewee 6 adds that if TV creates a show or any product, the 
viewer needs to have the possibility to pick it up where it is convenient for him/her; it could 
a swell be a telephone. When it comes to advertising and other production creation, there is a 
global trend to make it as cheap as possible, Interviewee 8 says. This trend is very vital within 
a significant number of customer cases. Thus, the Internet TV allows advertising cheaper and 
more accurately: the Internet service providers have lower costs compared to traditional TV. 
Even though Interviewee 8 suggests the synergy between the TV and the Internet in order to 
have the best results, a contemporary business customer is still more generous to traditional 
TV projects. Moreover, a Business model should be reconfigured to combine revenue streams 
from the traditional TV and the Internet TV. According to Interviewee 8, there are two types 
of products: for TV and for the Internet. Sometimes it takes time to convince consumers not 
to underestimate one or the other group of TV viewers. In most cases, the clients imagine that 
most of the budget should go to traditional TV, and it is not so instrumental for the Internet. 
But currently, he explains, the online advertising is not inferior to what is seen on TV. Partially 
it is due to the fact that one can easily display advertisement in HD on the Internet, while the 
TV lacks this option. Another advantage for the Internet is that it is easier to define and target 
the preferred segment here. Having a number of different portals and the Internet TV, 
Interviewee 8’s team can help decide where to advertise. By all means, one thing is a constant: 
combined advertising on TV and on the Internet is beneficial twice. It is therefore inaccurate 
to say that if a client advertises on the Internet nobody watches the advertisement. Naturally, 
the initial message is stronger on TV. Interviewee 8 finalizes that reciprocal exchange or 
synergy between traditional TV and Internet TV advertisements provides the best results, as 
one cannot function properly without the other. When talking about business models, 
Interviewee 10 says that the Internet TV is a fruit of customer needs rather than a promising 
revenue stream. Indeed, Interviewee 9 adds that, for instance, in India that has about 1 billion 
inhabitants, the Internet or Mobile TV business can survive by having 3 percent of viewers. 
In Lithuania it would not survive, she says. However, according to Interviewee 1, their 
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Internet TV is now perceived as a separate TV channel on the Internet, constituting a part of 
a business model.  
Then, regarding Catalysts of disruption, primary notion has been suggested in the 
previous chapter. However, the most evident ones and related to the response strategy are 
Enabling technology and Platforms. This discovery only sustains the idea, that a disruptive 
innovation, even though having many different, mostly new approaches (e.g., Hagel, 2015; 
King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Denning, 2016a; Chase, 2016), rather than Christensen’s (1997) 
technology-related notion, in business environment is evidently perceived from the 
technological perspective. Hence, Enabling technology is an undeniable facilitator when 
launching an Internet TV, as a response to disruptive innovation. Interviewee 6 thinks that 
any technological innovation is related to complex solutions – from changing cameras to 
training people. Interestingly, its link to Platform basically goes through Customer mindset 
perspective. Thus, when speaking about the role of the Platform, the dissemination of 
information, communication with the customer, or co-working projects, Interviewee 3 
mentions Facebook as an active tool to disseminate direct information and get it back through 
different platforms. He mentions that all the platforms are used by different segments. If, for 
instance, their company wants to announce the broadcast of The Wall Street Wolf movie, 
Facebook is probably one of the best places to reach a young audience. In fact, he says, the 
dissemination of information on one side, and social networking as a form of communication 
with the audience on the other, are the main goals to reach through different platforms. By all 
means, innovative technologies pay off at least considering the image of TV broadcasters in 
a segment of younger audience who knows and understands the use of technology, for 
instance. Talking about technology- and innovation-related events, Interviewee 3’s company 
attended innovative events, so the TV broadcaster interacted with a certain audience, 
sophisticated in IT. Not all of those solutions pay back in Euros, he says. Some time ago the 
TV did not have any strategy on what exactly should be uploaded to the Internet, but after 
some experimenting they designed a strategy to upload music-related content or TV show 
trailers with references to the TV web portal or repository. By uploading contents to Youtube 
first, the TV Group gained attention of the younger audience which is usually hard to attract. 
Thus, by combining these two platforms, the TV reached a wider range of audience. In order 
to go hand in hand with current industry trends, TV groups have to have their own platform 
online. Interviewee 8 has highlighted that her TV Group’s Internet TV and their web portal 
has a considerable number of direct streaming programs. 
There is a link between the choice of response strategy and Human/ managerial factors, 
according to interviewees. Specifically, Strategic direction/ vision, Non-autonomous (team) 
decision making, and Executives’ psychological and observable characteristics are related to 
the chosen response strategy. Strategic direction/ vision has been perceived as very important 
by Interviewee 5 in terms of launching the Internet TV. Interviewee 8 first considered it as a 
trend from Scandinavia, but in the end the strategic direction was taken by the CEO of the 
latter TV Group. Indeed, Interviewee 4 admits having had a vision regarding new products 
and production, including the Internet TV project. Non-autonomous (team) decision making 
are related to the strategic direction in Interviewee 9 case. While Interviewee 9 argued it had 
to be the Internet TV, other managing team members disagreed and proposed a concept of a 
website with a TV archive. With limited resources at that time the team decided to make the 
website, which eventually became an Internet TV. Executives’ psychological and observable 
characteristics can also be linked to the response strategy. Watching traditional TV is a habit 
that has deep roots, Respondent 2 says; so, the viewer is not very much into watching contents 
on the Internet. Probably, he/she would rather be lying on bed and watch traditional TV. And 
indeed, traditional television still tends to be more popular if compared to the Internet TV. 
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The previous conclusion can be made only by possessing adequate characteristics. 
Interviewee 4 shares her experience about starting to sell target audiences. After doing so, the 
main competitor, the other TV Group, did not do anything for a year. At the beginning, the 
customers were not satisfied, as it was something new and they also had to change their 
business principles. But, eventually, the clients adopted the new rules from Interviewee 4 TV 
and forced the other TV group to do the same. Thus, the other TV Group had to invest in 
software and change their system. In the case of Interviewee 4’s TV Group, they made 
mistakes 5 years ago, and these mistakes are still relevant to both the other TV group and the 
Internet TV. 
Regarding Structural/ organizational factors, all factors, especially Investments, 
Resources and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies can be related to the response 
strategy. The process to identify the Investments is undoubtedly an important facilitator when 
launching an Internet TV. Indeed, when asked how one TV Group is different from a 
traditional TV in terms of Internet TV contents, Interviewee 9 admits to have Invested in it. 
But mostly their Internet TV shows everything that has been shown on TV. However, there 
are some specific products, usually about 10 products during the season. And, indeed, they 
attract audience, she says. Representative 6 adds that innovation processes go in line with the 
investment. And as all Lithuanian tax payers are involved in the formation of their budget, 
the TV plans the investments into innovative technologies in order to meet the expectations 
of their viewers. Thus, by combining traditional and Internet TV platforms, the TV has 
reached a wider range of audience: the TV Representative 3 counts 45 million 500 thousand 
views since 2009, and now is the largest media repository in Lithuania. On the contrary, 
Interviewee 7 states, the TV Group he represents does not attempt to be an ultimate leader in 
technology. He highlights that the investments have a definite size and the TV Group invests 
in valuable technologies. Interviewee 1 adds that if the latter Group has to invest 1 million 
Euro, the company firstly evaluates investment goals. In the case of competitors, Interviewee 
11 argues that the main competitor’s Internet TV solution is related to their group strategy, 
internal investment strategies, and plans. Thus, the other Channel group is trying to 
differentiate its business and expand it in order to make the package more attractive to 
investors, in case they have to sell it. Indeed, Interviewee 4 adds that soon they are launching 
a modern TV solution which will comprise everything, including a new Internet TV. The 
users will be able to watch it from all devices: phone, tablet or a large screen. Representative 
4 admits that there was no market pressure to have it before because this is a big investment. 
In order to reduce costs, this project is being made with Latvia and Estonia as a joint 
investment, a joint product. However, Interviewee 10 finalizes that, in general, even though 
the Internet TV is not a big business, the investment is crucial. 
The process to identify the Resources is another important point to mention. Interviewee 
4 emphasizes that with the emergence of the Internet TV they did not assume more staff. In 
fact, the TV tries to optimize costs and integrate their Internet TV into the existing structure. 
If once a program manager was responsible for 1 channel, now he/she deals with 3 channels, 
the Internet TV and also with the video contents for the web platform. The latter TV Group 
has experienced growth in terms of channels and now, they state, they have 4 of them. In the 
case of the main competitor, within their Internet TV unit, there is currently one person 
working. Mainly there are two of them, including Interviewee 9, she says. Resources for the 
Internet TV, according to Interviewee 7 are sufficient because the contents replicate in about 
90 percent the one on a traditional TV. The resources are needed to place the contents to 
servers and for Internet TV promotion. It is to note that the Internet TV contents requires just 
as much human resources as the traditional TV content. It means same budgets, she says. So 
far, as the same budgets do not generate the same returns, the TV is not ready to invest, 
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Representative 11 adds. According to Interviewee 10, the Internet TV is partly an expression 
of political will – a required attribute, he says. At the moment, their Internet TV is still too 
small to have a unit label and a head of the unit. 
Talking about Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies, Interviewee 6 has said 
that all the decisions are within the framework of the Council strategy, and, indeed, the launch 
of the Internet TV was a part of the strategy. Also, Interviewee 3 mentions that the 
bureaucratic procedures were complex. Being a budget institution, this TV has to follow 
public procurement procedures, prepare reports, and meet lots of bureaucracy. Interviewee 5 
agrees that the Corporate governance has a significant impact as it comes from both the global 
corporate governance model and from a local TV company. Interviewee 8 also admits that 
Corporate governance has a great impact. 
Interestingly, Other variables, such as First mover/ second mover; Channel groups; 
Competition, competitors; and Niche channels have also had the influence on the choice of 
strategy. Indeed, according to various Interviewees, Big TV channels are experiencing 
decline, while the Niche channels start growing. According to Interviewee 1, in Lithuania, the 
niche phenomenon is related to several factors. The first is the supply. The second is the 
demand that to some extent follows the global trend. Thus, one of the niche solutions was the 
Internet TV.  
But to the greater extent, the launch of an Internet TV was influenced by local 
competitive environment. The Competition, competitors sub-category was also perceived as 
a broader construct, mainly meaning the actions of other Channel groups and the 
consideration which of them was a First mover and which is a Second mover. Interviewee 9 
laughs that there are, of course, competitors who teach always very well. Interviewee 9 argues 
that hectic competition between her group and the main competitor, other Channel group, 
leads to solutions that logically do not make sense in many respects. Further, Interviewee 9 
gives an example of their Internet TV project. While Interviewee 9 had argued it had to be the 
Internet TV, the other team members disagreed and proposed a concept of a website with a 
TV archive. Importantly, at that time the resources were very limited, and the team decided 
to make a website. But eventually it happened so that the TV Group had to re-arrange it as a 
TV. This is an obvious example, she says. The myopic moment occurred when the current 
project was postponed, and the other Channel group made it earlier. 
Then, the second thing Interviewee 9 mentions is that her TV group has been competing 
in the oligopolistic market where the competitor launched their Internet TV earlier, thus 
becoming the First mover. If not the crisis, they should have been first, she says. But the crisis 
came, the resources were very limited, and the TV Group was forced to abandon the idea of 
the Internet TV. Hence, another channel group launched it first. However, one thing the TV 
group would not have done (which the main competitor did) was free viewing. If Interviewee 
9’s TV group were first, they would have charged it, she said, very minimally, only to 
accustom the viewer. In the case of Interviewee 10’s TV Group, he admits to be the second-
mover in launching the Internet TV. Whereas in the case of the main competitor, he argues, 
that was a corporate decision. Eventually it happened that the other group launched their 
Internet TV first and became a First mover. However, Interviewee 10 claims that the Second 
mover ‘strategy’ of his TV Group might be perceived both as strength as well as weakness. It 
is also related to the fact, as highlighted by Interviewee 7, his group chooses to wait until the 
technology gets cheaper. 
Having linked the response strategies of Lithuanian TV broadcasters with most 
frequently manifesting factors in the context of disruptive innovation, named as an Internet 
TV, in the subsequent chapter based on multiple case analysis and within-case analysis, 
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Human/ managerial and Structural/ organizational factors, determining the choice of response 
strategy by local TV broadcasters to global disruptive innovation, are being disclosed. 
 
4.2.4. Factors determining the choice of response strategy by local TV 
broadcasters to global disruptive innovation 
 
The results of the interview, however, revealed the undeniable importance of these 
factors: Human/ managerial factors and Structural/ organizational factors (or variables). In 
order to reveal the combinations and in depth manifestations of these factors in case of the 
response strategy, two approaches are analyzed: within-case, following all-in-one logic, and 
multiple case analysis, thus representing separate TV Groups’ results. 
 
Multiple case analysis 
Multiple case analysis represents the manifestations of the aforementioned factors in 
each TV Group separately. The analysis has been carried out with Maxqda relations browser. 
In case of LNK TV Group, all factors to some extent have been used in the context of 
response strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, 
according to both factor categories, are the below mentioned factors, that are illustrated by 
some excerpts from the interviews, sustaining their relations, or combinations. The linkages 
between factors and response strategies are highlighted. 
Value network and Investments. For instance, Interviewee 1 talks about the HD 
technology and its relation to whole local value network and investments: the producers who 
will have to buy new cameras, suitable lights, rethink editing process, etc. What concerns 
movies, the TV already has them in HD, and it is possible to broadcast. Lastly, it requires 
investments for archiving and storing the HD production. 
Value network and Resources. Value network is very important in case of LNK, as the 
TV does not produce in-house, Interviewee 7 confirms, therefore, does not need to have its 
own resources. 
Heterogeneity and Investments. Interviewee 1 claims that there are some heterogeneous 
activities, like the investments that come from the MG Baltic.  
Heterogeneity and Resources. Heterogeneity is an important factor in choosing the 
response strategy, because it describes the most efficient way to use limited resources, and 
how to choose the best mix, Interviewee 1 says. As for Heterogeneity, Interviewee 9 sees the 
ways to have more synergy. The MG Baltic Media Group has the Alfa.lt news portal, which 
currently has a minimal effect on LNK. However, if it became a strong portal, developed 
according to LNK’s vision, LNK would win. 
Investments and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. According to 
Interviewee 11, in terms of investments, everything is being decided by the shareholders. 
Investments and Managerial myopia. Interviewee 9 has argued that in case of 
Managerial myopia there have been some myopic moments, as LNK has had to learn from 
the mistakes. Interviewee 9 agrees that it is very important to find consensus, as the 
investments are high. 
Investments and Response strategy. According to Interviewee 1, TVs should be aware 
of not investing too much: if the Internet TV does not guarantee a long-term competitive 
advantage and has a risk to disappear after a year, it makes no sense to invest much, he 
finalizes. Interviewee 10 claims that LNK Go is not a big business but the investment crucial. 
Interviewee 9 argues that when it comes to big investments, like the acquisition of BTV, the 
shareholders want to see the price that LNK is going to pay. 
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Resources and Investments. Interviewee 9 has argued that the crisis came, and the 
resources were very limited, thus, LNK was forced to abandon the idea of the Internet TV. 
Strategic direction/ vision and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. In case 
of Strategic direction/ vision, this factor is seen as probably the most decisive. Both, the vision 
of LNK and the vision of LNK’s CEO are fundamental, Interviewee 7 says. Of course, these 
visions are in line with the higher structures, but at the same time, the stakeholders did not 
argue about these visions. 
Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous (team) decision making. Talking about 
Non-autonomous (team) decision making, Interviewee 9 agrees that the managing team is 
discussing and always searching for consensus. The cases in which she decides are very rare. 
If she lacks patience for some quick decisions or she sees a guaranteed win-win project, then 
she decides. However, Interviewee 10 argues that the CEO is quite a clear settler herself. 
Strategic direction / vision and Response strategy. According to Interviewee 1, at the 
beginning, the competition was among the major channels, but later it started among 
consolidated channel groups. This was a big change in strategic direction. This change took 
place in 2010, when TVs started launching niche channels because the trend was unstoppable. 
The TV groups started to think how to compensate the loss of the major channel’s audience. 
The Figure below illustrates the relations of factors influencing the response strategy 
based on multiple case analysis in case of LNK TV. 
 
 
Figure 10. Factors influencing the response strategy based on multiple case analysis, LNK case 
 
Next, Lietuvos Rytas TV case analysis is performed in a similar way. 
In case of Lietuvos Rytas TV Group, only a few factors have been used in the context 
of response strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, 
according to both factor categories, are Investments and Response strategy that are illustrated 
by some excerpts from the interviews, sustaining the relations. 
Investments and Response strategy. Interviewee 2 says that the choice of a strategy 
highly depends on the money a company has. Also, Lietuvos Rytas TV cannot react very 
quickly without evaluating each project. In order to make a very big decision the first thing to 
do is to find a very large strategic investor in Lithuania. 
The Figure below illustrates the relations of factors influencing the response strategy 
based on multiple case analysis in case of Lietuvos Rytas TV. 
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Figure 11. Factors influencing the response strategy based on multiple case analysis, Lietuvos Rytas 
TV case 
 
Next, LRT TV case analysis is performed in a similar way. 
In case of LRT TV Group, not all factors have been used in the context of response 
strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, according to 
both factor categories, are the below mentioned factors, that are illustrated by some excerpts 
from the interviews, sustaining the relations. The linkages between factors and response 
strategies are highlighted. 
Value network and Resources. Value network allows LRT to create something, with a 
partner to create an innovation, Representative 3 says. He only mentions that it all depends 
on resources: human, technical, and financial, that has to be planned way before the project 
implementation. 
Heterogeneity and Company structure. As for Heterogeneity, according to Interviewee 
6, there is room for improvement, but the synergy among various news services, including 
radio, TV and the Internet exist. This is also highly desirable by the company.  
Investments and Resources. The innovations are in line with the investments, 
Interviewee 3 adds. LRT always tries to find the cheapest way to find a proper innovative 
solution:  go through universities, communicate with young programmers. 
Investments and Expertise, competency. Regarding the Investments, Interviewee 3 says 
this is the Director General’s decision. The proposals of what needs to be updated, changed, 
etc., are collected from all units and then they are placed in the budget. And since the 
investments generally are major than the budget, the Director General decides where to invest 
(top-bottom decision). 
Investments and Response strategy. According to Interviewee 6, LRT surely plans the 
investments into innovative technologies in order to meet the expectations of their viewers. 
Thus, their priorities are investments in content and technology. Interviewee 3 adds that the 
advantage of LRT is that they can experiment and do not have to wait for the return on 
investments right away, during the same financial year, as the commercial channels cannot 
afford it themselves. In case of the commercial networks, if it does not generate revenues 
quickly, it will be closed down. On the contrary, LRT can wait and evaluate some solutions 
and decisions in a long run and then tell whether the technology paid off. 
Resources and Non-autonomous (team) decision making. Interviewee 3 adds that they 
have structural decisions. He admits, that anybody in LRT can have or express a certain idea, 
but then it has to be linked to certain business processes: who will make the contents, who 
will administer it, who will answer to the questions or comments on Facebook, will somebody 
answer to them on weekends? If there is a specific content for social media, somebody has to 
decide which part exactly should be cropped, etc. LRT includes all the relevant people and 
departments in content-related or management-related decision making. 
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Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies and Strategic direction/ vision. In case 
of Strategic direction/ vision, Interviewee 6 responds that firstly it is about the Director 
General’s vision that has to be presented during the competition for the position of Director 
General and every 5 years if he/ she gets re-elected. Clearly, the vision has to be in line with 
the Council’s strategy. 
Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous (team) decision making. Customer 
mindset-related decisions also depend on the LRT Council, strategic direction and durability, 
says Respondent 6.  
The Figure below illustrates the relations of factors influencing the response strategy 
based on multiple case analysis in case of LRT TV. 
 
 
Figure 12. Factors influencing the response strategy based on multiple case analysis, LRT case 
 
Lastly, TV3 TV case analysis is performed in a similar way. 
In case of TV3 TV Group, all factors to some extent have been used in the context of 
response strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, 
according to both factor categories, are the below mentioned factors, that are illustrated by 
some excerpts from the interviews, sustaining the relations. 
Value network and Heterogeneity. Value network works as an integral system based on 
cooperation between the TV and producers when the viewer goes to tv3.lt during the 
advertisement on ttraditional TV and watches, for instance, the backstage of the XFactor’s 
show, he may remain watching TV3, says Respondent 5. 
Value network and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. Talking about 
Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies, Interviewee 4 has stressed that in Lithuania 
TV3 was a horizontal organization having a lot of matrix points in line with the higher 
organization. She gives an example of program purchasing. This means that the local 
Acquisition Manager communicates with the Acquisition Managers in the Baltic countries 
and Central-Eastern Europe and form a common need list, which is then submitted to the 
Central Acquisition Team and then they negotiate and buy content for all countries. 
Interviewee 5 agrees that the Corporate governance has a significant impact. He says that the 
industry itself has learned that there is an impact. 
Value network and Risk propensity. Value network and risk are related bcause of the 
uncertainty. Representative 5 says there are certain needs that TV3 creates, and certain needs 
they satisfy. They satisfy the trendy need to be in the Internet. Thus, TV companies invest to 
the Internet projects but don’t really know how to earn from advertising online. Interviewee 
5 highlights that TV3 risks, but risks wisely. With the tv3.lt portal the company took the 3rd 
or 4th position, while alfa.lt remained in the 7th place. 
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Heterogeneity and Resources. As for Heterogeneity, Respondent 5 says that TV3 is 
trying hard to implement heterogeneity among different actions and indeed, substantial 
linkages already exist, starting from costs, cross prom making, content management, etc. And 
even now, when making a television reality show, Representative 5 is always very keen that 
a part of TV projects have online broadcasting. For example, TV3 should give some contents 
to the portal tv3.lt, and after that even the Power Hit Radio DJs would be able to talk about 
the reality show content. For complement activities TV3 is very a heterogeneous company. 
Interviewee 4 agrees that this is one of the major advantages the TV3 Group has because the 
whole picture can be seen. For instance, while TV3 broadcasts the XFactor live, other 
departments can make direct connections during breaks through the Internet, and the radio 
can organize morning shows with the participants of the XFactor. If there were different 
people working on all these units, it would be very difficult to coordinate the process. 
Investments and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. Respondent 4 says 
that when a project requires investments, TV3 has to get approval from the Board. Interviewee 
4 extends that her task is to persuade the Board regarding the investments, which sometimes 
becomes a time-consuming process. Even if Interviewee 4 wants to make a decision within 1 
month, it sometimes takes up to 3 months due to formal procedures. 
Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies and Non-autonomous (team) decision 
making. Talking about Non-autonomous (team) decision making and its linkage to the 
response strategy, Respondent 5 highlights that they make decisions in a team. Interviewee 4 
adds that it is important to highlight that every idea should become a project, or be rejected. 
When a project requires investments, TV3 has to get approval from the Board. This means 
the team has to prepare a project, present it to the members of the Board, and, if approved, it 
can be implemented. 
Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous (team) decision making. Respondent 4 
ensures she does not take the decisions autonomously because she is not able to implement 
everything on her own. Therefore, there is a leading management team involved: Sales 
Manager, Creative Director in charge of programming and marketing, Head of Media, who 
have to believe in the project. Interviewee 5 argues whether the Strategic direction or vision 
comes from him and he supposes that officially it is his decision, but informally it belongs to 
the team. 
The Figure below illustrates the relations of factors influencing the response strategy 
based on multiple case analysis in case of TV3 TV. 
 
 
Figure 13. Factors influencing the response strategy based on multiple case analysis, TV3 case 
 
Interestingly, according to the performed multiple case analysis of the four TV Groups, 
there were only a few cases when combinations of two factors were diffused among different 
TV Groups. This remark lets the author state that even though the TV Groups compete in the 
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same Lithuanian Free-TV broadcasting market and is competing for the same viewer, their 
response strategies to disruptive innovation are based on different factors. The only (almost) 
matching point, except for the TV3 group, was the clear relation between the Investments and 
Response strategy. In LNK, LRT and Lietuvos Rytas TV cases, as purely local TV industry 
players’ cases, it is pretty evident and presumable. In case of TV3, as mentioned by their 
competitors, the launch of the Internet TV, as a response strategy, is a must, therefore might 
have not be linked to the investments. The other possible condition, expressed by TV3’s 
competitors, is that the response strategy is being implemented throughout all the MTG 
network, thus cheaper and top-down. It is also evident, that the market is highly oligopolic, 
as being stated by Interviewee 9, and mainly having two strongest industry players: TV3 
Group and LNK Group. However, it is to note, that the other two TV Groups are meeting the 
primary selection condition and are incumbent TV broadcasting companies in Lithuania. 
Therefore, in order to represent the full picture of manifestations of Human/ managerial 
factors and Structural/ organizational factors in the choice of the response strategy, lastly, 
within-case analysis is pursued.  
 
Within-case analysis 
In order to have a full view of the factors (or variables) and their combinations 
influencing the response strategy to disruptive innovation in Lithuanian TV broadcasting 
industry, within-case analysis is performed. By doing so, the Figure below reveals the 
manifestations of Human/ managerial factors and Structural/ organizational factors in the 
choice of the response strategy. In this part, it is also revealed which group of factors has a 
relatively higher importance in choice of the response strategy, as inquired previously, having 
met the research contradiction. 
 
 
Figure 14. Factors influencing the response strategy based on within-case analysis 
 
First, by referring to the frequency, the code, or a factor, has been used throughout all 
the interviews, some factor relations are evident implementing within-case analysis, while the 
others are manifesting somewhat to a lesser extent. By all means, all the theoretically selected 
factors have been tested empirically and the influence on the response strategy by Lithuanian 
incumbent TV broadcasting companies facing disruptive innovation has been revealed (see 
column SUM). Based on the within-case analysis, these factors are advocated to be the most 
evident and influencing (red squares only; frequency > 50) the response strategy: Structural/ 
organizational variables: (1) Value network; (2) Investments; (3) Resources; (4) Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies; and Human/ managerial variables: (1) Strategic 
direction/ vision. It is, however, to note that all the factors have been mentioned by the 
interviewees, therefore, they cannot be excluded from the empirical research results.  
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In order to perform deeper factor analysis, the combinations, or relations between 
factors have also been revealed. As seen from the picture above, Maxqda software allowed 
the author to identify the strongest relations between variables. To provide a broader relational 
picture, in this part, not only the red squares have been analysed. Since most of these relations 
have been illustrated by within-case examples, in this part, only the frequencies of 
interrelations (by using Maxqda Code Relations Browser) and manifestations among TV 
Groups (using Maxqda Code Matrix Browser) are identified among the latter variables. 
 Value network and Heterogeneity (16 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly 
evident in LNK Group and TV3 Group’s cases); 
 Value network and Investments (16 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident 
in LNK Group, Lietuvos Rytas TV and LRT Group’s cases); 
 Value network and Resources (22 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident 
in LNK Group and TV3 Group’s cases);  
 Value network and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies (18 times used 
in interrelated contexts; mostly evident in LNK Group, TV3 Group and LRT Group’s 
cases); 
 Heterogeneity and Investments (16 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident 
in LNK Group, Lietuvos Rytas TV and LRT Group’s cases); 
 Heterogeneity and Resources (24 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident 
in LNK Group and TV3 Group’s cases); 
 Heterogeneity and Company structure (16 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly 
evident in LNK Group and TV3 Group’s cases); 
 Investments and Resources (24 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident in 
LNK Group, Lietuvos Rytas TV and LRT Group’s cases); 
 Investments and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies (18 times used in 
interrelated contexts; mostly evident in LNK Group, Lietuvos Rytas TV and LRT 
Group’s cases); 
 Investments and Response strategy (35 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly 
evident in LNK Group, Lietuvos Rytas TV and LRT Group’s cases); 
 Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies and Strategic direction/ vision (22 
times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident in LNK Group’s case); 
 Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous (team) decision making (33 times 
used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident in LNK Group’s case); 
 Executives’ psychological and observable characteristics and Managerial myopia 
(14 times used in interrelated contexts; mostly evident in Lietuvos Rytas TV’s case). 
 
The latter relationship analysis brings forth some interesting outcomes. First, Structural/ 
organizational factors were relatively more interrelated in the cases of LNK Group and TV3 
Group, while Human/ managerial factors had more synergy points in the case of LNK Group. 
Second, a clear mix of both factor groups was not evident in any of the TV Group’s case. 
Lastly, Investment-related factors were highly diffused in the cases of LRT Group & Lietuvos 
Rytas TV and, on the contrary, less diffused in the case of TV3 Group. 
The second objective in this part was to clarify the contradictions, found counting 
Structural/ organizational factors and Human/ managerial factors mathematically and 
revealing their essence based on content analysis. As presented in the part 4.2.1, even though 
Structural/ organizational variables at first are perceived as more influencing, on the 
contrary, Human/ managerial variables have a relatively stronger impact on the choice of 
response strategy to disruptive innovations. In order to analyse these contradictions, content 
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analysis is performed. Indeed, when talking about a more relative factor group, that has more 
impact on the response strategy, Interviewee 8 adds that the Human/ managerial factors, when 
working in a corporation, influence at least 50 percent of the result, if not more. This is what 
makes all the success and all the television online processes successful, he says. Interviewee 
3 agrees and adds, that is all influenced by Human/ managerial factors. Interviewees 7 and 
11 keep a more moderate position but still agree that Human/ managerial factors, or soft 
factors, are very important. Interviewee 9 highlights that the Human/ managerial factors in 
the choice of response strategy are unambiguously fundamental. On the other hand, regarding 
Structural/ organizational factors, Interviewee 9 highlights that the latter factor group does 
not oblige or constrain to chose the response strategy at all. Interviewee 4 argues, that nobody 
sets a strategy for them, thus decreasing the impact of the Structural/ organizational factors 
in the process of choosing the response strategy to disruptive innovation. It is although to 
note, that the other interviewees did not express direct position towards this issue. 
 
4.3. Linking the choice of response strategy by local TV broadcasters to 
influencing factors in Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry 
 
Based on the empiric results of the main research, the tested conceptual model reveals 
the linkages among the main research concepts: (1) catalysts of disruption, (2) response 
strategy, and (3) factors determining the choice of the response strategy. It is to note, that the 
tested disruptive innovation and desired response strategy towards it was related to the launch 
of the Internet TV. From the perspective of the small open economy, Lithuania, with its 
incumbent TV broadcasting companies, has some certain pathways and choices, as 
demonstrated in the Figure and the analysis below. 
The implemented research has empirically revealed: 
1. The role and importance of all 5 Catalysts of disruption when facing the disruptive 
innovation in Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry, in case of incumbent industry 
players. However, the more frequent Catalysts of disruption were perceived as 
Enabling technology, Customer mindset and Platform. 
2. The existence of two out of six response strategies in Lithuanian TV broadcasting 
industry, in case of incumbent industry players: (4) innovation adoption with focus 
on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) and (1) traditional 
business and sustaining innovation strategy. However, in some LNK TV’s cases, (6) 
merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy was also mentioned as a complementary, for 
market expansion, together with the (4) innovation adoption with focus on existing 
businesses (considering creating a new business unit) strategy. 
3. The manifestations of all indicated sub-factors within the categories of Human/ 
managerial factors (6) and Structural/ organizational factors (7) in the Lithuanian 
TV broadcasting industry, in case of incumbent industry players. It should be noted 
that only in the case of LRT, two of the factors have been excluded. The other 3 
incumbent players, even in different quantities, have demonstrated the importance of 
all the factors when chosing the response strategy to disruptive innovation. 
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Human/ managerial factors: Structural/ organizational factors: 
1. Strategic direction / vision 
2. Non-autonomous (team) decision making 
3. Risk propensity 
4. Executives’ psychological and observable characteristics 
5. Expertise, competency 
6. Managerial myopia 
1. Value network  
2. Heterogeneity  
3. Investments  
4. Resources 
5. Organizational lethargy 
6. Company structure 
7. Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies 
 
Figure 15. Tested conceptual model 
 
In fact, quite similar importance perception of both groups’ above mentioned factors 
can be also grounded by the statistical data. Interestingly, Statistics Lithuania (2013) provides 
information that the Lithuanian companies, operating in J60 Programming and Broadcasting 
area, compared to all companies, implement technological innovations (50 percent of 
companies during the years 2012–2 014), as well as non-technological innovations (35.7 
percent of companies during the years 2012–2014). In other words, Structural/ organizational 
factors, or the ‘hard’ factors, count, but at the same time, the ‘soft’, or the Human/ managerial 
factors are also perceived to be very important. 
However, the model did not reveal: 
1. The importance of Other factors in the choice of response strategy to 
disruptive innovation (this has been done in the chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.3); 
2. The combinations, or relations of various factors, underlying the response 
strategy to disruptive innovation (this has been done in the chapters 4.2.2, 
4.2.3 and 4.2.4); 
3. The relevant weight/ importance of the factor groups: Human/ managerial 
factors vs. Structural/ organizational factors, underlying the response 
strategy to disruptive innovation (this has been done in the chapter 4.2.4). 
 
In order to provide the full picture of the factors behing response strategies at incumbent 
firms engaged in disruptive innovation, the discussion part presents the missing linkages, as 
well and provides business case insights from global to local. Moreover, based on the 
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empirical research results, the final part of the thesis amplifies theoretical notions on 
disruptive innovation, small open economies, strategic management, business model 
literature, and provides managerial implications on the topic.  
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5. Discussion and recommendations 
 
While the researched scientific literature provided only a few distinct linkages between 
patterns, or catalysts of disruption and disruptive innovation (e.g., Hagel, 2015; Christensen, 
1997), response strategies and influencing factors (Christensen, 1997; Charitou & Markides, 
2003; Sandström et al., 2009; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010), value networks in the context of 
disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997; 2003; Tesfaye & Nguyen, 2012; Evens, 2010), first-
mover vs. second-mover incumbents (Zhou, 2002; Madjdi & Hüsig, 2011; Viellechner & 
Wulf, 2010), and disruptive innovation in TV industry (Benson, 2007; Sarkis, 2009; Storsul 
& Krumsvik, 2013), the author attempted to link and to test empirically the chosen response 
strategies by local incumbent firms, engaged to global disruptions and the factors behind 
response strategy. Having carried out the empirical research and presented its results in the 
previous parts, still, some implications must be argued based on different perceptions of the 
executed empirical research and the suggestions of scholars. 
It is also crucial to stress the importance of the context in this research. The current 
investigation higlights the specifics and the importance of incumbent Lithuanian firms’ 
response strategies and factors in the light of disruptive innovation, providing the valuable 
context-related notions to extend the existing theory on topic. Moreover, the context 
application provides theory extention from the global case analysis as well. 
 
1) Implications on disruptive innovation theory 
The classic scientific literature sources on disruptive innovation suggest that even the 
successful firms operating correctly in a given market risk to lose market leadership and fail 
when new entrants take over the market (Christensen, 1997). Fisher (2001) sustains the 
controversial idea that a company can be doing everything correctly: dialoguing to its users, 
investing in R&D, competing boldly, and still fail due to a new technology or a business model 
that at first seemed irrelevant. In case of incumbent firms, it is generally presumed, that as 
companies become bigger and more successful, they tend to reduce risk and ignore 
innovation. However, the theory of disruptive innovation suggests that it is not the case. 
Indeed, industry giants often adopt sustaining technologies, or innovation, that often influence 
performance breakthroughs. Christensen (1997) advocates, that the adoption of a sustaining 
technology, or innovation, helps leading companies to create better results for its customers. 
Differently, a disruptive innovation, or technology, allows creating products and services 
which are not targeted to main pool of customers. Therefore, mainly companies ignore 
disruptive innovations for rational reasons, as the profit margins seem to be low for their 
businesses. Hence, Christensen (1997) proposes two response strategies for incumbent firms, 
engaged to disruptive innovation: (1) to create a new business unit, or (2) to sustain 
innovation. In addition, Catalysts of disruption, highlighted by Hagel (2015), can also be 
linked to strategic pathways of the latter companies. On the other hand, there are many 
researches criticizing the classic theory of disruptive innovation, stressing such primary 
factors of disruption, as shifting economies of scale, first-mover advantage, legacy costs, 
inability to innovate, managerial myopia (King & Baatartogtokh, 2015), incumbent 
companies’ inability to respond to disruptive innovation accordingly (Denning, 2015), or that 
the theory should be expanded by considering the excess capacity notion and the adoption of 
an innovative business model (Chase 2016). 
Based on the observations from the global pilot research, the actual situation of the 
global TV industry, the business models companies are using to compete, the challenges 
industry is facing in global media value chains and a spectrum of antecedents and factors 
influencing incumbent TV firms, engaged in disruptive innovation have been highlighted. The 
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three common trends named by the Representative correspond to the main concepts in the 
literature of disruptive innovation and are sustained by various authors: (1) the 
internationalization processes (disruptive changes in media industry, advocated by Benson, 
2007), (2) new possibilities provided by internet and digitalization (Enabling technology, as 
a Catalyst of disruption, provided by Hagel, 2015), and (3) relevant content creation and 
distribution for the television (Customer mindset, as a Catalyst of disruption, provided by 
Hagel, 2015).  
Based on the empirical research implemented in Lithuania it is advocated that there 
is no need to expand Christensen’s (1997) theory of disruptive innovation, nor propose 
alternative response strategies, referring to the contemporary contradictions and criticism 
towards the theory (see King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Denning, 2015; Chase, 2016). The 
empirical results of the main research sustain Cristensen’s (1997) notion, that first, generally 
business practitioners perceive disruptive innovation from the technological perspective (thus, 
sustains the existence of Enabling technology and Platform, as main Catalysts of disruption). 
To some extent, Customer mindset, as a Catalyst of disruption emerged in the discussions, but 
again, it had roots in the changing technology and customer’s shift to the Internet. Second, 
even though the managers were proposed to choose an adequate response strategy, still, they 
chose Christensen’s (1997) strategies, adapted for the current research objectives: ((1) to 
create a new business unit, or (2) to sustain innovation) in the very essence. And only to some 
extent, also mergers and acquisitions (M&A) strategy was chosen, while other types of 
strategies did not gain much attention from the practitioners. Thus, the author’s suggestion is 
to explain, but not to expand the existing theory of disruptive innovation for business and 
therefore, help companies confront the ‘innovator’s dilemma’ between monetizing on its 
current business and/ or creating a new source of future growth.  
 
2) Implications on business models: from global to local 
Findings from the scientific literature suggest that, in relation to various disruptive 
changes, companies do need to transform their business models, as the core logic for 
explicating how a firm will remain profitable, will change over time (Najmaei, 2011). 
Therefore, it is essential to identify how the innovation of the business model (Chesbrough, 
2007) can generate new value in an industry (in value proposition, target market, value chain, 
revenue mechanisms, value network or ecosystem, competitive strategy). In other words, the 
business model innovation is not only a modification of an existing product or service; it 
describes the development of a new activity system for the creation and capture of value (Amit 
& Zott, 2010) in existing radical changes in established paradigms (Markides, 1997; Hamel 
& Valikangas 2003, quot. in Najmaei, 2011). Therefore, in the light of disruptive innovation, 
it is important to emphasize the importance of business model innovation and its types. In the 
latter research case, the most suitable type of business model is perceived as an Industry model 
(Giesen, Berman & Bell et al., 2007), innovating the whole industry value chain. The other 
important notion on topic derives from the fact that (1) companies commercialize innovative 
ideas and technologies through their business models, and (2) that the business model 
represents a new subject of innovation, which complements the traditional subjects of process, 
product, and organizational innovation and involves new forms of cooperation and 
collaboration (Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011), thus a business model innovation itself can be a 
pathway to competitive advantage if the model is sufficiently differentiated and hard to 
replicate for incumbents and new entrants alike (Teece, 2010). On the one hand, in highly 
technological industrial contexts, as TV industry in this case, it is also essential to highlight 
the importance of e-business models, as a sort of technological ‘outcome’ in business 
modelling (Osterwalder, 2004; Gordijn & Akkermans, 2001; Gordijn, 2003). In fact, when 
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talking about the launch of the Internet TV, the e-business model allows to describe work 
processes utilized in virtual or electronic environments (Botto, 2003, cit. in Hanafizadeh & 
Nikabadi, 2011) like the Internet, to carry out transactions and create value for customers 
(Currie, 2004; quot. in Hanafizadeh & Nikabadi, 2011). On the other hand, other authors (e.g., 
Chesbrough, 2007) stress the idea that business model innovation clearly requires 
involvement of soft skills, e.g., top leadership. Moreover, Doz & Kosonen (2010) propose 
the importance of meta-capabilities: strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource 
flexibility. Smith, Binns & Tushman (2010) highlight how business model innovation 
depends on leadership that can make dynamic decisions, build commitment to both, 
overarching visions and agenda specific goals, learn actively at multiple levels and engage 
conflict. Santos, Spector & Van Der Heyden (2009) also emphasize the importance of the 
behavioral aspects involved in business model innovation. When linking business modelling 
to open innovation perspective it is important to note that open innovation influences 
spillovers of a company’s business model (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006).  Thus, 
here innovation is perceived as a strategy to increase the firm’s competitive advantage that 
can be reached together with other agents in the value network. In the light of disruption, it is 
crucial for companies to benefit from ‘openness’, as from means of expanding value creation 
with partners, customers and suppliers (Gassmann & Enkel, 2004). 
Based on the observations from the global pilot research, from the business model 
perspective, the Representative argued, that the global TV broadcasting industry’s business 
model contains advertising, broadcasting (broadcasting in terms of affiliates), and producing 
(content creation) revenues. It is explained further, that when running a channel, a company 
has basically one main business model, based on affiliates revenues and other revenues. In 
addition, a TV broadcaster can have different business models with joint ventures and 
partners. It is also to mention that FOX is more likely to produce more for the cinemas, movie 
industry and not for television, but however, this is a part of a FIC’s business model. It is 
important to note that FIC tries to keep their business model suitable for niche customers by 
providing them niche channels with a specific advertisement. The Representative claims, that 
sometimes niche channels are more profitable because they need less structural costs and 
gives more revenues. In relation to FIC business model, the global player has a separate 
advertisement company within the company, called FOX One Stop Media. In addition to the 
notions in the Business modelling literature, the Representative from FIC also links the 
business model to soft skills, e.g., vision. The representative explains, that throughout the 
time, the European President’s and the Worldwide President’s vision has changed from the 
expansion of the channels to new markets, plus adding additional narrow businesses, to pretty 
much the opposite vision, focusing on current brand. Also, the importance of value network 
is highlighted in case of FIC business model.  
Based on the empirical research, implemented in Lithuania, the business models 
were presented from the disruptive business model, as well as from the value chain 
perspectives. Indeed, the empirical research results sustain the importance of a business model 
when engaged to disruptive innovation. In accordance, PwC (2013) and Schindler, Upreti & 
Goswami (2011) advocate that the traditional value chain for media companies has been 
changing recently. Obviously, the analysis with the Maxqda software revealed that the most 
related code (interrelated 25 times) to the value chain, or in this case, Value network, is a 
Business model (as value network makes part of a business model). On the one hand, this 
relation is inevitable and does not raise scientific questions according to definition (e.g., 
Osterwalder, 2004; Gordijn, Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Sandström et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, such a link might indicate the transformation, or the innovation 
of the Business model from the Value network perspective, when facing disruptive innovation. 
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Hence, the author argues, that the latter relationship reveals the business model transformation 
process and advocates Business model innovation (BMI) for Lithuanian TV broadcasting 
companies. As the context for the BMI, the empirical analysis reveals the engagement in 
disruptive innovation, which is supported by two catalysts of disruption: Trends and 
challenges (interrelated to Value network 16 times) and Enabling technology (interrelated to 
Value network 13 times). The interrelations of various variables will be presented further, 
following the logic of the current research. Based on these findings it is suggested to amplify 
the existing scientific notions on Business modelling literature by linking it closer to 
disruptive perspective: catalysts of disruption and to factors behind response strategies, when 
facing the disruption. 
 
3) Implications on strategy discourse and response strategies 
The scientific literature suggests that the linkage between an organization and its 
environment is a primary component of strategic management (Rabin, Miller & Hildreth, 
2000), and strategic sense making is the key organizational cognition-action processes of 
environmental scanning, interpretation and associated responses (quot. Thomas et al., 1993), 
or strategic analysis, strategic choice, and strategy implementation, as Grant (2016) suggests. 
Scanning in this context means the search of the external environment’s events or issues that 
possibly affect the company. This draws attention to analyze environmental uncertainty, as a 
source of disruption. Similarly, Hagel (2015) suggests, that in order to avert disruption for 
incumbents, it is essentially important to see it coming. Therefore, (1) understanding the shape 
new disruptions are likely to assume (patterns of disruption); (2) understanding what 
particular response strategies the industry should adopt; and (3) understanding what external 
factors will act as catalysts of disruption, are crucial. By understanding this, companies 
engaged to disruptive innovation can start not only to anticipate the environmental changes 
but also transform the ‘unexpected’ into ‘expected’ and get the competitive advantage, by 
adopting a Strategy as a cohesive response to an important challenge (Rumelt, 2011, quot. in 
Grant, 2016). Therefore, the term Response strategy is the most related to this research.  In 
the light of disruptive innovation, the latter response strategies have been proposed based on 
various research (Markides, 2006; Worlock, 2007; Yovanof &  Hazapis, 2008; Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Overdof, 2000;  Markides, 2006; 
Georgantzas et al. 2005; Sandström et al., 2009; Bores et al., 2003; Medina, 2011): (1) 
traditional business and sustaining innovation strategy; (2) ignore the innovation strategy; (3) 
disrupt the disruption strategy; (4) innovation adoption with focus on existing businesses 
(considering creating a new business unit) strategy; (5) embrace the innovation strategy; and 
(6) merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. 
Based on the observations from the global pilot research, the merger and acquisition 
(M&A) strategy was mentioned in the FIC case. 
Based on the empirical research implemented in Lithuania, there were two main 
response strategies to disruptive innovation, mentioned by the incumbent firms’ 
representatives: focusing on and investing in the (1) traditional business and sustaining 
innovation strategy, and (4) innovation adoption with focus on existing businesses 
(considering creating a new business unit) strategy. These two choices generally correspond 
to Christensen’s (1997) response strateges. However, in two of the investigated cases, LNK 
and TV3, (6) merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy was mentioned as having impact during 
the market expansion phase. The empirical results on the response strategies imply, that there 
is no substantial empirical background to test more than the presented number of strategies in 
the TV broadcasting industry. However, the research also revealed that the identification of 
the proper strategy is not enough. It is therefore important to evaluate whether the incumbent 
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was the first mover, or the second mover in the industry. Considering first mover and second 
mover perspectives and advantages, it can be stated that: (1) LRT Group is perceived as an 
absoulte first mover in innovative technologies and its adaptations: HD broadcasting, 360 
cameras, Virtual Reality content, TV applications, etc.; (2) TV3 Group generally is a first 
mover of almost everything what now all TVs have, including the Internet TV; is a first mover 
in terms of online TV broadcasting for its audience; in terms of content that TV3 offers today; 
TV3 has been a first mover to accustom public to ‘delayed view’ and created conditions for 
their audience to watch it; it is to mention, that the competitors consented to TV3’s first mover 
position in the industry; (3) LNK Group is perceived as a second mover in almost all activities: 
based on one LNK’s interview excerption it can be stated that the TV3 Group is an active first 
mover, whilst LNK Group is a second mover. However, despite being a little behind the 
competitor, the TV group perceives it as an advantage: one always has a chance to get closer 
to the first mover and beat it with some quality content; (4) Lietuvos Rytas TV Group does 
not define itself either from the first mover, or the second mover perspective. However, the 
author argues that based on the fact that Interviewee 2 has admitted to be myopic 
management-wise, Lietuvos Rytas TV is perceived as a second mover. Based on the latter 
research insights, strategic management literature and response strategies undoubtedly have 
to be linked to the first mover and the second mover perspectives. 
 
4) Implications on factors behind response strategies: from global to local 
Findings from the scientific literature suggest that in order to attain success, companies 
have to constantly strengthen their organizational capabilities – intangible assets and possible 
sources of strategic advantage (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Cordes-
Berszinn, 2013; Galdo, 2016). According to various researches, these common Human/ 
Managerial factors are highlighted (Christensen & Bower, 1996; King & Baatartogtokh, 
2015; Day & Lord, 1992; Vlaar, de Vries & Willenborg, 2005; Chesbrough, 2001; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984; Viellechner & Wulf, 2010): (1) Strategic direction/ vision, (2) Non-
autonomous (team) decision making, (3) Risk propensity, (4) Executives’ psychological and 
observable characteristics, (5) Expertise, competency, and (6) Managerial myopia. As Teece 
et al. (1997); Chesbrough (2003); Wang & Ahmed (2007); Teece (2007); Kindström et al. 
(2013) advocate, the latter capabilities, often linked to human/ managerial practices, or 
factors, help organizations effectively deal with new challenges, create advanced 
configurations of resources and find relevant solutions allowing companies to obtain and 
sustain their high performance as well as innovatively-shaped competitive advantage by 
setting the ‘right’ response to disruptive innovation strategy. Also, in a similar vein, quoting 
Sandström et al. (2009), it appears reasonable that the capacity to respond to disruptive 
innovations depends largely on more formal characteristics of the incumbent. According to 
various researches, these common Structural/ organizational factors are highlighted (Dutton 
& Duncan, 1987; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Sandström et al., 2009; Madjdi & Hüsig, 
2011): (1) Value network, (2) Heterogeneity, (3) Investments, (4) Resources, (5) 
Organizational lethargy, (6) Company structure, and (7) Corporate governance, bureaucracy 
and policies. 
Based on the observations from the global pilot research, the most common factors 
behind the response strategy in case of FIC were the following: the most frequent factor within 
Structural/ organizational variables was Value network (mentioned 16 times), while in the 
Human/ Managerial sub-category, the most frequent one was Strategic direction/ vision 
(mentioned 17 times). The relevance of Value network is based on the following quotations: 
we are a multi market company, a part of 21st century FOX; there are several different tracks 
on divisions <…> it is movie division, we have the studios, distribution, everything; better if 
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you produce locally with local talents, artists, that can create significant content; FIC makes 
movies production and co-production with partners. Also, as Structural/ organizational 
factor, Content was mentioned: according to the Representative, content can provide the 
identity of FOX, as well as strong content can make your channel relevant and different from 
other ones. The importance of the Strategic direction/ vision is sustained by some excerpts, 
e.g., those channels can change because of the vision of the president or at first I didn't believe 
in our president's vision because it is very much a status quo. The other Strategic direction / 
vision – related notions have been presented in the previous sub-chapter ‘Implications on 
business models: from global to local’. 
In order to ground the launch of the Internet TV, as a response strategy to global 
disruptive innovation, at this stage, the empirical research implemented in Lithuania 
adopted two perspectives: within-case, following all-in-one logic, and multiple case analysis, 
representing separate TV Groups’ results, that allowed the author to exclude the factors (and 
their combinations) in a relevant manner. 
First, multiple case analysis represented the manifestations and combinations of the 
Human/ managerial factors and Structural/ organizational factors (or variables) in each TV 
Group separately. (1) In case of LNK TV Group, all factors to some extent have been 
perceived as influencing in the context of response strategy to disruptive innovation. 
However, the most frequently related factors, according to both factor categories (or to 
response strategy), are: Value network and Investments; Value network and Resources; 
Heterogeneity and Investments; Heterogeneity and Resources; Investments and Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies; Investments and Managerial myopia; Investments and 
Response strategy; Resources and Investments; Strategic direction/ vision and Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies; Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous 
(team) decision making; Strategic direction/ vision and Response strategy. (2) In case of 
Lietuvos Rytas TV Group, only a few factors have been used in the context of response 
strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, according to 
both factor categories and response strategy, are Investments and Response strategy. (3) In 
case of LRT TV Group, not all factors have been named as influencing in the context of 
response strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most frequently related factors, 
according to both factor categories (or to response strategy), are: Value network and 
Resources; Heterogeneity and Company structure; Investments and Resources; Investments 
and Expertise, competency; Investments and Response strategy; Resources and Non-
autonomous (team) decision making; Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies and 
Strategic direction/ vision; Strategic direction / vision and Non-autonomous (team) decision 
making. (4) In case of TV3 TV Group, all factors to some extent have been named as 
influencing in the context of response strategy to disruptive innovation. However, the most 
frequently related factors, according to both factor categories, are: Value network and 
Heterogeneity; Value network and Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies; Value 
network and Risk propensity; Heterogeneity and Resources; Investments and Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies; Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies and 
Non-autonomous (team) decision making; Strategic direction/ vision and Non-autonomous 
(team) decision making. The multiple case analysis allows the author to state that even though 
the TV Groups compete in the same Lithuanian Free-TV broadcasting industry and is 
competing for the same viewer, their response strategies to disruptive innovation are based on 
different factors. The (almost) only matching point, except for the TV3 Group, was the clear 
relation between the Investments and Response strategy. In LNK, LRT and Lietuvos Rytas 
TV cases, as purely local TV industry players’ cases, it is pretty evident and presumable. In 
case of TV3, as mentioned by their competitors, the launch of the Internet TV, as a response 
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strategy to a global disruption, is a must by all means, therefore, might have not been linked 
to the investments. It is also evident that the market is highly oligopolic, as being stated by 
Interviewee 9, and mainly having two strongest industry players: TV3 Group and LNK Group. 
Second, within-case analysis allowed to get a full view of the factors (or variables) and 
their combinations, influencing the response strategy to disruptive innovation in Lithuanian 
TV broadcasting industry, as well as revealing the contradictions of this research. Based on 
the within-case analysis, these factors are advocated as the most evident and influencing the 
response strategy: Structural / organizational variables: (1) Value network; (2) Investments; 
(3) Resources; (4) Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies; and Human/ managerial 
variables: (1) Strategic direction/ vision. It is however to note, that all the factors have been 
mentioned by the interviewees, therefore, cannot be excluded from the empirical research 
results. The next implemented relationship analysis brings out some interesting outcomes. 
First, Structural/ organizational factors were relatively more interrelated in the cases of LNK 
Group and TV3 Group, while Human/ managerial factors had more synergy points in the 
case of LNK Group. Second, a clear mix of both factor groups was not evident in any of the 
TV Group’s case. Lastly, Investment-related factors were much diffused in the cases of LRT 
Group & Lietuvos Rytas TV and, on the contrary, less diffused in the case of TV3 Group. 
Also, it is important to clarify the research contradiction, based on the relative weight of the 
more influencing factor group. Even though Structural/ organizational variables, calculating 
mathematically, are perceived as more influencing, on the contrary, Human/ managerial 
variables have relatively stronger impact on the choice of response strategy to disruptive 
innovations according to interviews’ excerpts. The further argumentation on the matter is 
presented in depth in the part 4.2.4. The other contradiction among research results was linked 
to Other factors group. Here, empirical evidence was found that Other factors, such as First 
mover/ second mover; Channel groups; Competition, competitors; and Niche channels have 
also had influence (or was related) to the choice of response strategy. 
To sum up, to some extent, all the mentioned factors shape the choice of response 
strategies to disruption by the local incumbent firms confronting global disruptive change in 
case of TV broadcasters in Lithuania. Moreover, it can also be grounded based on statistical 
information (Statistics Lithuania, 2013). However, the relative weight of factors depend on 
the company itself and managers working for the TV broadcaster. Therefore, not to mention 
the need to extend scientific literature on separate factor manifestations, it is also suggested 
to amplify the scientific literature by the notions of the relative weights of the factor groups 
in different industrial contexts. 
 
5) Will the response strategy, the launch of the Internet TV pay off? Managerial 
implications on the response strategy, facing the global disruptive innovation 
In order to evaluate the theoretical return on this investment, based on the interviews 
conducted in Lithuania, the research provides some data on topic. Indeed, there are modest 
and also bold statements regarding the Internet TV. 
To start with, Representative 2 has expressed quite a sceptical perception of the Internet 
TV. Continuing with the explanation of the choice, Interviewee 2 says, the choice of the 
Internet TV launch highly depends on the money the company has. In addition, there is a 
strong opinion that not a single Lithuanian television would leave its traditional TV business 
and start a new Internet TV business because traditional business still generates a lot of 
money. This statement does not mean, however, that TV companies are not investing in 
Internet technologies. In Interviewee 2’s TV case, they are focusing on the traditional TV 
business and are observing what happens in the market. Also, they invest only in profitable 
projects. In the case of other big TV Groups, they can afford buying new channels or platforms 
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as they are large financial groups. Representative 2’s company, as a part of a media group, 
has to act very cautiously. 
Other than that, Interviewee 9 mentions that the Internet has been receiving more 
attention and their Internet TV solution pays off, as well as all the other absolutely profitable 
channels. Interviewee 9 gives an example of their Internet TV project development cycle. 
There was a very clear interest from the Marketing Department. However, Interviewee 9 
remembers that at the beginning it was not the product she wanted. At first, it was a website 
with an integrated archive, but not an Internet TV. However, the Marketing Department 
perceived it as a marketing tool, while the Sales Department perceived it as added value for 
business clients. Therefore, it could be generalized that suitable staff determines appropriate 
decisions because of their business interest. Nevertheless, in that case, other departments saw 
it more problematically: the Finance Department always wanted minimum investment, the 
Technical Director did not want to give his budget, the Traffic Manager needed one additional 
employee for this job, etc. (Interviewee 9 laughs). As Interviewee 9 claims, the strategy of 
their TV Group is more linked to the maintaining audience, offering free TV channels. And 
the other important part of the strategy is dedicated to strengthen the Internet, but at the same 
time, the Group does not invest too much to the Internet, as the return is still very modest. But 
the fact was, the Internet TV had been in the company’s strategy, and it was launched. 
Interviewee 1 argues that lately it has become trendy to invest a part of the advertising 
budget in the Internet, as there is a young spectator out there and the Internet is more effective 
with that. But Interviewee 1 argues that there are many arguments why such strategy cannot 
be not reasoned. He bases his insights on Dansu (2016) market research, saying that the online 
advertising has been found not as profitable as it looks like. There are such issues as ad 
blocking, false users, etc. Despite those, the advertisers still tend to think that the Internet is 
the king and invest 50 percent of the advertising money there. In Lithuania, the importance of 
the Internet as media has been rising. The trend is clear, but it is not exceptional, he says. At 
the same time, Interviewee 1 understands that their traditional TV platform will mutate or 
disappear. But those changes are not as quick as everybody claims, considering the market 
overview. But if the advertiser needs young audience, traditional TVs can help less and less. 
Talking about the know-how, Interviewee 1 argues that maybe, if the company had a very 
good online specialist, they may have entered the Internet earlier and in a broader sense. Since 
they did not have one, they had to follow the trend, were forced to make mistakes and learn 
from them. But since these have been relatively small investments, they can give that a second 
try. During that time the know-how emerges. The latter TV Group had an idea to hire 
somebody who knows the Internet and the TV business model well, but it was difficult to find 
the one for that kind of a startup project, he said. However, there is one head person, who has 
been engaged in the Internet TV specifically. To some extent, he can be called a Chief Digital 
Officer. In the case of Interviewee 1’s Internet TV, he argues whether putting efforts on the 
local Internet TV does not limit the TV. Besides, global players have been fighting for the 
same market share. Eventually, Interviewee 1 doubts whether a shift to the Internet TV would 
not mean getting into the direct competition with global players.  
Representative 6 has chosen mainly to sustain the traditional TV business. Interviewee 
3 has chosen the same response strategy accordingly, but, at the same time, they put lots of 
effort on innovation and have employees for developing the Internet TV exclusively to 
correspond to customer’s needs. Representative 5 and Representative 4 chose to follow the 
trend to adopt the Internet TV and focus on traditional TV businesses at the same time. Based 
on their strategy, this is what they did in 2015. 2015 was the year of transformation for this 
TV Group, when the representatives revised classical or traditional TV activities. The team 
optimized the costs to the maximum. After this program the TV Group reduced staff in order 
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to keep the classic TV as a cash cow that would guarantee daily income. In parallel, they 
allocated funds to create a new generation TV. They did not share contents with others (e.g., 
cable networks) due to the fact that in 2016 their own VOD was launched. The main concept 
is similar to Netflix, except the fact that it has a localized content which means that it will be 
translated into the Lithuanian language. This VOD will have sports broadcasts that Netflix 
does not offer, and that would be the new VOD’s competitive advantage, she says. Thus, the 
TV Group has collected much contents which makes them more competitive; they would be 
able to have another channel completely filled with their contents. As highlighted, this VOD 
has been created for all the Baltic countries. Interviewee 8 specifies that their Internet TV is 
basically the same in terms of broadcasting, only shown on two channels: one channel online, 
and the other on traditional TV. Content-wise it has some differences, but the Internet TV is 
a technological innovation that is complementary to the traditional TV, and vice versa. 
Interviewee 8 thinks the time will come when multitasking in terms of watching both sources 
at the same time emerges. 
 
6) Implications on the research model and proposition for further research on topic 
Findings from the scientific literature suggest that in many cases, the factors behind 
response strategies can be linked to firm’s dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece, 2007; Teece & 
Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). Considering this notion, the factors could have been 
distributed as the dynamic capabilities’ framework implies. Hence, one of the possible 
research stream might be to advocate linkages between dynamic capabilities and disruptive 
innovation pillars, opting out the response strategies, and making the research model less 
complex. On the second thought, from the business perspective, more strategic pathways were 
revealed using the author’s model. 
Another interesting notion on further research on topic derives from the observations 
from the global pilot research. It was noted that, despite the trends and catalysts of disruption 
in the global TV industry, the most frequently used Human/ managerial factor was the 
managing person’s Strategic direction/ vision. Therefore, it would be interesting to redefine 
the research model and investigate the impact of the Strategic direction/ vision in the choice 
of response strategy for incumbent firms, engaged to disruptive innovation. 
Based on the empiric research, implemented in Lithuania, some future investigations 
can be carried out on the basis of the same main research methodology, applied in other 
technology-intense and innovation-based industries, having incumbent market players.  
Lastly, the triangulation strategy approach for the obtained results might increase the 
credibility of qualitative results of the implemented analysis. 
 
7) Theoretical and practical research results and implications. 
From the theoretical perspective, the results of the research suggest to explain more in 
depth, but not to expand the existing theory of disruptive innovation for business and 
therefore, help companies confront the ‘innovator’s dilemma’ between monetizing on its 
current business and/ or creating a new source of future growth. Based on the research 
findings, it is suggested to amplify the existing scientific notions on Business modelling 
literature by linking it closer to disruptive perspective: catalysts of disruption and to factors 
behind response strategies when facing the disruption. In addition, an integrated research 
framework has been prepared and tested based on the above mentioned theoretical insights. 
In the context of disruptive innovation, the latter framework incorporates and links these 
theoretical constructs: Catalysts of disruption, Response strategies and Human/ managerial & 
Structural/ organizational factors. 
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From the practical perspective, the integrated research framework can be used as an 
integral instrument to reveal the Response strategies and Human/ managerial & Structural/ 
organizational factors in the TV broadcasting industry, as well as it can be adapted to other, 
disruption-intense creative industries. In addition, the latter framework allows companies to 
identify disruptive market threats and choose an adequate response strategy based on the most 
important company-specific factors. The disclosed Human/ managerial & Structural/ 
organizational factors allow TV broadcasting industry’s companies to, firstly, identify the 
factors, which are relevant in specific cases and, secondly, to set an appropriate response 
strategy to global disruptive innovation. The results of the research also allow local incumbent 
TV broadcasting companies to evaluate whether the response disruptive global innovation – 
the launch of an Internet TV - will pay off, based on all the local broadcasting companies’ 
experience. 
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Conclusions 
 
1. Disruptive innovation is perceived as an innovation employing a ‘technology’ in 
management, marketing activities and investment policy which transforms 
information, labor, capital, and materials into products or services of greater value, 
which becomes the main goal of a company, and, as a consequence, fundamentally 
changes the established ‘rules of the game’ in many industries.  
2. A response strategy by an incumbent company engaged to disruptive innovation is 
advocated to be one of the following: (1) traditional business and sustaining 
innovation strategy; (2) ignore the innovation strategy; (3) disrupt the disruption 
strategy; (4) innovation adoption with focus on existing businesses (considering 
creating a new business unit) strategy; (5) embrace the innovation strategy, and (6) 
merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy. 
3. Considering the nature of disruption, grounded by catalysts of disruption and the 
chosen response strategy by an incumbent, scientific literature suggests that in order 
to attain success, companies have to constantly strengthen their assets, or main factors 
and other possible sources of strategic advantage. 
4. Two main sets of factors can be distinguished: Human/ managerial factors and 
Structural/ organizational factors. In the context of disruption, the main Human/ 
managerial factors are: (1) Strategic direction/ vision, (2) Non-autonomous (team) 
decision making, (3) Risk propensity, (4) Executives’ psychological and observable 
characteristics, (5) Expertise, competency, and (6) Managerial myopia. In similar 
vein, the following Structural/ organizational factors are set out: (1) Value network, 
(2) Heterogeneity, (3) Investments, (4) Resources, (5) Organizational lethargy, (6) 
Company structure, and (7) Corporate governance, bureaucracy and policies. 
5. The designed qualitative research methodology has been based on the analysis of the 
global and local TV industries. According to the methodology, the results of the pilot 
research were expected to reveal the manifestations of different factors and their 
combinations shaping global incumbent firms’ response strategies, facing disruptive 
innovation, while the results of the main research had a scope to reveal the response 
strategies and influencing factors in the case of Lithuanian TV broadcasters.  
6. The main research, based on 11 semi-structured interviews with local TV 
broadcasters’ representatives has been finalized as a result of local multiple cases and 
a within-case of the local incumbent TV broadcasting companies: LNK Group case, 
LRT Group case, TV3 Group case, and Lietuvos Rytas TV Group case. The main 
research has revealed the factors and their combinations that determine the choice of 
response strategy, chosen by 10 out of 11 interviewees: the innovation adoption with 
a focus on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) strategy. 
7. Within-case analysis has allowed to get a full view of the factors (or variables) and 
their combinations, influencing the response strategy to disruptive innovation in 
Lithuanian TV broadcasting industry, as well as has revealed the contradictions of 
this research. Based on the within-case analysis, these factors are advocated as the 
most evident and influencing the response strategy: Structural/ organizational 
variables: (1) Value network; (2) Investments; (3) Resources; (4) Corporate 
governance, bureaucracy and policies; and Human/ managerial variables: (1) 
Strategic direction / vision. It is however to note that all the factors have been 
mentioned by the interviewees, therefore, cannot be excluded from the empirical 
research results. 
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8. Multiple case analysis has revealed the fact that even though the TV Groups compete 
in the same Lithuanian Free-TV broadcasting industry and is competing for the same 
viewer, their response strategies to disruptive innovation are based on different 
factors and their groups. The (almost) only matching point, except for the TV3 Group, 
was the clear relation between the Investments and Response strategy. In LNK, LRT 
and Lietuvos Rytas TV cases, as purely local TV industry players’ cases, it is pretty 
evident and presumable. In case of TV3, as mentioned by their competitors, the 
launch of the Internet TV, as a response strategy to a global disruption, is a must by 
all means, therefore, might have not been linked to the investments. It is also evident, 
that the market is highly oligopolic and has two strongest industry players: TV3 
Group and LNK Group. 
9. Statistical data analysis highlights the similar presence of both, technological (50%) 
and non-technological (35.7%) innovation in the TV industry during the period of 
2012–2014. 
10. The most diffused and effective response strategy, chosen by local incumbent TV 
broadcasters facing the disruptive innovation can be evidenced as the innovation 
adoption with focus on existing businesses (considering creating a new business unit) 
strategy influenced by a mix of Structural/ organizational and Human/ managerial 
factors which have a different relative weight based on the mathematical calculations 
encoded and implemented by Maxqda, and according to the interview excerpts 
analyzed manually. 
11. The further research on the topic might be enriched by combining the triangulation 
method. It is also suggested to analyze the topic from another theoretical perspective 
by using the approach of dynamic capabilities, for instance. 
  
106 
References 
 
1. 2012–2017 m. Lietuvos nacionalinio radijo ir televizijos (LRT) valstybinė programų 
strategija. (2015). Vilnius: LRT. 
2. About LRT. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.lrt.lt/en/about 
3. Amit, R., & Zott, C. (2001). Value creation in e-business. Strategic Management Journal, 22. 
4. Amit, R., & Zott, C. (2010). Business Model Innovation: Creating Value in Times of 
Change. University of Navarra: IESE Business School. 
5. Apie LNK. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://lnk.alfa.lt/apie-lnk/imone  
6. Apie TV3. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://tv.tv3.lt/apie-tv3 
7. Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.apple.com/tv/   
8. Balčiūnienė, R. (2015). Televizija vienintelė neneša pelno „Lietuvos rytui“. Verslo žinios, 
2015-05-06. Vilnius: Verslo žinios.  
9. Battistella, C., Biotto, G., & De Toni, A.F. (2012). From design driven innovation to 
meaning strategy. Management Decision, Vol. 50 No. 4. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.  
10. BCG Perspectives. (2016). The Digital Revolution Is Disrupting the TV Industry. Retrieved 
from https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/media-entertainment-digital-
revolution-disrupting-tv-industry/?chapter=5  
11. BCG. (2016). BCG Analyzes the Factors Driving Digital Disruption in the TV Industry. The 
Boston Consulting Group. Retrieved from http://www.bcg.com/d/press/march-21---digital-
revolution-is-disrupting-the-tv-industry-32058  
12. Benson, B. (2007). Couch potato famine: prospering through an era of disruptive change in 
media. FTI Consulting, New York. 
13. Bewley, T. (2002). Interviews as a valid empirical tool in economics. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 31(4), 343-353. 
14. Bitinas, B., Rupšienė, L., & Žydžiūnaitė, V. (2008). Kokybinių tyrimų metodologija. I dalis. 
Klaipėda: S. Jokužio leidykla-spaustuvė. 
15. Bloomberg. (2016). Media. Company Overview of TV3 Lithuania, UAB. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=11632539 
16. Boccardelli, P., & Magnusson, M. G. (2006). Dynamic capabilities in early‐phase 
entrepreneurship. Knowledge and Process Management, 13(3), 162-174. 
17. Bogner, A., & Menz, W. (2009). The theory-generating expert interview: epistemological 
interest, forms of knowledge, interaction. Interviewing experts (pp. 43-80). Palgrave 
Macmillan UK. 
18. Bolton, D. (2015). How The Apple TV Has Three Clear Advantages Over Its Rivals. 
Retrieved from https://arc.applause.com/2015/09/15/apple-tv-streaming-advantages/  
19. Borés, C., Saurina, C., & Torres, R. (2003). Technological convergence: a strategic 
perspective. Technovation, 23(1), 1-13. 
20. Bourne, H., & Jenkins, M. (2005). Eliciting managers’ personal values: An adaptation of the 
laddering interview method. Organizational Research Methods, 8(4), 410-428. 
21. Casadesus-Masanell R., Ricart J.E. (2010). From strategy to business models and to tactics. 
Long Range Planning, 43. 
22. Chan-Olmsted, S. M., & Kang, J. W. (2003). Theorizing the strategic architecture of a 
broadband television industry. The Journal of Media Economics, 16(1), 3-21. 
23. Chapman R.L., Soosay C., & Kandampully J. (2003). Innovation in logistic services and the 
new business model. A conceptual framework. International Journal of Physical Distribution 
& Logistics Management, 33(7). MCB UP Limited. 
24. Charitou, C. D., & Markides, C. C. (2003). Responses to disruptive strategic innovation. 
MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(2), 55-64. Magazine: Winter 2003, Research Feature 
January 15, 2003. 
25. Chase, R. (2016). We Need to Expand the Definition of Disruptive Innovation. Harvard 
Business Review. Harvard Business Publishing. 
107 
26. Chesbrough H. (2010). Business Model Innovation: Opportunities and Barriers. Long Range 
Planning, 43. 
27. Chesbrough H., Rosenbloom R. S. (2002). The Role of the Business Model in Capturing 
Value from Innovation: Evidence from Xerox Corporation’s Technology Spin-Off 
Companies. Industrial &Corporate Change, 11(3). 
28. Chesbrough H., Wanhaverbeke W., & West J. (2006). Open Innovation: Researching a New 
Paradigm. Oxford University Press. 
29. Chesbrough H.W. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting 
from Technology. Boston: Harward Business School Publishing Corporation. 
30. Chesbrough H.W. (2007). Business model innovation: It’s not just about technology 
anymore. Strategy and Leadership, 35. 
31. Chesbrough H.W., & Appleyard M.M. (2007). Open Innovation and Strategy. California 
Management Review, 50 (1). 
32. Chesbrough, H. (2001). Open innovation: a new paradigm for managing technology. In 
OECD Conference on New Business Strategies for R&D (Vol. 22). 
33. Chesbrough, H. W. (2006). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting 
from technology. Harvard Business Press. 
34. Chesbrough, H., Vanhaverbeke, W., & West, J. (2006). Open innovation: Researching a 
new paradigm. Oxford University Press on Demand.  
35. Christensen, C. (1997). The innovator’s dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms 
to fail. Harvard Business School Print. 
36. Christensen, C. M. (1997). Making strategy: Learning by doing. Harvard business review, 
75(6), 141-156. 
37. Christensen, C. M. (2003). The innovator's dilemma: the revolutionary book that will 
change the way you do business (p. 320). New York, NY: HarperBusiness Essentials. 
38. Christensen, C. M., & Bower, J. L. (1996). Customer power, strategic investment, and the 
failure of leading firms. Strategic management journal, 17(3), 197-218. 
39. Christensen, C. M., & Overdof, M. (2000). Meeting the challenge of disruptive change. 
Harvard business review, 78(2), 66-77. 
40. Christensen, C. M., Raynor, M. E., & McDonald, R. (2015). What is disruptive innovation. 
Harvard Business Review, 44-53. 
41. Christopherson, S. (2008). Beyond the self-expressive creative worker an industry perspective 
on entertainment media. Theory, culture & society, 25(7-8), 73-95. 
42. Christopherson, S. (2008). Beyond the self-expressive creative worker an industry 
perspective on entertainment media. Theory, culture & society, 25(7-8), 73-95. 
43. Clear Channel rides on the crest of the airwaves. The impact of business model innovation. 
(2004). Strategic Direction, 20(10). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.  
44. Cordes-Berszinn, Ph. (2013). Dynamic Capabilities: How organizational structures affect 
knowledge processes. Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.  
45. Davis, L. E., North, D. C., & Smorodin, C. (1971). Institutional change and American 
economic growth. CUP Archive. 
46. Day, D. V., & Lord, R. G. (1992). Expertise and problem categorization: the role of expert 
processing in organizational sense‐making. Journal of Management Studies, 29(1), 35-47. 
47. Denning, S. (2015). How Useful Is Christensen's Theory Of Disruptive Innovation? Forbes. 
Retrieved on June 2, 2015, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/10/15/how-
useful-is-christensens-theory-of-disruptive-innovation/#18100aa04fb7  
48. Denning, S. (2016a). Christensen updates disruption theory. Strategy & Leadership, 44(2), 
10-16. 
49. Denning, S. (2016b). What You Need To Know About Disruption: John Hagel. Forbes. 
Retrieved on June 2, 2015, from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/02/29/john-hagel-fresh-research-on-
disruption/#8b72a175444f  
50. Doz, Y.L., & Kosonen, M. (2010). Embedding strategic agility. Long Range Planning, 43. 
108 
51. Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (2014). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics. University of Chicago Press. 
52. Dutton, J. E., & Duncan, R. B. (1987). The influence of the strategic planning process on 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 8(2), 103-116. 
53. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. 
54. Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25–32. 
55. Ernst & Young. (2013). Future of television. Media & Entertainment. Global Media & 
Entertainment Center. 
56. Evens, T. (2010). Value networks and changing business models for the digital television 
industry. Journal of media business studies, 7(4), 41-58. 
57. Fisher, L.M. (2001). Clayton M. Christensen, The Thought Leader Interview. 
strategy+business. October 1, 2001, Fourth Quarter, Issue 25. Booz & Company. 
58. Fontaine, G. & Kevin, D. (2016). MAVISE EXTRA. Media ownership: towards Pan‐
European groups? Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory.  
59. Friedrichsen, M., & Mühl-Benninghaus, W. (2013). Handbook of social media management. 
Heidelberg: Springer Science+ Business Media.  
60. Galdo, A.M.R. (2016). Capacidades dinamicas para a inovacao aberta: analise com base no 
capital intelectual. Florianopolis, SC.  
61. Gassmann, O., & Enkel, E. (2004). Towards a theory of open innovation: three core process 
archetypes. 
62. Gassmann, O., Enkel, E., & Chesbrough, H. (2010). The future of open innovation. R&D 
Management, 40(3), 213-221. 
63. Georgantzas, N. C., Peeva, N. A., & Weinberg, H. (2005, July). Disruptive innovation 
diffusion. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference of the System Dynamics 
Society. 
64. Gewirtz, D. (2015). Why Apple is ripe to disrupt the TV business. Retrieved from 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/why-apple-is-ripe-to-disrupt-the-tv-business/ 
65. Giesen E., Berman S.J., Bell R., et al. (2007). Three ways to successfully innovate your 
business model. Strategy and Leadership, 35. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
66. Gordijn J. (2003). Why visualization of e-business models matters. 16th Bled Electronic 
Commerce Conference eTransformation. 
67. Gordijn J., & Akkermans H. (2001). Designing and Evaluating E-Business Models. Intelligent 
E- Business. JULY/AUGUST 2001. 
68. Gordijn J., Osterwalder A., & Pigneur Y. (2005). Comparing two Business Model Ontologies 
for Designing e-Business Models and Value Constellations. 18th Bled eConference 
eIntegration in Action.  
69. Grant, R.M. (2016). Contemporary Strategy Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Business & 
Economics, 480 p. 
70. Gummesson, E. (2003). All research is interpretive! Journal of business & industrial 
marketing, 18(6/7), 482-492. 
71. Hagel, J. (2015). Patterns of Disruption. Deloitte University Press. Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu Limited. 
72. Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection 
of its top managers. Academy of management review, 9(2), 193-206. 
73. Hanafizadeh P., & Nikabadi M.S. (2011). Framework for selecting an appropriate e-business 
model in managerial holding companies. Case study: Iran Khodro. Journal of Enterprise 
Information Management, 24 (3). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
74. Hannon M.J. (2012). Co-evolution of innovative business models and sustainability 
transitions: The case of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model and the UK energy 
system. PhD thesis. Leeds: The University of Leeds.  
109 
75. Hayes J., & Finnegan P. (2005). Assessing the of potential of e-business models: towards a 
framework for assisting decision-makers. European Journal of Operational Research, 160. 
Elsevier 
76. Healey, M. P., & Hodgkinson, G. P. (2013). Psychological foundations of strategic 
management. Wiley Encyclopedia of Management. 
77. Henderson, B. D. (1989). The origin of strategy. Harvard business review, 67(6), 139-143. 
78. How Netflix Is Changing The TV Industry (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/060815/how-netflix-changing-tv-
industry.asp  
79. Iordanova, D., & Cunningham, S. (2012). Digital disruption: Cinema moves on-line. St 
Andrews film studies. 
80. Iordanova, D., & Cunningham, S. (2012). Digital disruption: Cinema moves on-line. St 
Andrews film studies. 
81. Jackson, J. H. (1997). The world trading system: law and policy of international economic 
relations. MIT press. 
82. Jenner, M. (2014). Is this TVIV? On Netflix, TVIII and binge-watching. New media & 
society, 1461444814541523. 
83. Jennes, I., & Van den Broeck, W. (2014). Digital TV innovations: industry and user 
perspective. info, 16(6), 48-59. 
84. Jofre S. (2011). Exploring the role of knowledge and technology transfer in innovation 
systems. Proceedings of Triple Helix IX International Conference: “Silicon Valley: Global 
Model or Unique Anomaly?”. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
85. KANTAR TNS. (2015). TV auditorijos tyrimo rezultatai 2015 m. sausis. Retrieved from 
http://www.tns.lt/lt/news/tv-auditorijos-tyrimo-rezultatai-2015-m-sausis/ 
86. KANTAR TNS. (2016). TV auditorijos tyrimo rezultatai 2016 m. sausis. Retrieved from 
http://www.tns.lt/lt/news/tv-auditorijos-tyrimo-rezultatai-2016-m-sausis/ 
87. Kiesler, S., & Sproull, L. (1982). Managerial response to changing environments: 
Perspectives on problem sensing from social cognition. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
548-570. 
88. Kim, W. C., & Mauborgne, R. (2004). Blue ocean strategy. If you read nothing else on 
strategy, read these best-selling articles, 71. 
89. Kindström, D., Kowalkowski, C., & Sandberg, E. (2013). Enabling service innovation: A 
dynamic capabilities approach. Journal of business research, 66(8), 1063-1073. 
90. King, A. A., & Baatartogtokh, B. (2015). How Useful Is the Theory of Disruptive 
Innovation?. MIT Sloan Management Review, 57(1), 77. 
91. Kon, M., Ning, L., Kalmus, M., Mank, T., Lin, G., & Attanucci, M. (2016). Connected 
Trends: CES 2016 Observations and Questions from the Floor. Retrieved from 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/hardware-software-media-entertainment-
connected-trends-ces-2016-observations-questions-from-floor/#3  
92. Küng, L. (2008). Strategic management in the media: Theory to practice. Sage. 
93. Lashinsky, A., (2011). How Apple works: Inside the world's biggest startup. Fortune. 
Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2011/05/09/inside-apple/ 
94. Leading media companies in 2015, based on revenue. (2015). Statista. Retrieved from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272469/largest-media-companies-worldwide/  
95. Lichtenthaler, U. (2009). Outbound open innovation and its effect on firm performance: 
examining environmental influences. R&D Management, 39(4), 317-330. 
96. Lieberman, M.B., & Montgomery, D.M. (1988). First-Mover Advantages. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9. 
97. Lietuvos rytas TV. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lietuvos_rytas_TV  
98. Lietuvos ryto TV administracija. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://tv.lrytas.lt/kontaktai/  
99. Lietuvos ryto TV apyvarta. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://rekvizitai.vz.lt/imone/lietuvos_ryto_televizija/apyvarta/  
100. Lietuvos televizijos rinkos 2014 metais apžvalga. (2015). Retrieced from 
http://mediazip.lt/201506/lietuvos-televizijos-rinkos-2014-metais-apzvalga/ 
110 
101. LNK darbuotojai. (2016). Retrieved from 
http://rekvizitai.vz.lt/imone/laisvas_ir_nepriklausomas_kanalas/darbuotoju-skaicius/LNK 
vadovai. (n.d.). Retrieded from http://lnk.alfa.lt/apie-lnk/vadovai 
102. LNK registracinė informacija. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.cr.lt/imones/imone-UAB-
Laisvas-Ir-Nepriklausomas-Kanalas/noriu/kontaktai/info/37863/ 
103. Loewe, P., & Chen, G. (2007). Changing your company’s approach to innovation. Strategy & 
Leadership, 35(6). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.  
104. LRT biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos (2015). 2015 III ketvirčių vykdymo ataskaitos. LRT. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.lrt.lt/userfiles/files/2015_III_ketvirciu_vykdymo_ataskaitos(1).pdf 
105. LRT biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos (2016). 2016 II ketvirčių biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos. 
LRT. Retrieved from 
http://www.lrt.lt/userfiles/files/2016_II_ketv_biudzeto_vykdymo_ataskaitos.pdf 
106. LRT finansinės ataskaitos. (2016). LRT. Retrieved from 
http://www.lrt.lt/userfiles/files/2015_finansiniu_ataskaitu_rinkinys.pdf 
107. LRT HD. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.lrt.lt/hdtv  
108. LRT-TELEVIZIJA. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.lrt.lt/en/channels/LRT-TELEVIZIJA  
109. Madjdi, F., & Hüsig, S. (2011). The heterogeneity of incumbents' perceptions and response 
strategies in the face of potential disruptions. Foresight, 13(5), 14-33. 
110. Markides, C. (2006). Disruptive innovation: In need of better theory. Journal of product 
innovation management, 23(1), 19-25. 
111. Markides, C. C. (1999). A dynamic view of strategy. MIT Sloan Management Review, 40(3), 
55. 
112. MAVISE. (2016). TV and on-demand audiovisual services in Lithuania. EU: European 
Audiovisual Observatory. Retrieved from http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=19 
113. MAVISE: Lietuvos Rytas TV. (n.d.). TV Channel: Lietuvos Rytas TV. EU: European 
Audiovisual Observatory. Retrieved from http://mavise.obs.coe.int/channel?id=367  
114. MAVISE: LRT. (n.d.). Company: VSI LIETUVOS NACIONALINIS RADIJAS IR 
TELEVIZIJA (LRT). Retrieved from http://mavise.obs.coe.int/company?id=6511  
115. MAVISE: TV3. (n.d.). TV Channel: TV3 (Lithuania). EU: European Audiovisual 
Observatory. Retrieved from http://mavise.obs.coe.int/channel?id=359  
116. Mažeika, Š. (2013). Socialinė atsakomybė: misija, pašaukimas ar pasirinkimas? Retrieved 
from http://www.delfi.lt/projektai/archive/socialine-atsakomybe-misija-pasaukimas-ar-
pasirinkimas.d?id=63468494  
117. McDaniel, Jr, C. (2007). Marketing Research/C. Jr. McDaniel, R. Gates. 
118. McGrath, R. G., & MacMillan, I. C. (1995). Discovery driven planning. Philadelphia: 
Wharton School, Snider Entrepreneurial Center. 
119. Medina, M., & Ojer-Goñi, T. (2012). The transformation of Public TV Companies into 
Digital Services at the BBC and RTVE. 
120. Mei-Pochtler, A., & von Merey, T. (2013). Preparing for Public Broadcasting’s Perfect 
Storm. Staying Relevant in a World of Nonlinear Media. BCG Perspectives. Retrieved from 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/media_entertainment_public_sector_prep
aring_public_broadcasting_perfect_storm/ 
121. MG Baltic Media (2013). Retrieved from http://www.mgbaltic.lt/en/about-us/structure/mg-
baltic-investment/lnk-group/ 
122. MG Baltic. (2013). LNK TV group was the most viewable in Lithuania in 2013. Retrieved 
from http://www.mgbaltic.lt/en/news/news/lnk/lnk-tv-group-was-the-most-viewable-in-
lithuania-in-2013.html 
123. MG Baltic. (n.d.). LNK Group strengthens „Info TV“ channel - “Dviračio šou“ ("Bike Show") 
will appear this autumn. Retrieved from http://www.mgbaltic.lt/en/news/news/lnk/lnk-group-
strengthens-info-tv-channel---dviracio-sou-bike-show-will-appear-this-autumn.html  
124. Mills, J., Platts, K., & Bourne, M. (2003). Applying resource-based theory. Methods, 
outcomes and utility for managers. International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, 23(2). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
111 
125. Mitchell, D., & Coles, C. (2003). The ultimate competitive advantage of continuing business 
model innovation. Journal of Business Strategy, 25(5). MCB UP Limited. 
126. Mitchell, D.W., & Coles, C.B. (2004). Business model innovation breakthrough moves. 
Journal of Business Strategy, 25(1). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
127. Morris M., Schindehutte M., & Allen J. (2005). The entrepreneur’s business model: Toward 
a unified perspective. Journal of Business Research, 58. 
128. MTG. (2003). MTG acquires remaining shares in TV3 Lithuania. Retrieved from 
https://www.mtg.com/press-releases/mtg-acquires-remaining-shares-in-tv3-lithuania/ 
129. Najmaei, A. (2011). Dynamic Business Model Innovation : An Analytical Archetype. 3rd 
International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering IPEDR vol.12. 
Singapore: IACSIT Press. 
130. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge university press. 
131. Nugaraite, A. (n.d.). Media Landscapes. Lithuania. Retrieved from 
http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/lithuania 
132. OECD, (2016). OECD Economic Surveys: Lithuania 2016: Economic Assessment. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. 
133. Osterwalder, A. (2004). The business model ontology—a proposition in a design science 
approach. Dissertation. Switzerland: University of Lausanne. 
134. Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., & Tucci, C.L. (2005). Clarifying business models: Origins, 
present and future of the concept. Communications of the Association for Information 
Science (CAIS), 16. 
135. Ovans, A. (2015). What Is Strategy, Again? Harvard Business Review. Harvard Business 
Publishing.  
136. Pajarinen, M., Rouvinen, P., & Ylä-Anttila, P. (1998). Small Country Strategies in Global 
Competition. Benchmarking the Finnish Case. ETLA B. 
137. Paterson, M., & Higgs, J. (2005). Using hermeneutics as a qualitative research approach in 
professional practice. The Qualitative Report, 10(2), 339-357. 
138. Picard, R. G. (2004). Environmental and market changes driving strategic planning in media 
firms. Strategic responses to media market changes, 1-17. 
139. Pohle, G., & Chapman, M. (2006). IBM’s global CEO report 2006: business model innovation 
matters. Strategy & Leadership, 34(5). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 
140. Porter, M. E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Harvard business review, 68(2), 
73-93. 
141. Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy?. Published November. 
142. Porter, M. E., Rivkin, J. W., & Kanter, R. M. (2013). Competitiveness at a Crossroads: 
Findings of Harvard Business School's 2012 Survey on US Competitiveness. Harvard 
Business School. 
143. Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio, P. J. (Eds.). (2012). The new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis. University of Chicago Press. 
144. Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (2006). The core competence of the corporation. In 
Strategische unternehmungsplanung—strategische unternehmungsführung (pp. 275-292). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
145. PwC. (2013). Game changer. A new kind of value chain for entertainment and media 
companies. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
146. Rabin, J., Miller, G. J., & Hildreth, W. B. (2000). Handbook of Strategic Management. 
Second Edition. Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
147. Račas, A., Ulevičius, L., & Paršonis, D. (2011). Mapping Digital Media: Lithuania. Country 
report. Open society foundations 
148. Rimkuviene, G. (2012). Lithuanian-made high definition TV program was launched. BNS. 
Retrieved from http://www.bns.lt/topic/941/news/40046875/print/true/ 
149. Ringel, M., Taylor, A., & Zablit, H. (2015). The most innovative companies. Boston: BCG. 
150. RRT (2013). Lietuvos ryšių sektorius 2013. Lietuvos Respublikos ryšių reguliavimo 
tarnyba. 
112 
151. RRT (2017). Skaitmeninė antžeminė televizija Lietuvoje. Lietuvos Respublikos ryšių 
reguliavimo tarnyba. Retrieved from http://www.rrt.lt/lt/vartotojui/radijas-
televizija/programos.html  
152. Sandström, C., Magnusson, M., & Jörnmark, J. (2009). Exploring factors influencing 
incumbents' response to disruptive innovation. Creativity and Innovation Management, 
18(1), 8-15. 
153. Santos, J., Spector, B., & Van Der Heyden, L. (2009). Toward a theory of business model 
innovation within incumbent firms. Working paper no. 2009/16/EFE/ST/TOM. 
Fontainebleau: INSEAD. 
154. Sanz, E. (2012). Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and 
Content Industries: European Television in the New Media Landscape. JRC Technical 
Reports. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.  
155. Sarkar, S. (2016). Uncorking knowledge-purposeful spillovers as a strategic tool for 
capability enhancement in the cork industry. International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal, 1-25.  
156. Sarkis, H. (2009). Disruptive innovations and technologies and their impact on the 
telecommunication industry: an exploratory study. In ASAC (Vol. 30, No. 25). 
157. Schindler, S.K., Upreti, A., & Goswami, P. (2011). Reengineering the Broadcasting Value 
Chain. TATA White Paper. 
158. Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, 
capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle (Vol. 55). Transaction publishers. 
159. Seymour, R. G. (2006). Hermeneutic phenomenology and international entrepreneurship 
research. Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 4(4), 137-155. 
160. Shenkar, O. (2010). Copycats: combining imitation and innovation to outsmart your 
competitor. Harvard: Harvard Business Press. 
161. Shenkar, O. (2010). Copycats: how smart companies use imitation to gain a strategic edge. 
Strategic Direction, 26(10), 3-5. 
162. Smith, W.K., Binns, A., & Tushman, M.L. (2010). Complex business models: Managing 
strategic paradoxes simultaneously. Long Range Planning, 43. 
163. Stähler, P. (2011). Can you copy a business model? Groupon and its clones. Retrieved from 
http://blog.business-model-innovation.com/2011/04/can-you-copy-business-model-groupon-
and-clone/ 
164. Stankevice, I., & Jucevicius, G. (2010). Innovation Strategy: an integrated theoretical 
framework. Social Sciences, 3(69), 24-31. 
165. Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev. 2 (2008). 
Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&
StrNom=NACE_REV2&StrLanguageCode=EN&IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=&IntCurrent
Page=1  
166. Statistics Lithuania. (2013). Retrieved from http://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/statistiniu-rodikliu-
analize;jsessionid=65A2179FE57FD59ABE3E2074AE91C688?portletFormName=visualiza
tion&hash=d93a636f-54cd-414f-a42d-20764dc59df4  
167. Steel, E., & Gelles, D. (2014). Smaller Cable Networks Plan Their Survival Under the Feet 
of Giants. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/business/media/under-
the-feet-of-giants.html?_r=2  
168. Storsul, T., & Krumsvik, A. H. (2013). What is media innovation?. Nordicom. 
169. Storsul, T., & Stuedahl, D. (2007). Introduction: Ambivalence towards convergence. 
Ambivalence towards convergence: Digitalization and media change. Göteborg, SE: 
Nordicom. 
170. Stubbart, C. I. (1989). Managerial cognition: a missing link in strategic management 
research. Journal of Management Studies, 26(4), 325-347. 
171. Suster, M. (2011). Twitter Drives 4 x as Must Traffic as You Think. Retrieved on June 2, 
2015, from http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/14/twitter-drives-4x-as-much-traffic-as-you-
think-heres-why/ 
113 
172. Tartaglione, N. (2014). The Indie TV Production Company Buying Spree: What’s Behind 
It? When Will It End? Retrieved from http://deadline.com/2014/03/the-indie-tv-production-
company-buying-spree-whats-behind-it-when-will-it-end-697680/  
173. Teece D.J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovation. Long Range Planning, 
43.  
174. Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic management journal, 28(13), 1319-1350. 
175. Teece, D., & Pisano, G. (1994). The dynamic capabilities of firms: an introduction. Industrial 
and corporate change, 3(3), 537-556. 
176. Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal 18: 509–533. 
177. Tesfaye, H.G., & Nguyen, T. H. N. (2012). Incumbent firms and Response to Disruptive 
Innovation through Value Network Management: Lessons from Eastman Kodak‟ s failure in 
the digital era. 
178. Transliuotojų ir retransliuotojų pajamos 2014 metais. (2013). LRTA.  Retrieved from 
http://www.lrta.eu/Naujienos/Aktualijos/Transliuotoju-ir-retransliuotoju-pajamos-2014-
metais  
179. Trott, P. (2008). Managing Innovation and New Product Development. 4th ed. London: 
Prentice Hall. 
180. Trott, P., Hartmann D. (2009). Why ‘Open Innovation’ is Old Wine in New Bottles. 
International Journal of Innovation Management, 13 (4). UK: Imperial College Press 
181. TV3 registracinė informacija. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.cr.lt/imones/imone-Uab-
Tv3/noriu/kontaktai/info/24567/  
182. Valdani, E., & Arbore, A. (2007). Strategies of imitation: an insight. Problems and 
Perspectives in Management, vol. 5, issue 3. 
183. Van de Vrande, V., De Jong, J. P., Vanhaverbeke, W., & De Rochemont, M. (2009). Open 
innovation in SMEs: Trends, motives and management challenges. Technovation, 29(6), 
423-437. 
184. Viellechner, O., & Wolf, T. (2010). Incumbent Inertia Upon Disruptive Change in the 
Airline Industry: Causal Factors For Routine Rigidity and Top Management Moderstors 
(No. 100). HHL Working Paper. 
185. Vlaar, P., De Vries, P., & Willenborg, M. (2005). Why Incumbents Struggle to Extract 
Value from New Strategic Options: Case of the European Airline Industry. European 
Management Journal, 23(2), 154-169. 
186. Von Hippel, E. (1988). The sources of innovation. New York. 
187. Wang, C.L., Ahmed, P.K. (2007). Dynamic Capabilities: A Review and Research Agenda. 
International Journal of Management Reviews 9(1), 31-51. 
188. Wells, A. (1996). World broadcasting: a comparative view. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
189. Wolff, M. (2014). Michael Wolff on HBO, CBS Streaming: TV Is Disrupting the Internet. 
Retrieved on June 2, 2015, from http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/michael-wolff-
hbo-cbs-streaming-742721 
190. Worlock, D. R. (2007). The view from the tower Disruptive technologies and the disruptive 
business models they create. Business information review, 24(2), 83-88.  
191. Yarow, J. (2015). The new Apple TV will blow up the TV industry. Business Insider. 
Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/the-new-apple-tv-is-going-to-blow-up-the-
tv-industry-2015-9 
192. Yovanof, G. S., & Hazapis, G. N. (2008). Disruptive technologies, services, or business 
models?. Wireless Personal Communications, 45(4), 569-583. 
193. Yu, D., & Hang, C. C. (2010). A reflective review of disruptive innovation theory. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(4), 435-452. 
194. Zhou, Z. (2002). Achieving Late-Mover Advantage: The Effects of Enhancing and 
Distinctive Strategies. Dissertation. Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 
195. Žiniasklaidos tyrimų apžvalga 2014. (2015). TNS 
114 
196. Žiniasklaidos tyrimų apžvalga 2015. (2016). TNS 
197. Zott, Ch., Amit, R., & Massa, L. (2011). The Business Model: Recent Developments and 
Future Research. Journal of Management, 37(4). Sage Publications. 
198. Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. Annual review of sociology, 
13(1), 443-464. 
199. Zuckerman, N., Arthofer, F., Mei-Pochtler, A., Hutchinson, R., & Rastogi, V. (2015). 
Branded Content: Growth for Marketers and Media Companies. BCG Perspectives. 
Retrieved from https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/media-entertainment-
marketing-branded-content-growth-for-marketers-media-companies/ 
200. Zuliani, S. (2015). Netflix in Italia e il big bang di cinema e TV. Milano: Gruppo 24 ore. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SL344. 2017-06-28, 14,75 leidyb. apsk. l. Tiražas 12 egz. Užsakymas 216. 
Išleido Kauno technologijos universitetas, K. Donelaičio g. 73, 44249 Kaunas 
Spausdino leidyklos „Technologija“ spaustuvė, Studentų g. 54, 51424 Kaunas 
 
  
115 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Interview questions (in Lithuanian) 
 
FACTORS BEHIND RESPONSE STRATEGIES OF INCUMBENT FIRMS TO 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION: CASE OF TV BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 
(liet. Veiksniai, lemiantys rinkoje įsitvirtinusių įmonių atsako strategijas į 
pertraukiamąsias inovacijas: TV transliuotojų industrijos atvejis) 
 
Tyrimu siekiama nustatyti, kokia yra veiksnių bei strategijų, lemiančių Lietuvos TV 
transliuotojų strateginius atsakus į pasaulines pertraukiamąsias (disruptive) inovacijas, 
raiška ir įtaka. Tyrimo problema: kokie veiksniai nulemia įsitvirtinusios įmonės strateginio 
atsako į pertraukiamąsias inovacijas pasirinkimą? Kokie galimi strateginiai atsakai į tokias 
inovacijas? Nuo ko tai priklauso (žmogiškųjų/organizacinių veiksnių)?  
 
Informacija renkama moksliniais tikslais, daktaro disertacijai parengti. Konfidencialumas 
respondentui yra garantuojamas. Esant poreikiui išlaikyti konfidencialumą apie interviu metu 
suteiktą bei disertacijoje naudojamą informaciją apie konkrečios įmonės strategijas, galimas 
įmonės pavadinimo neviešinimas. 
 
Pusiau struktūruoto interviu klausimai 
 
1. Kokias tendencijas galėtumėte įvardinti Lietuvos TV transliuotojų sektoriuje? 
Kokias tendencijas matote savo atstovaujamos įmonės atveju? Kokie yra esminiai 
iššūkiai TV tinklams, kaip modernių vertės kūrimo grandinių dalyviams? 
2. Kokie inovatyvūs verslo modeliai (VM) atsiranda industrijoje? Ar konkurentai 
varžosi skirtingais produktais/paslaugomis (vertės pasiūlymu), ar skirtingais verslo 
modeliais? Ar šioje industrijoje iš esmės egzistuoja vienas verslo modelis, tik turintis 
skirtingus vertės pasiūlymus (produktas/paslauga)? Koks yra technologijos, kaip 
sėkmės faktoriaus, vaidmuo konkurencinėje kovoje? Ar Lietuvos TV transliuotojai 
labiau varžosi naujomis technologijomis, ar produktais/paslaugomis? 
3. Kokios rinkos jėgos skatina sektoriuje vykstančias pertraukiamąsias inovacijas? 
a. Kaip įgalinanti technologija (pvz., skaitmeninė infrastruktūra; prieiga prie 
išmaniųjų gamybos sistemų; pigesnis, greitesnis, patikimesnis prekės ar 
paslaugos teikimas; įvairūs jutikliai, padedantys matyti nematoma (3D 
akiniai)) paveikė sektorių ir Jūsų įmonę? 
b. Kaip kinta ir ar kinta klientų ir užsakovų (TV žiūrovų, reklamos užsakovų, 
turinio kūrėjų) pozicija/poreikiai? Kaip pakitęs vartotojo požiūris (pvz., nuo 
„norinčio geriausio, įdomiausio produkto/paslaugos“ iki „priimančio bazinį 
vertės pasiūlymą“; nuo  „priimančio universalų, standartizuotą, iki 
besitikinčio personalizuoto produkto/paslaugos“; nuo „pasyvaus vartotojo iki 
aktyvaus individualisto“) paveikė sektorių ir Jūsų įmonę?  
c. Kaip įvairios platformos (platformų, tarp jų ir socialinių, agregacija, 
mažinanti atskirtį; platformų agregacija, mažinanti inventoriaus ir 
distribucijos kaštus; mokymosi ir jungimosi platformos, skatinančios 
bendradarbiavimą) paveikė sektorių ir Jūsų įmonę? 
d. Kaip pasaulio ir šalies ekonomika (pvz., ar jaučiama mažesnė perkamoji 
galia; ar pastebimas universalių produktų/paslaugų poreikis, lyginant su 
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specializuotais; ar ekonomikos sąlygos lemia tik „pakankamai gerų“ 
produktų/paslaugų paklausą) paveikė sektorių ir Jūsų įmonę? 
e. Kaip viešoji politika (pvz., kontrolės ir įstatymų leidžiamosios struktūros 
pamėgtas „pagyvensim-pamatysim“ požiūris; lokalus sprendimų priėmimas 
ir biudžetavimas; mokesčių ar teisinių normų, įstatymų ir kodeksų pokyčiai) 
paveikė sektorių ir Jūsų įmonę? 
4. Kokios yra jums žinomos atsako į pertraukiamąsias inovacijas strategijos, 
vyraujančios Lietuvos TV sektoriuje? Įmonėje? Ar yra bendros sektoriui strategijos? 
Kurios iš minimų strategijų egzistuoja Lietuvos TV transliuotojų atveju: 
(1) koncentruotis į esamą tradicinį verslą ir palaikomąsias inovacijas, kurių 
tikslas – palaikyti esančią sistemą ar technologiją ir ją tobulinti, naudojant 
naujas priemones, leidžiančias pasiekti geresnių verslo rezultatų.  
(2) ignoruoti inovaciją, kadangi ji iš pirmo žvilgsnio netaikoma Jūsų verslui – 
t.y. tai visai kiti vartotojų segmentai, naujas vertės pasiūlymas, reikalaujantis 
kitokių kompetencijų ir t.t.  
(3) atsakyti į pertraukiamąją inovaciją kita pertraukiamąja inovacija – 
nebūtinai technologine, o galbūt strategine  (koncentruotis į papildomas 
vertės pasiūlymo funkcijas, kokybę, tikslumą). 
(4) žaisti du žaidimus – ir perimti inovaciją, ir koncentruotis į tradicinį 
verslą tuo pačiu metu, vienu iš priimtiniausių tokio atsako variantų laikant 
naujo verslo vieneto kūrimą naująjai veiklai. Tokiu būdu siekiama užimti 
naujas rinkas bei įveiklinti naują technologiją, o taip pat susikurti naują VM. 
(5) perimti inovaciją ir, turint reikiamus išteklius, ištobulinti ją iki tinkamumo 
masinei rinkai.  
(6) vykdyti susijungimų ir įsigijimų strategiją, dažnai pasirenkamą dėl veiklų 
sinergijos, know-how perėmimo, resursų paskirstymo, strateginių vadovybės 
tikslų ar rinkos veiksnių. 
Jei, įvertinus interviuotojo pateiktus pavyzdžius, Jūsų nuomone, įmonei neteko 
patirti pertraukiamųjų inovacijų ir rinktis atsako strategijos, pasirinkite vieną ar 
kelias strategijas (ar strategijų derinį), labiausiai tikėtinas Jūsų sektoriaus ir įmonės 
atvejais, vertindami situaciją retrospektyvai ir iš perspektyvos. 
Gal teko susidurti su neįgyvendinta arba nesėkmingai pritaikyta strategija? Kas tai 
lėmė? Kokie faktoriai tai labiau įtakojo? 
 
5. Kokie veiksniai (žmogiškieji-vadybiniai bei struktūriniai-organizaciniai) lemia 
atsako į pertraukiamąją inovaciją strategijos pasirinkimą Jūsų įmonės (ir Lietuvos TV 
transliuotojų?) atveju? 
a. Ar, Jūsų nuomone, vadovavimas bei asmeninės-vadybinės kompetencijos yra 
svarbūs veiksniai, padedantys numatyti bei pasiruošti kylančiai grėsmei, 
tokiai, kaip pertraukiamoji inovacija, rinkoje, bei į ją atsakyti tam tikru 
strateginiu atsaku? Jei taip, kokie žmogiškieji ir vadybiniai veiksniai lemia 
Jūsų įmonės atsako į tokias inovacijas pasirinkimą: 
• Ar ir kaip vadybinis „trumparegiškumas“ lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip autonomiškai priimami, arba priešingai, neautonomiškai 
priimami sprendimai lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens patirtis ir profesionalumas lemia atsako 
strategijos pasirinkimą?   
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• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens vizija lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą?  
• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens asmeninės savybės, amžius lemia 
atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens drąsa ir užsispyrimas lemia atsako 
strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens rizikos tolerancija lemia atsako 
strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip vadovo/atsakingo asmens gebėjimas komunikuoti, įtikinti kitus 
darbuotojus lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą?  
 
b. Ar, Jūsų nuomone, struktūriniai ir organizaciniai veiksniai (pvz., įmonės 
VM, vidinė politika) yra svarbūs ir padeda numatyti bei pasiruošti kylančiai 
grėsmei, tokiai, kaip pertraukiamoji inovacija, rinkoje, bei į ją atsakyti tam 
tikru strateginiu atsaku?  Jei taip, kokie struktūriniai - organizaciniai veiksniai 
lemia įmonės atsako į tokias inovacijas pasirinkimą: 
• Ar ir kaip korporacinio valdymo modelis lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą?  
• Ar ir kaip įmonės heterogeniškumas lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip įmonės struktūra lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip įmonės strategija lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip biurokratija ir įmonės politika lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą?  
• Ar ir kaip investicijų politika (pvz., į MTEP) lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą?  
• Ar ir kaip turimi resursai lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip įmonės vertės tinklas lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip tinkamų darbuotojų (aukščiausiosios - vidurinės grandies) 
parinkimas lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
• Ar ir kaip informacijos turėjimas (pvz., big data) lemia atsako strategijos 
pasirinkimą? 
Ar, jūsų nuomone, galima išskirti vieną iš dviejų kriterijų grupių, kuri yra 
svarbesnė pasirenkant atsako strategiją? O galbūt vieną kriterijų? Ar egzistuoja ir 
kiti svarbūs, Jūsų nuomone, veiksniai, kurie nebuvo paminėti? Jei taip, kokie 
papildomi veiksniai lemia atsako strategijos pasirinkimą? 
 
 
